От	B~M
К	vladvitkam
Дата	28.01.2008 04:19:16
Рубрики	WWI;

Как насчёт восстаний в Средней Азии в 1916?

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Турецкая агентура прямо участвовала.

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От	Офф-Топик
К	B~M (28.01.2008 04:19:16)
Дата	28.01.2008 04:40:13

(Я растяпа. Я забыл поставить заголовок)

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Идеи панисламизма приходят с Запада
В конце XIX века Германия и Турция провоцировали войну с неверными в Средней Азии

Проблемы, связанные с распространением в Средней Азии радикального ислама, не новы. Впервые они возникли еще в конце XIX века. Укрепление позиций России на территории Туркестана в 1865-1917 гг. привело к тому, что привычный уклад жизни мусульман стал разрушаться. Недовольство местного населения насаждавшимися российскими порядками усиливалось: одно за другим вспыхивали народные восстания.

Такая ситуация была крайне выгодна политическим противникам России, желавшим обосноваться в Туркестане. Германия, например, видела в этом регионе не только источник сырья и новый рынок сбыта, но и плацдарм для экспансии на Средний Восток. За несколько лет до начала Первой мировой войны в Туркестан стали проникать немецкие коммерсанты, дипломаты и военные. Была создана мощная агентурно-разведывательная сеть.

На тот момент в Германии действовал закон о двойном гражданстве, позволявший одновременно иметь русское и немецкое подданство. Это давало немцам возможность проникать во все административные, военные и хозяйственные учреждения края, внедряться в сферы торговли, транспорта и промышленности. Нередко через подставных лиц они становились владельцами русских фирм.

Стремясь усложнить внутриполитическую обстановку в России, немецкие агенты провоцировали межнациональные конфликты. Есть основания полагать, что резня между персами и бухарцами в 1910 году в Бухаре вспыхнула не без их участия.

Своего пика подрывная деятельность Германии в Туркестане достигла к началу войны. Агенты развернули в крае массовую агитацию, призывая среднеазиатские народы всеми способами помогать Германии и ее союзникам. В ход пошли лозунги панисламизма. Сначала в Берлине, а затем и в Туркестане стали появляться брошюры, адресованные мусульманам. В них говорилось, что российское правительство притесняет приверженцев ислама, а потому долг каждого мусульманина – оказать посильное сопротивление российским оккупантам.

Населению всячески пытались внушить, что единственным его защитником является Германия и что со временем останутся только две сверхдержавы: исламская и германская. В ноябре 1914 г. во все мусульманские дома в Бухаре и Самарканде были подброшены письма. В них говорилось: "Правительство Германии поддерживает мусульман и собственно ради их защиты воюет с Россией и Англией, ибо эти государства стремятся к разрушению Турции и Персии, а между тем разорение мусульманских государств вредно отразилось бы на торговле Германии. Таким образом, интересы мусульманских государств и Германии совпадают… Защищая ваши интересы, мы в то же время стоим на страже своих".

В 1915 г. начались призывы к "священной войне". "Тот, кто убьет русского, будет газы (угодник божий), а кто будет убит русскими, тот станет шахидом (мучеником)", – гласили германские листовки того времени.

Еще одним видом подрывной деятельности стала организация панисламистских конференций. На одной из них, состоявшейся в 1916 г. в Вене, решено было направить в Туркестан персидских эмиссаров, поскольку Персия была нейтральной страной и ее гражданам въезд в Россию не был запрещен. Персы включились в работу почти сразу. Они стали вести агитацию среди малообразованных верующих, которые верили даже в то, что все немцы во главе с императором Вильгельмом II приняли ислам.

Германия была далеко не единственной страной, мечтавшей подчинить Среднюю Азию своему влиянию. Помимо Ирана и Афганистана значительных успехов на этом поприще достигла Турция. Турецкие эмиссары стали активно поддерживать джадидизм, пришедший в Туркестан из Казани. В 1917-1922 гг. начали возникать тайные общества, вдохновляемые джадидами. Именно в это время выступления против царизма перешли в открытую борьбу против советской власти. Наиболее известными "подпольщиками", распространявшими идеи национал-шовинизма, пантюркизма и панисламизма, были Джемаль Паша, Энвер Паша, Талгат Паша, Осман Бей, Мухамед Эмиин Заде, Хайдар Шауки, Юсуф Зия Бек, Мухамед Эмин Эфенди Заде, Сулейман Сами Бек и др.

Панисламистскими идеями вдохновлялись и формирования басмачей. Выступая под лозунгом священной войны против неверных, они боролись за отделение Туркестана от СССР и возврат феодальных отношений. Басмачи избегали открытых столкновений с регулярными частями Красной Армии и предпочитали совершать набеги на населенные пункты и мелкие гарнизоны.

Некоторые тайные общества пытались придать басмаческому движению организованный характер. Наиболее многочисленными из них были "Милли Иттихад", "Общество ханзаде и баев" и "Урта Осие халас ислам джамияти".

"Общество ханзаде и баев" организовали Сеид Ахрари и Гази Галими. Они рассчитывали с помощью Турции восстановить Кокандское ханство и привести к власти Мухамеда Эмин Бека, сына последнего кокандского хана. И хотя их надежды не сбылись, само распространение такой идеи сыграло немалую роль в развитии "ферганского басмачества".

