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	Дата	08.10.2007 21:48:56
	Рубрики	Локальные конфликты;

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В кратце указывается на:

1. Предательство и саботаж со стороны боливийской компартии (в часности её про-советского крыла)
2. Саботаж со стороны "Тани" в интересах Москвы
3. Соучастие Фиделя.

WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR
CHE GUEVARA IN BOLIVIA
Major Donald R. Selvage, USMC
1 April 1985

Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Marine Corps Development and Education Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134

The Bolivian communist party deliberately betrayed Che, first by giving false information to Havana about the political situation in Bolivia, and secondly, by failing to support him once the foco was in place. Richard Harris attributes the first act of betrayal to Mario Monje, who falsely portrayed Bolivia as an anarchic state ripe for revolution. Harris submits that Monje and his friends
were "con artists" who planned a fraudulent guerrilla operation in order to expand their party treasury at Cuba's expense. When Che established the foco in Bolivia, Monje actively sabotaged the guerrillas by withholding all support. Harris further claims that the pro-Moscow communists in La Paz were acting in accordance with in-
structions from the Soviets, who regarded Che's operations in Bolivia as a serious threat to their Latin American policy.

Tania's controversial role in the ill-fated campaign adds
credence to Harris' theory of Soviet complicity. Daniel James refuses to attribute Tania's amatuer bungling of the affair in Camiri to honest mistakes. Accidently leaving incriminating documents in a deserted jeep is not the work of a professional agent who had successfully operated covertly in Bolivia for two years. That incident, plus other deficiencies in Tania's performance, drives James to conclude that: "Tania was sabotaging Che and his guerrilla movement in the interests of Moscow."

Fidel Castro's complicity in Che's failure is not clearly
evident. Castro certainly provided the guerrilla movement with the fundamental external support necessary to initiate the foco. He was its sole financier and contributed manpower, weapons, and supplies to Che's force. Bolivian guerrillas trained in Cuba and Castro bore all expenses. Yet, many Latin American communists be-
lieve that Fidel Castro betrayed his comrades in Bolivian jungles. Betrayal implies that Castro intentionally subverted the guerrilla movement, an illogical accusation when the tremendous assets initially provided to Che by Fidel are taken into account. Abandonment best describes Castro's actions as the situation deteriorated in Bolivia. Despite Che's implication by message on May 18, 1967 that he desired public announcement of the Bolivia insurgency, Castro never acknowledged to the world that Che Guevara was fighting for the "liberation" of Bolivia. He remained strangely quiet throughout the summer, when publicizing Che's presence in Bolivia might have achieved a propaganda victory for the beleaguered guerrillas.

Castro may have sensed the inevitable defeat of Che's guer-
rillas and decided to cut his losses, allowing the aborted campaign to wither away. Another theory behind Castro's abandonment of Che involves the underlying issue of personal problems between the two men. Daniel James proposes that Castro believed that publically announcing the insurgency would greatly enhance Che's reputation
as a worldwide revolutionary. In view of the two men's recent differences, Fidel may have considered resurrecting Che as a great leader counter to his own personal interests. James concludes: "Fidel Castro and the Bolivian army combined unwittingly to end a mutual
threat."

Any hypothesis regarding Fidel Castro's reasons for abandoning Che is based on speculation. The circumstances under which Castro abandoned Guevara, however, clearly indicate that the Cuban dictator deliberately deserted his former minister. Castro, a superb politician, may have played Machiavellian politics. Guevara may have been
a problem alive, but in Bolivia, Castro can "win either way: if Che fails and is killed, the cause has a martyr; if he wins, he is out of Cuba spreading the new zeal of revolutionary warfare. Martyrdom can always be used for propaganda victories. Castro may have realized that a dead Guevara would be more valuable to Cuba and a threat
to the U.S. and its allies than he was alive.