Re: Т-щи флотофилы,...
>Почему Адмиралтейство так его сцалось?
Возможно, не его:
Of great significance in understanding the fate of PQ 17 is the lack of enthusiasm for the Arctic convoys in the Royal Navy. Norway, Dunkirk, and Crete had taught the navy what the Luftwaffe could do. The Bismarck chase had demonstrated the devastating punch and tremendous defensive strength of her class of battleship. Tirpitz would likely prove just as powerful and just as tough. Given the German advantages in proximity to the contested area, reconnaissance, air power, and possession of the initiative, by the spring of 1942, Tovey was, as we have seen, urging that the convoys be suspended. Pound agreed, warning the Cabinet Defence Committee that conditions were such that, given Luftwaffe numbers and eternal daylight, losses to the convoys might well reach an unsustainable level. In frustration, Pound wrote to the US Navy supremo, Admiral Ernest J. King: ‘These Arctic convoys are becoming a regular millstone round our necks and cause a steady attrition in both cruisers and destroyers.’ But political pressure from Churchill and Roosevelt to keep the convoys running in support of the Red Army overrode the doubts of the professionals. Deep down, it is likely that Pound and Tovey believed that the summer convoys were doomed to heavy losses, and that committing significant British naval forces to German air, submarine, and surface attack in their defence would be, as it were, throwing good money after bad – money that the British could not afford to lose. Reluctantly, they carried out the orders of their political master.
>Напротив казалось бы "воююя по Мэхену" коновой можно использовать как приманку.
Tovey discussed using the convoy as a lure, having it retire westward for a time during the approach to Bear Island, to entice the Germans within range of Victorious’s Albacores, but the plan was rejected
James P. Levy The Royal Navy’s Home Fleet in World War II