Устав общества "Милли Иттихад" предусматривал избавление от власти России, вхождение Туркестана в состав Турции и создание "великого тюркского государства" ("Улуг тюркчилик"). Это общество старалось внедрить своих членов в образовательные структуры, госаппарат и органы Коммунистической партии. Так, в одно время из 12 комиссариатов республики 7 возглавлялись членами "Милли Иттихад". Позже оно было реорганизовано в "Милли Истиклял", установившее тесный контакт с афганской миссией в Ташкенте.

"Урта Осие халас ислам джамияти" было создано Зеки Велиди по договоренности с Энвером Пашой, чтобы объединить все тайные общества вокруг единого центра. Организаторам удалось связаться с Афганистаном и договориться о поставках оружия. В своих докладах Велиди неоднократно призывал афганские власти начать военные действия против Советов.

ОГПУ довольно быстро осознало, что основной двигатель басмаческого движения – идеи панисламизма, и построило борьбу с басмачами на сочетании карательных мер с агитационной работой. Чекисты стремились усилить секуляризацию, ослабить влияние мусульманского духовенства на народ и отделить религиозных деятелей от басмачества.

Один из директивных документов ОГПУ предписывал "агентурным путем предупредить влиятельных лиц духовенства: за веру не трогаем, но если будете агитировать против советской власти, помогать басмачам – будем бить и бить твердо и решительно…". Чекисты вербовали наиболее авторитетных и влиятельных мулл, которые затем посылали коллективные письма к басмачам с призывом отказаться от борьбы против советской власти. Часто эти письма оформлялись как "ривояты" (традиционные обращения к пастве).

Лояльные к советской власти представители мусульманского духовенства включались в специальные комитеты по борьбе с басмачами, куда входили избранные представители населения.

Объединить разрозненные силы и реализовать свои идеи туркам так и не удалось. В 1920-1922 гг. турецкое влияние в Туркестане стало ослабевать, и к 1930 году практически все нелегальные общества прекратили свою деятельность. Многие их активисты впоследствии были репрессированы. Однако основным инициаторам подпольного движения, кроме Энвера Паши и Джемаль Паши, удалось ускользнуть. Многие из них вернулись в Турцию и Афганистан, а некоторые обосновались в Европе, продолжая пропаганду идеи панисламизма.

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От	Офф-Топик
К	Офф-Топик (28.01.2008 04:40:13)
Дата	28.01.2008 04:46:29

А вот скан книги на английском про басмаческое движение 1916

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BASMACHI MOVEMENT FROM WITHIN:

ACCOUNT OF ZEKI VELIDI TOGAN

H. B. Paksoy



Published in NATIONALITIES PAPERS

Vol. 23, No 2. June 1995. Pp. 373-399.





J. V. Stalin, in his denunciation of Sultan Galiev,

formerly Stalin's own assistant in Narkomnats, stated:

....I accused him (Sultan Galiev) of creating an

organization of the Validov type... despite

that, a week later, he sent... a secret

letter... to establish contact with the Basmachi

and with their leader Validov...1



Ahmet Zeki (Validov) Velidi Togan (1890-1970), a

Bashkurt Turk,2 published his own comprehensive account of

the Basmachi movement3 on two separate occasions.

According to Togan, these were based on the field diaries

he kept during his involvement in the movement. The said

diary was smuggled out of Turkistan in segments, via

various persons and routes, before and after Togan's own

departure from Turkistan in 1923.4 Both accounts

complement each other and contain ample material to aid

the reader in reconstructing the events surrounding

Stalin's references and putting all in historical

perspective.5

In completing the final versions of these works for

publication, Togan indicates, in addition to his own field

notes, he had also utilized secondary sources to refresh

his memory. These included the materials deposited with

the Hoover Institution Library, which he consulted during

1958, as well as the newspaper collections pertaining to

the time period which he chronicles. Togan recalled:

Kerensky (1881-1970) and I sat down at the

microfilm machine and together read the

newspapers dating back to the times when we knew

each other.



Togan also cites various histories written in the

Soviet union after his departure, containing references to

his own activities. The first section of this study

contains Togan's brief biography, educational and personal

background. The second, the events leading to his

Basmachi period, due to space limitations, in a highly

compressed form.6 The last section is largely translated

directly from his pen, both from Turkili and Hatiralar.

At the outset, two points must be made. The first

one pertains to the term Basmachi, as described by Togan:

Basmachi is derived from "baskinji," meaning

attacker, and was first applied to bands of

brigands. During the tsarist times, these

brigands existed when (Turkistan) independence

was lost and Russian occupation began in

Turkmenistan, Bashkurdistan and Crimea.

Bashkurts (in Russian language sources: Bashkir)

called the ayyar, by the Khorasan term. In

Crimea (and, borrowed from there, in Ukraine)

haydamak was used. Among Bashkurts such heroes

as Buranbay; in Crimea, Halim; in Samarkand,

Namaz became famous. These did not bother the

local indigenous population but sacked the

Russians and the Russian flour-mills,

distributing their booty to the population. In

Ferghana, these elements were also active during

the tsarist times.... After the proliferation of

cotton planting in Ferghana [with the forced the

tsarist policy of replacing grain production]

the economic conditions deteriorated. This

increased the brigandage. Among earlier

Basmachi, as was the case among the Western

Turks, the spiritual leader of the Ozbek and

Turkmen bands was Koroglu.7 Basmachi of

Bukhara, Samarkand, Jizzakh and Turkmen gathered

at nights to read Koroglu and other dastans.

