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Дата 03.05.2013 09:11:06 Найти в дереве
Рубрики WWII; Танки; Память; Версия для печати

Американские FM 39того года

http://www.6thcorpscombatengineers.com/docs/Field%20Manuals%20to%201940/FM%206-5%20(%20Field%20Artillery%20Field%20Manual%20).pdf

http://www.6thcorpscombatengineers.com/docs/Field%20Manuals%20to%201940/FM%206-20%20(%20Field%20Artillery%20Field%20Manual%20Tactics%20and%20Techniques%20).pdf

http://www.6thcorpscombatengineers.com/docs/Field%20Manuals%20to%201940/FM%206-40%20(%20Field%20Artillery%20Manual%20Firing%20).pdf

Интересно сличить с нашими довоенными уставами. Но уставы это одно, а практика это другое.

Амеры советскую артиллерию оценивали очень не высоко.
http://etloh.8m.com/strategy/artil.html

Soviet Artillery Practices

I am not sure my information may be as reliable regarding Soviet practices as it is with the American or German. Also, I would not be surprised, as in so much else, that much of the Soviet practice significantly changed during the course of the war.

Having said that, let me venture the following as my understanding. Apparently the Soviets had very limited ability to call in impromptu fires. As the guy giving the Origins lecture said (more or less), "If Ivan knew how to do those calculations (that any German high school graduate was capable of), then they did not waste him firing artillery, but put him to work designing aircraft." Possibly apocryphal, but somehow telling.

Therefore I'd postulate that in prepared, and certainly observed fires, the Soviet artillery should be able to be reasonably effective (i.e., accurate and timely). However, once the situation turns fluid, and the front starts to displace, Soviet artillery fire probably becomes almost useless except where the artillery itself can see the target and correct its own fires. In essence, this mirrors the World War I experience of well-planned initial fires, and slackening effect as troops move forward (especially in fluid situations). Regardless, the general take is that by late '43 Ivan is rolling in barrels of batteries, and is indeed evilly equiped in '44 and '45.

Again, the above is just my best guess, and the Soviets may have been able to adopt some other system as the war progressed, especially for mobile operations.
http://etloh.8m.com/strategy/artil.html