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Дата 28.08.2011 10:43:26 Найти в дереве
Рубрики WWII; Танки; Версия для печати

пардон, текст на английском , но думаю понятно будет

Приветствую всех!

The Soviet attack had secured a long if fairly shallow strip of East Prussian territory, from Schillfelde in the north to Goldap in the south. Here, around Goldap, the Soviet positions formed a salient that still threatened the Angerapp valley, and Hossbach decided to reduce this bulge. The operation would be under the aegis of XLI Panzer Corps, commanded by 5th Panzer Division's former commander, Decker. Skirmishes continued around Goldap itself, which was screened off by a few ad hoc German formations. The Soviet forces in the town knew that an attack was coming, and deployed anti-tank guns and artillery pieces to reinforce the defence.
The terrain around Goldap was unfavourable for an attack, and the battle plan was changed several times. Finally, 5th Panzer Division, with the Führer-Grenadier Brigade's Panzergrenadier battalion, was positioned to attack towards Goldap from the north, while 50th Infantry Division, reinforced with the Führer-Grenadier Brigade's Panzer-Fusilier battalion, attacked from the south. The constant fighting in Lithuania and south of Gumbinnen had taken a toll on 5th Panzer Division; on 1 November, it had only 12 Pz. IVs, 21 Panthers and 87 half-tracks available.
On the evening of 2 November, 5th Panzer Division moved into position northwest of Goldap. German officers and NCOs had reconnoitred the area a couple of days before, but heavy snow made it hard to recognize terrain features, and there was much confusion. By midnight, everything was ready. There was no preparatory artillery bombardment, partly in an attempt to ensure surprise, but difficulties in moving artillery into position, and securing sufficient ammunition, probably also played a part. Nevertheless, the assault began at 00l0hrs on 3 November, with the attack formations improvising their own preparatory fire:
After substantial fire magic from our guns and those around us, we set off, firing like mad in front of us, as it was not possible to make out targets in the snow. The first tanks and half-tracks drove onto mines. But we reached the first Russian trenches, which they appeared to have abandoned hastily. As we advanced, we penetrated into a trench system, where in places the Russians mounted a stiff defence. In one such trench, Oberleutnant Kröcher ... found himself encircled by the Russians, but in close-quarter fighting he was able to bring his half-track out. Oberleutnant Meissner, commanding 3 Company, ran over a mine and suffered a serious foot wound. During the night, the snow showers eased and we were able to orient ourselves and reorganize the muddled companies. The Russians mounted only isolated resistance. After reaching Lake Goldap, we pushed on south towards Goldap. As 3 November dawned, we saw Goldap some two kilometres away. To our left on the edge of the wood, we hastily deployed some tanks for defence and drove on to Goldap with the bulk of our forces. Shortly before we reached the bridge over the River Goldap, which here ran from the west to the east across the northern edge of the town, there was a powerful detonation. The Russians blew up the bridge right under our noses. Under covering fire from the tanks and half-tracks, the grenadiers set off and stormed into Goldap over the remains of the bridge. Later, we were able to cross the bridge, which was torn up on the right, with half-tracks and tanks, after Hauptmann Pilch's pioneers had secured it and later rebuilt it. Goldap quickly fell into our hands. Some of the Russians were still asleep in the beautiful houses, some of them drunk senseless.17
The northern part of the German assault was an outstanding success. Further south, the Führer-Grenadier Brigade's Panzer-Fusilier battalion attacked towards prominent high ground in front of Goldap, while Generalmajor Georg Haus' 50th Infantry Division advanced towards the southern side of the town. Immediately, the Panzer-Fusiliers came under heavy fire. The terrain was swampy and unsuitable for such an assault; the Germans had hoped that the winter weather would freeze the ground, but the going remained very heavy. Amidst mounting casualties, the battalion's officers and NCOs strove in vain to get the half-tracks moving forward again.
The soldiers of 50th Infantry Division had an easier time. Supported by an armoured train, they were able to overcome the Soviet defences, and swiftly established contact with 5th Panzer Division east of Goldap. Here, they set up defensive positions, and for two days beat off repeated attempts by the Red Army to break through to the forces trapped in Goldap itself. The division had already won praise for its resolute defence at Ossowiec in Poland, and in the snowy terrain east of Goldap it now accounted for another 42 Soviet tanks.
The isolated Soviet forces in and around Goldap were finally mopped up by the end of 5 November. By then, the picturesque town had been reduced to ruins. Gradually, the German armoured elements were withdrawn to reserve areas to allow them to recover, and were replaced by infantry. It was the last time that Decker and his former division served together. Decker was assigned to the command of an infantry corps on the Western Front, and did not survive the war; when his corps was surrounded in the Ruhr pocket, he preferred suicide to surrender.


Со всем почтением.