What has the external appearance of brigandage

is actually a reflection and representation of

the thoughts and spirit of a wide segment of the

populace. Akchuraoglu Yusuf Bey8 reminds us

that during the independence movements of the

Serbians, the Hoduk; the Kleft and Palikarya of

the Greeks comprised half nationalist

revolutionaries and half brigands... The

majority and the most influential of the

Basmachi groups founded after 1918 did not

follow the Koroglu tradition; they were composed

of serious village leadership and sometimes the

educated. Despite that, all were labelled

Basmachi. Consequently, in Turkistan, these

groups were regarded as 'partisans;' more

especially representing the guerilla groups

fighting against the colonial power. Nowadays,

in Ozbek and Kazakh press, one reads about

Chinese, Algerian and Indian Basmachi.9



Second is the language issue. Togan was fluent in

quite a number of dialects used in Turkistan; historical

and modern. At times he writes in an amalgam of those,

not only while he is quoting from manuscripts, but also

when he mentally travels to a particular location,

recalling an incident. Togan gives the impression that

the memory was etched in his mind in that particular

dialect. He was sufficiently concerned about his

propensities in that regard, and the readability of his

writing dialect to ask a scholar-poet friend to review the

manuscript of at least one of his books.

Togan was very sensitive to the matter and details

his own views of the "language and dialects" issue (i.e.

Bolshevik claims that the dialects of Central Asia are

"languages"), as well as the Bolshevik political stance.

He even confronted the Bolshevik leadership on the matter,

with a letter, which is translated below. Togan supplies

additional observations on the politics of language in a

special section of his Turkili. It must be noted that

Togan's references to Turk is in accordance with the

normal usage in all dialects of Turke; Turki, Turkistani.

The terms "Turkic" and "Turkish" are only introduced into

non-Turk languages in much more recent times10 and do not

reflect the actual, native usage.

Togan's own writing style also has to be considered

separately. It is not always an easy task to unpack his

highly elaborate, detailed, information-laden and lengthy

sentences. At times it has been necessary to break his

paragraph-long statements into a number of smaller ones.

Furthermore, he sometimes provides the consequences of an

event he is narrating before fully recounting the event

itself. Thus he may interrupt his narrative to report an

eventual outcome in a single sentence or page and then

continue with the remaining sequence of the event.11

That might be one reason holding back potential

translators and publishers of Togan's works. Indeed,

several attempts have been made to translate his Turkili

into English and German over the past decades. Almost all

of those remain in manuscript form, some complete. Togan

reports that one draft English translation of Turkili was

distilled by Olaf Caroe and incorporated into one of his

books.12





I. TOGAN's UPBRINGING, EDUCATION, EARLY YEARS



Togan was born 10 December 1890, in Bashkurt-Eli, the

Kuzen aul near Isterlitamak.13 His family, like their

ancestors, was involved most aspects of agriculture, most

prominently apiculture and animal husbandry. Togan

observes that in areas surrounding his ancestral lands,

there were localities named "Uris Olgen" (Russian died)

and "Uris Kirilgan" (Russian was "broken") indicating

previous battles, since the 17th century, when the

Russians first invaded the Bashkurt lands.

Togan received his elementary education from his

parents, both of whom were literate in several languages

in addition to the Bashkurt dialect and well-read in

related literatures. Togan also studied in the village

medrese14 of his own father and of his maternal uncle at

Utek, a few miles away from his home. Consequently, by

age 18, Togan had a command of his native Bashkurt,

Chaghatay, Persian, Arabic and Russian. He accompanied

his father on travels, on yearly extended social calls, to

Troitsk and neighboring cities, and became familiar with a

wide geographic region. This was to prove beneficial

after 1916, when he became the Chairman of the Bashkurt

Autonomous Region.

During the summer of 1908, he unceremoniously left

his home to further his education and to gain a wider

world perspective. At Kazan, he met several prominent

Orientalists including N. Katanov (1862-1922) and N.

Ashmarin,15 and attended lectures at the Kazan university

and the Kasimiye Medrese. He notes that in Kazan,

Merjani's (1818-1889) circle was very much alive.16 By

1911, Togan published in Kazan his Turk ve Tatar Tarihi

(Turk and Tatar History), meant to be a textbook for the

course he began teaching at Kas miye.

During the summer months of ensuing years Togan

returned to Utek, on the way stopping at various cities,

such as Orenburg, Astrakhan, Kemelik to visit historical

sights and meet with individuals with whom he was

corresponding. He began learning German and French, and

Latin. His aim was to sit for the necessary examinations

to qualify as a teacher in higher institutions of learning

within the Russian empire. He was reading voraciously,

both Eastern and Western authors, especially works on the

history of the Turks.

His Turk ve Tatar Tarihi was well received, and he

was therefore elected a member of the Kazan university

Historical and Archeological Society. He also received

invitations from a number of medreses to teach, with

offers of "satisfactory stipends." In 1913, the Kazan

university Historical and Archeological Society officially

charged him with the task of collecting primary documents

pertaining to the indigenous history, language and

literature from the Ferghana region. Once in Tashkent, he

was invited to join the Turkistan Military Governor's

administration. He declined.

