поскольку проживание в стране позволяет значительно точнее чувствовать обстановку, нежеде об этом же можно судить даже по разнузданнейшим PR кампаниям, - соответственно вопрос : -
Каковы реальные шансы МАТЕРИАЛИЗОВАТЬСЯ новой истерии NSA (поиски электронных ведьм) для обретения права тотальной электронной слежки не ТОЛЬКО ВОВНЕ, но и ВНУТРИ (В США, то есть)
STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD BY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, USAF
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/
CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
BEFORE THE
JOINT INQUIRY OF THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
AND THE
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
17 OCTOBER 2002
18.The volume, variety and velocity of human communications make
our mission more difficult each day. A SIGINT agency has to look
like its target. We have to master whatever technology the target is
using. If we don’t, we literally don’t hear him; or if we do, we
cannot turn the “beeps and squeaks” into something intelligible.
We had competed successfully against a resource-poor, oligarchic,
technologically inferior, and overly bureaucratic nation state. Now
we had to keep pace with a global telecommunications revolution,
probably the most dramatic revolution in human communications
since Gutenberg’s invention of movable type.
22. By the end of the 1990s—with a budget that was fixed or falling and
demands from our customers that were unrelenting—we attempted
to churn about $200 million per year in our program. This meant
taking money away from current, still active, still producing activities
and investing those dollars in future capabilities. $200 million per
year was far short of what we needed and, in fact, I could make
only about one-third of that number stick as our program went
through the Executive Branch and the Congress.
26.It was heartening, for example, to hear Congress echo the phrase
of our SIGINT Director, Maureen Baginski, in the belief that we need
to be “hunters rather than gatherers.”
30.In that light, Congress has criticized us for a “failure to recruit,”
especially to recruit linguists and analysts. Let me try to present the
facts on that. NSA recruiting for the decade of the 1990s was
indeed minimal. The Agency accomplished the downsizing that
was imposed on it in the easiest and most humane way possible—it
shut the front door. But as these committees know, we turned the
“recruiting corner” in 2000, and 2001 was actually a record year for
Agency recruiting, the best in over a decade. On one day alone in
February of 2001 we interviewed some 1,700 applicants.
Conclusion
32.I want to end by focusing on some comments made in recent
hearings about NSA’s “unwillingness” to share information. I need to
be clear on this point. We are a SIGINT agency. Our mission in life is
to provide information to all source analysts, military commanders,
policy makers and others in the U.S. government. Our only measure
of merit is the quality and quantity of information that we push out
the door every day. As we speak, NSA has over 700 people—not
producing SIGINT—but sitting in our customers’ spaces explaining
and sharing SIGINT.
38.When I spoke with our workforce shortly after the September 11 th
attacks, I told them that free people always had to decide where
to draw the line between their liberty and their security, and I noted
that the attacks would almost certainly push us as a nation more
toward security. I then gave the NSA workforce a challenge: We
were going to keep America free by making Americans feel safe
again.
40.In the context of NSA's mission, where do we draw the line between
the government's need for CT information about people in the
United States and the privacy interests of people located in the
United States? Practically speaking, this line-drawing affects the
focus of NSA's activities (foreign versus domestic), the standard
under which surveillances are conducted (probable cause versus
reasonable suspicion, for example), the type of data NSA is
permitted to collect and how, and the rules under which NSA
retains and disseminates information about U.S. persons.
