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Рубрики Флот; Версия для печати

Про последствия выхода 1ТОЭ 10/23 июня

Там внизу всплыло:

http://www.vif2ne.org/nvk/forum/0/co/2792344.htm

Текст стоп-приказа, отданного японским армиям 24 июня, первым у нас ввёл в оборот Егорьев.

фактически доказано, что русский флот способен выходить из Порт-Артура. Морские перевозки снабжения, необходимого для соединенных Манчжурских армий после их продвижения к Ляояну, таким образом, делаются необеспеченными, и наступление 2-й армии дальше, чем до Кайпинга, в настоящее время неуместно. Сражение под Ляояном, которое предполагалось дать до начала дождливого сезона, откладывается до его окончания. Организуйте Ваши действия соответственно

http://cruiserx.net/ovc/138-149.htm#1.1

Егорьев ссылается на английский официоз, его можно взять на archive.org https://archive.org/details/officialhistoryn01grea

Там соответствующий текст выглядит так.

The fact has been proved 1 that the Russian fleet is able to come out of Port Arthur. The transport by sea of the supplies, which will be required by the combined Manchurian armies after their arrival at Liau-yang, is therefore rendered uncertain, nor is it advisable for the Second Army to advance further north than Kaiping for the present. The battle of Liau-yang which we expected to fight before the rains will now be postponed till after them. Arrange your operations accordingly.


Комментарии Корбетта заслуживают того, чтобы их процитировать "в объёмах"

Barren as was Admiral Vitgeft's effort of any positive result, it meant a profound change in the whole aspect of the war. Though superficially it seemed an ignominous failure for the Russians, it marked, in fact, a serious setback for the Japanese, and with no illusions they frankly recognised a strategical reverse. Their war plan, as it -then stood, turned on an immediate concentric advance upon Liau-yang and a blow at the Russian concentration zone in the week or ten days they had in hand before the rains set in. As we have seen, the orders for the preliminary forward movements had already been given ; they were on the point of being executed on all three lines of advance, when on June 24th, the day after the sortie, the whole movement was stopped. It was not merely that the sortie, by preventing the formation of the supply base at Gobo, had made it impossible for General Oku to advance ; the whole military plan had been based on the assumption that the fleet had obtained such a preponderance in the Yellow Sea that there was no serious danger of the army communications being interrupted. The events of June 23rd had demonstrated that no such preponderance existed. Not only was it clear for the first time that the blocking operations had entirely failed to seal the port but, to the surprise of the Japanese, the Russian Squadron had succeeded in finishing its repairs and to all appearance had completely recovered from the effects of the first blow. The situation therefore was changed to its foundations, and if the restored squadron were handled with anything like the dash of the Vladivostok cruisers, the supply of the four Japanese armies was highly precarious. At any rate the risk was more than the Imperial Staff could face.
[цитируется стоп-приказ]
A similar order was sent to General Kuroki directing him to make his dispositions in accordance with the new plan " ; while as for General Oku his position was even worse than was realised at Tokyo. Until Dalny was clear of mines and locomotives could be brought from Japan to work the railway his progress even up to Kaiping depended, as we have seen, on an advanced supply base being established by the fleet in the Gulf of Liau-tung and nourished from the sea ; and since the sortie of the Russians it was obvious that Admiral Togo could not undertake any operations on the far side of Port Arthur. The dispersal they would entail was not to be thought of. Consequently General Oku had to inform General Kawamura that he could not advance in time with him. Though he was but 13 miles north of Telissu his land transport was insufficient for the daily needs of his army ; an accumulation of stores on his line of advance was out of the question ; and consequently he would not be able to move on Kaiping for some time. Possibly the Japanese Staff was unduly nervous about the oversea communications, but it must be remembered the state of public feeling was such that the Government could not face the prospect of a repetition of such regrettable incidents as had recently occurred in the Straits of Tsushima. Even had they been willing to take the risk still it would have been useless and even vicious for the First and Fourth Armies to advance till the Second was able to move, and for the present without naval assistance General Oku could not stir.

Аннотация комментария Корбетта: Выход 1ТОЭ в море 10/23 июня, при поверхностном взгляде представляющийся полным провалом, на деле поколебал основы японского плана. Их планам дать сражение под Ляояном до начала сезона дождей (до которого оставалось не более 10 дней) не суждено было сбыться. Выход русской эскадры в море доказал, что третья операция по закупорке входа в Порт-Артур оказалась недучаной (чего японцы точно не знали), а русские смогли восстановить боеспособность всех своих броненосцев. Планировавшиеся перевозки вокруг Ляодуна теперь представлялись слишком рискованными - особенно на фоне результата от набега на Цусиму владивостокских крейсеров. Всё рухнуло.