The following year, the Imperial Academy of Sciences

(St. Petersburg) and the International Central Asian

Historical Society, with the recommendation of Katanov and

Bartold (1869-1930), jointly sponsored Togan to conduct a

similar study and collection tour in the Bukhara Khanate.

Upon his return to St. Petersburg with Bartold's urging he

began publishing the results of these missions in related

journals.

Bartold also introduced Togan to General Pisarev, the

director of School of Oriental Languages. The Tsarina was

the patron of this institution and Bartold was attempting

to secure a position for Togan as an instructor. Again on

the advice of Bartold, Togan went to Kazan, sat for the

examinations to qualify as a Russian language teacher at

the "non-Russian Seminaries." Although he passed the

test, the schedule of which was expedited by Ashmarin,

Togan dryly notes that "since I did not have an

appointment, the diploma was useless." He continues:

Bartold did not approve of the war efforts of

the Tsardom. He told me: 'to be cannon fodder

is unsuitable for you.' But the efforts of

Bartold, who had lost a number of his students

at the front during the first months of the war,

and of Samaylovich,17 bore no fruit. I was

inducted into the Army. Fifteen days after I

settled into the barracks as a soldier, a law

was passed to exempt the teachers of the non-

Russian schools. I returned to Ufa.



At the end of 1914, Togan started teaching at Ufa.

During 1915, he was elected a deputy from that city to the

St. Petersburg Duma. Togan continued his scholarly

endeavors in St. Petersburg and helped Bartold with the

preparation and publication of Ulugh Bey.18 He became a

member of Radloff's (1837-1918)19 Circle, worked on the

corrections of Bartold's Timur's Indian Expedition and

worked with Samaylovich at the Imperial Geographic

Society. Asiatic Museum there. He continued publishing and

began meeting political figures, especially those belonging to

Socialist Revolutionaries (SR's). Kerensky was one such

individual. He had grown up in Tashkent as the son of

an "Education Inspector." With the aid of Kerensky, Togan and

Mustafa Chokay visited the front to observe the conditions of

the laborers conscripted from Turkistan.20

During this period, Togan also met Maxim Gorkii

(1868-1936) and the writers working at the Russkii

Letopisets:

Gorkii had decided to publish the Sbornik of the

'nations imprisoned by the Russians.' to stress

their cultures. Histories of Ukrainian,

Finnish, Armenian and Georgian literatures were

being written. Gorkii asked me to write the

Sbornik of the Russian Moslems. During the

winter of 1916, I devoted much time to this

project. I read all pertinent publications

printed in Russia, such as those written by

Gasp ral (1854-1914)21, Azerbaijan's Hasan Bey

Melikov (Zerdabi; 1842-1907), Fettah Akhundov

(Mirza Fath Ali Akhunzade; 1812-1878)22; also

those Russian works printed in Turkistan. Old

Professor V. D. Smirnov, who was the Director of

the Oriental Section of the St. Petersburg

General Library, rendered spacious help. I

evaluated those works written by Russian Moslems

but have not been published. Smirnov was very

interested in the topic, from the Russian point

of view. I finished the draft of this large

volume during winter of 1916, in Russian, and

gave it to Gorkii. He gave it to Ukrainian

Gurevich, to read. Then the Revolution took

place. The volume was left in the hands of

Gurevich, who was killed after he became

Minister of Education in Ukraine.



Togan returned to full-time academic life during

1925. Invited to the Turkish Republic by the Ministry of

Education, he was given citizenship in six weeks and began

teaching at Istanbul university the same year. After a

disagreement on historiography in the First Turkish

History Conference, he resigned and went to University of

Vienna (1932), where he earned his doctorate (1935).

Togan taught at Bonn and Goettingen Universities (1935-

1939) before returning to his earlier post at Istanbul

University (1939).

Togan was jailed for 17 months 10 days (1944) by the

Turkish government "for acts against the Soviets,"

released and later returned (1948) to his post; organized

and convened the XXI International Congress of

Orientalists (1951); appointed Director of the Islamic

Institute at Istanbul University (1953); became a visiting

professor at Columbia University (1958); was awarded an

honorary doctorate from Manchester University (1967);

remaining an historian until his death (1970) in Istanbul.

His life-time publications, in various languages, approach

400 in number.23





II. PREPARATORY YEARS



The February Revolution of 1917 found Togan living

across from the Preobrazhenskaia Military Barracks. He

immediately plunged into the organization of the

forthcoming political meetings, "called to discuss the

legal and social status of the Turk population of Russia

under new developments." These endeavors took him to

Tashkent, where he had to oppose the largely Russian

Tashkent Soviet. He joined the Tashkent SR party, but

resigned in disgust, within a month, upon discovering the

complicity of that party in inequitable food distribution.

Further, Togan notes, the majority of the educated

Russians in Tashkent were members of the Kadets, headed by

the mayor of the city, Malletskii. The Kadets planned to

establish two categories of municipal districts (one for

the local people, the other for the Russians), with the

Russian side ultimately wielding all power. Togan,

"having read the related publications for the past few

years" vehemently and publicly objected, exposing the

hidden purposes behind it in a series of meetings:

I knew that the structure proposed was

translated into Russian and published, from the

(British) Indian Government laws. The aim was

to have the minority rule over the majority

Turkistanis. I brought the books to the

meeting.



At that point, the SR's were supporting Togan.

Turkestanskaia Vedemost (published in Tashkent) carried

related speeches and meeting notes.

Togan prepared for the Moscow congress of "Moslems of

Russia, everywhere demanding that the Turk populations

should have territorial autonomy, thus forming a

federative system within the new regime." He was in favor

of "including all Turk regions of the Russian Empire into

this autonomous Turkistan." He faced opposition, not only

from the Bolsheviks, but also from some "unitarists" among

his own people who rejected Togan's federation idea and

instead favored a single Russian state. Also, the

kadimist ulama (the orthodox clergy), in some regions a

part of the salaried Russian bureaucracy,24 objected to

the territorial autonomy or the formation of a Turkistan

as a part of the federated Russian state.

Since both the Moscow and the Tashkent Soviets were

opposing anything but "Russianism," especially the demands

of the majority population of Turkistan, Togan continued

his efforts among Bashkurts. He met with success, as

Bashkurt autonomy was declared, after several Kurultays

(congresses), under the Presidency of Yunus Bekov. Togan

was appointed Minister of Interior and Defense.

Concomitantly, Bashkurt Government affairs began to be

formalized, the Bashkurt Army was reestablished.25

On 18 January 1918 (new style) Bolsheviks occupied

Orenburg, where the autonomous Bashkurt Government was

headquartered. For the first few days, the Bolsheviks

were solicitous towards the Bashkurt Government, but on 3

February arrested and jailed its prominent members,

including Togan. It appears that Togan's rivals,

including the unitarists, may have contributed to this

event. In the ensuing uncertainty among Bolsheviks, he

could easily have been executed, save for the uprising

staged by his followers to free him. During the night of

3-4 April he was freed. Quickly organizing his friends,

Togan began a guerilla movement for the purpose of

protecting Bashkurt population and property.

On 27 May 1918 the Czech Legions revolted against the

Bolsheviks, joining with the Whites. Togan and his

Bashkurt organization established contact with the Czechs.

The Bashkurt government was reestablished in Cheliabinsk

on 7 June and Bashkurt regiments were mobilized.26

Furthering cooperation with Western Siberia and the

Kazakh Alash Orda27 Governments, Togan and his Bashkurt

army units began engaging Red forces and succeeded in

driving them out of Orenburg and traditional Bashkurt

lands. An intelligence department, in collaboration with

the Samara government, Ural Cossacks and the Kazakhs, was

also established with representatives and contacts in

various cities around Turkistan. One member of this

organization and one time secretary to Togan was OOzbek

Abdlhamid Suleyman, whose pen name is Cholpan, 28 often

touted in Soviet historiography as a loyal Bolshevik.

Red units began exploiting the differences between

Kadets and the Whites. At that time, a French unit, under

the command of General Janin joined the fighting against

the Reds. Reportedly, Gen. Janin simultaneously addressed

the Russians with "You are all Russians; one side Red, the

other White. Why are you fighting? Would it not be

better for you to make-up and be reconciled?"

On 21 November Kolchak declared himself Supreme Ruler

and began preparations to disband Bashkurt-Kazakh armies.

Samara, a principal supply point of munitions to the

Bashkurt army, having capitulated to Kolchak, logically

ended the chances of Togan's forces to resist the Reds.

After intercepting and reading the communications between

Generals Janin, Dutov and Admiral Kolchak, the conditions

became more clear. Having been left facing four different

hostile forces from Samara and Aktbe Reds, Dutov and

Kolchak, without supplies, it became obvious to Togan and

his friends that they had to come to terms with Moscow in

order to save their native population from further losses.

Upon announcement of the Western Allies' cease fire

with Central Powers, Bashkurts and Kazakhs sent

representatives to Bolsheviks to negotiate terms. Togan

asked the aid of his old friends, Chaliapin (Feodor

Ivanovitch, 1873-1938) and Gorkii, to establish contacts

for the purpose with the Bolsheviks leadership, on the way

to collaboration.

"Affiliation" with the Bolsheviks, especially after

vigorously fighting them, demanded special care, secrecy

and discipline. During the ensuing negotiations with the

Bolsheviks, Mirsaid Sultangaliev29 was dispatched from

Moscow to Ufa, in order to expedite the matters.

Sultangaliev secured conditions favorable to the Bashkurt-

Kazakh forces and their leadership. Finally on 18

February 1919, Togan officially entered into cooperation

with Lenin and Stalin. This forced friendship was to last

15 months.

Lenin, Trotskii, Stalin and the rest of the Bolshevik

leadership sorely needed the propaganda afforded them by

this event, Bashkurts "joining" the Bolsheviks. In fact,

Lenin immediately wrote an article on the "developments of

the Eastern Question," published in the 2 March 1919 issue

of Pravda. Hence Togan and his colleagues were relatively

safe in Moscow and did not need to fear for their lives --

yet. The Bashkurt army was reconstituted under its

previous leadership and some of its units were sent to the

Western Front. However, differences of opinion among

prominent Bolsheviks had already become open competition.

Lenin ordered arms and ammunition to be provided to the

Bashkurt Army. Stalin reversed the directive. Trotskii

overruled Stalin's orders and provided the Bashkurt Army

with ample war materiel.

The ensuing events concerning Togan's "collaboration"

with Moscow constitutes a separate chapter. What is

certain is that Togan, if he had not had prior

reservations, quickly became disillusioned. More and more

it became clear to Togan that the ethnic Russians did not

intend to share power, despite all the promises. Talks

with Trotskii, Plekhanov, Lenin, Stalin, Preobrazhinskii,

Artium and a score of others did not produce a resolution

in the direction of maintaining the union and autonomy of

Bashkurt-Kazakh lands and populations. Instead, a Russian

province was inserted between the Kazakhs and the

Bashkurts.

On 25 February 1920, Bashkurt RevKom elected Togan

Chairman, when the previous President of the same body,

Haris Yumagulov was "called to Moscow." Shortly

afterward, Togan, too, was called to Moscow. According to

both Lenin and Stalin, he was to undertake "Soviet State-

wide affairs" as opposed to "looking after such a small

tribal matter as the Bashkurts." In Moscow, toward the

end of May 1920, Togan came into contact with Jemal and

Halil Pashas (of the Committee of Union and Progress),30

who were in Moscow. During a dinner given in honor of

these individuals at the "Bashkurt House"31 in Moscow and

probably to force the hand of the Russians, Togan

suggested a Congress of the Peoples of the East of

"Russia." Togan repeated that idea to Stalin and to the

Party Secretariat. It was also relayed to Lenin and

Stalin by Jemal and Halil Pashas.

Lenin personally entreated Togan to sit down with him

to discuss the issues pertaining the Eastern Question and

the "de-colonization" policies. Lenin insisted on

receiving Togan's comments in writing. In this last

meeting, Lenin rejected the requests and demands contained

in the joint resolutions of the Turkistan leadership,

submitted to him through Togan. Seemingly, this was the

last of many incidents that caused Togan to break with the

Bolsheviks and redouble his earlier efforts to devote

himself to the affairs of the "Secret Organization."



The Break with the Bolsheviks



During March 1919, just after Bashkurt-Bolshevik

alliance, Togan and the rest of the Turkistan leadership

proposed to establish the Erk Party32 for the Central

Asians. This party was intended to become a member of the

Comintern directly [rather than through RKP(b)], to

prevent Turkistan from coming under the total domination

of the Russian Communist Party. The idea was vetoed by

Stalin. Togan and the rest of the leadership then

concentrated on introducing their members into the upper

levels of the Communist Parties already being established

in Central Asia. Most probably, the Intelligence

Department of the Bashkurt Government was heavily involved

in this effort. This amalgam must be the "Secret

Organization" Togan references from that point on.

Following the last rebuff of the national aspirations at

the hands of Lenin in Spring 1920, Togan moved to

implement his plans and to join the Basmachi movement

already in progress in Central Asia. On 29 June 1920 he

left Moscow.

Togan spent the summer months on the Central Asian

bozkir (literally, pale pasture; the prairie), planning

the next phase of his group's activities. Between 1-5

September 1920, he "attended" the Congress of the Toilers

of the East in Baku. Though his presence was carefully

concealed from the organizers and majority of the

attendees, Togan was kept fully informed of the

proceedings through carefully chosen intermediaries. He

"participated" through motions and resolutions he wrote

and relayed via the same channels.

During the Conference, a resolution of the Comintern,

meeting after Togan had left Moscow, reached him. It was

prepared by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs under the

guidance of Middle Eastern Specialist of the Comintern,

Pavlovich. Intended for the Bolshevik operatives

designated to work in the Middle East and Central Asia, it

was not distributed to the representatives of the

indigenous populations. The copy in question was handed

to Togan's Organization by a sympathetic Polish

delegate.33 In summary, the resolution stated:

Since class differentiation among the Arab,

Turk, Iranian and Afghan populations of the Near

East are almost non-existent, as is the case

also with capitalism, it is necessary to exploit

other cleavages already in place. It will be

useful to keep alive tarikat and sectarian

differences, competition among rival commercial

interests and merchants, even after elimination

of those among their brethren. These rivalries

ought to be supplemented through the use of

differentiated languages, as the educated strata

among the target populations is a thin one and

that it would not be difficult to break the

population free of their influence.



This was significant, because: a) it was being

addressing the Russian Bolsheviks, behind the backs of the

indigenous delegates; b) outlined the same tactics

already used against the tsarists c) presumed control of

Turkistan and now planning to expand policies toward that

end. Togan arrived in Petrovsk and sent the following

letter to Lenin, Stalin, Trotskii and Rykov, dated 12

September 1920:

It is apparent from the policies of the Central

Committee of RKP(b), which is currently being

implemented, you, like Artium and his friends,

have accepted the Russian national chauvinist

thoughts as the basis of your policy towards

Eastern nationalities. Actually comrade

Trotskii elaborated on this while he was

investigating these matters in Ufa, he

pronounced the activities of aforementioned as a

provocation sequence. Undoubtedly, he also made

the same statement to the CC. Despite that, the

Russian imperialism remained as the policy. In

the same session held after I and Ryskulov had

departed, comrades Frunze and Kubyshev --like

Trotskii-- stressed that this policy of the CC

was nothing but hypocrisy and deceit. In the

same Turkkomisia (Turkistan Komisia) sessions,

those members of the party who wish to

perpetuate Russian imperialism behind a mask,

openly stated their objectives; that of fanning

the fires of artificial class distinctions among

the Turkistan populations; to declare such

nationalists as Ryskulov and Validov as the

enemies of the laborers; to create loyal

servants among the local educated under the

category of "Octoberists," to crush us with

their help. On the other hand, you must know

that we cannot become the artificial class

enemies of the local farmers and cannot allow

ourselves to become the target of general

mocking. You can find the required sacrificial

lambs. But we cannot be those victims. The

Congress of the Toilers of the East has clearly

shown our fellow-countrymen in attendance that

the attacks on the rights of Turkistanis is not

simply the machinations of the local Russian

communists, but consists of the policies of the

CC. The attitude of the CC representatives,

towards the Easterners in attendance, is the

same as those commissars at the beginning of the

1917 revolution toward the peasant congresses,

whose members were regarded ignorant. The CC

Representatives not only prevented, by shouting

down, those resolutions prepared by the

delegates at their homelands, but also utilized

the Red Guard soldiers in silencing them. The

delegates were forced to accept only those

resolutions written in Moscow and sent for the

purpose. The fact that the CC regards the

Eastern Nationality issues principally as a

matter of land disputes, a peasant problem,

indicates that the CC has taken a wrong turn.

The CC can keep alive this artificial class

differentiation among the Eastern peasants only

by the force of terror. Our comments written in

relation to these theses of comrade Lenin,

before he addressed the Comintern on the

colonialism issues, stressed that the social

revolution in the East could not be confined to

stratification (rassloenie); that this is a more

complex matter. Since the European capitalist

and laborers of the East are going to act

jointly as the rulers of the colony, then the

Eastern peasant will have to join forces with

the wealthy Easterner. When you determine that

the stratification is not taking place among the

indigenous population, you will blame the local

educated and declare a portion of the latter

"class enemy petty bourgeois" and the remainder

as left Octoberists "class enemy," and liquidate

them. In their stead, you will conjure new left

Octoberists. Finally, you will be left solely

with the illiterate peasant who is only familiar

with his donkey, ox and spade. I do not believe

that you can alter your distrust toward the

native educated of Turkistan. You can at least

allow the educated Turkistan elite the

opportunity to renovate and populate the Soviet

Bukhara, whose Emir has fled.



Togan sent another letter from Petrovsk, this time to

Kretinskii and Preobrazhinskii, both secretaries of the CC

and members of the Politburo:

Though you and I had our differences in our

understanding of socialism and nationalism, we

cannot reconcile our positions with regard to

the application of socialism in the development

of great nations; as a person wishing to remain

honorable, I have been honest with you two and

many other Party members. I did not deceive you

while I took the path of fighting against the

Soviets and Communism. Those I have deceived

are the likes of Stalin and other state

officials who have deceived me. Those friends

complaining of the masked Dictator's ridiculing

the dignity and the self- determination of

humans, inform me of the severe terror that is

yet to come within the party. Like them, I fear

that one day your heads may fly. I did not wait

for my head to fall. Even if I were to die, I

must do so while engaged in open struggle.



Togan adds, as a post script, that Kretinskii and

Preobrazhinskii were tortured and after making

"confessions" executed, during 1937.

Between 12 September and 31 December 1920, Togan

traversed the lands separating Petrovks and Bukhara.

Along the way, travelling incognito, he investigated

historical sites, made contacts with local leadership and

further studied the terrain and its inhabitants. He notes

that up to a certain location in Karakorum, he was also

reading the memoirs of Babur34 and Marx's Das Kapital

which he carried along with his field glasses. Prior to

his arrival in Kongrat, he finally had to give up those

items in order not to attract attention.



III. BASNACHI TOGAN



Upon arriving in Bukhara,35 Togan met with other

members of the Society as previously been arranged. Their

first task was to establish a Bukhara National Army, to

bring the representatives from Khiva, Turkmenistan and

Kazakistan to establish the Turkistan National Union. The

educated Kazakhs and individuals from other Turkistan

locations who have been sent to contact all groups in

Kazakistan, returned to join Togan after establishing

channels with the Japanese and the prominent Basmachi

leaders operating in Ferghana. A number of the officers

from the Bashkurt Army were appointed to command garrisons

in Karshi, Shehrisebz, Nur, Guzar, Kermin. Their

objective was to accomplish what the Russians were

preventing; i.e. autonomy.

In addition to these "undercover" efforts, there were

other officers working openly in "legal" positions known

to the Bolsheviks. Although a Bukhara government was in

existence in name, most affairs of state were in the hands

of the Revolutionary Committee (presumably comprising the

Russians) a portion of it operating as the Central

Committee. Togan describes the complexity of political

spectrum during the last stages of the Bukhara Emirate:

There were three types of Basmachi: "Emirists;"

"somewhat Emirists;" and "anti-Emirists." The

political spectrum of the Basmachi did not end

there. Jemal Pasha wished to manage the

problems of Turkistan and the Basmachi from

Kabul. Enver Pasha, on the other hand was

conducting pro-Bolshevik "Union of Islam"

propaganda from Moscow. This had some effect.

There were also others who tried to insinuate

themselves, seemingly eager to join us.....

Further, there was necessity to establish

contacts with the Russian parties who were

struggling against the Bolsheviks. In Bukhara

and Khiva the government was passing into the

hands of those nationalist friends whose

administration, though temporary, was moving

away from "communism" toward "populism." It was

necessary to formulate the economic and social

theories of all. The political spectrum had

earlier stratified as a) Kadimists36 b)

Jadids c) Socialists, and showed a propensity

to crystallize around Jadids and Socialists

after the disappearance of the Emir. However,

thoughts were scrambled. During the first week

of January 1921, the matter of the programs were

debated. Primarily, individuals from "Islamic

Unionists" and the Bukharan Jadids were

involved. Populist socialism was represented by

Abdulhamid Arif37 and myself. Since there was

no previously prepared program before the

general assembly, the Socialist Party Program

was presented. It was first read in

Bashkurdistan during 1919, then in Moscow during

1920 and finally in the 1920 Baku Congress. Few

of those in attendance were prepared to accept

it. A few days later, Mirza Abdulkadir

Muheddinoglu, representing the majority among

those present, proposed a program comprising 19

statutes. These pertained to the retention of

the women's veil, continuation of the Sharia

kad s, reverence for religion, application to

the League of Nations.38 However, these were

not acceptable to the other side.



Both groups only agreed upon: 1. The necessity of

the Secret Organization, 2. Elimination of the Emir

absolutely and establishing the machinery of national

government 3. Establishment of central ministry of

defense, local defense commissariats and the formation of

a national army, 4. The necessity of modern education.

As a result of their discussions, the two sides were able

to agree upon the seven point platform listed below.

Subsequently, the two parties engaged in these talks

developed their own party platforms. The contents of this

seven-point program was further discussed and refined at

the 2921 September-October Samarkand and September 1922

Tashkent Congresses. These seven items are as follows:



1. The Society's aim is to have a free Turkistan, and

that the Turkistanis to take charge of their own destiny.

2. Free Turkistan's form of government is a

democratic republic.

3. Freedom can only be obtained through a national

army. National government can only be based on a national

army.

4. Turkistan's freedom is dependent on economic

freedom. Turkistanis must have control over the decisions

concerning: the general outlines of the economic policy;

deciding the balance of vocational and agricultural

training and the level of importance to be accorded to

each; designating the locations and the directions of

future railroads and irrigation channels.

5. Contemporary and professional education must

prevail. The acquaintance with the European civilization

should be undertaken directly and not through Russians.

6. Nationality issues and the exploitation of the

nation's natural resources will be organized according to

census and prevailing proportions.

7. There will be freedom of religion. There will be

no mixing of religious and state affairs.



As it can be noted, this program is primarily non-

religious in character, and demonstrates religious

tolerance. Shortly afterwards, the effort was expanded.

According to Togan, the aim was to accommodate a full

spectrum of political views then prevailing in Turkistan

under a single umbrella, which, in today's terms, would be

akin to a Popular Front. During this period, the

Sosyalist Tde (party) was formed39, later changing its

name to Erk Party, and its program was shortened from 27

statutes to 9:



Erk Party Program

1. On the economic plane: In order to accomplish

socialism; land, water and mineral wealth must be

nationalized and village life collectivized.

2. To adapt, in a planned manner, the labor

organizations of industrial countries to Turkistan. The

farmers must also be regarded, from an organizational

point, as laborers.

3. Turkistan must free itself from colonizers and

become self-governing. This is the first and fundamental

step for stratification and the acquisition by the farmers

of means to fight for their own rights.

4. The government in free Turkistan will be the

democratic system supporting the farmers and those

supporting self-renewal without barriers. Turkistan

parliament, provincial and city councils will be

established and elected by the general population

directly.

5. Establishment of the national army will aid the

governance and the application of socialism.

6. In Turkistan, the nationality and minority affairs

are governed according to census figures and in

representative proportions.

7. On the educational plane: Affairs are to be

arranged such that, the native population will have direct

control of the country's governance; the national

government will undertake all contemporary governmental

services, modern transportation, railroads, post and

telegraph, agricultural and industrial organization.

Cultural affairs must be organized to reflect the strong

national local culture, to remove foreign, meaning Russian

influences. To establish business and trade schools,

effect general education are among the principal

objectives of education.

8. Religious affairs are kept totally separate from

the affairs of the government.

9. Turkistan Socialist Party can participate in an

"International," provided that such a gathering is

composed, in principle, of parties like itself, for the

purpose of fighting for the freedom of oppressed

nations.40



Counterbalancing the socialists, there were also

"modernists" in Central Asia. The origins of those can be

traced to the movement known as "Jadidizm," from

Shihabaddin Marjani (1815-1889)41 and Kayyum Nasiri (1825-

1902),42 to Gaspirali Ismail Bey (1854-1914). Gaspirali

supported and spread the movement through the newspaper he

published, and the schools he had established.43



Jadid Terakkiperver Party Program44



1. To live as an independent nation, based on native

culture, is the principle precept of life. This is the

ideal of all nations. We aim to have an independent

Turkistan with a national government. Nationality is based

on the unity of language, religion, tradition, literature

and custom.

2. The nature of government in free Turkistan is

republic. Sovereignty is in the hands of the national

assembly, councils for the provinces and cities, elected

according to democratic precepts.

3. Members of the central government are appointed by

the President, with the approval of the national assembly.

Governors of the provinces are appointed by the central

government. Chairmen of the provincial and city councils

are elected by the members of those assemblies. The

regulations governing the election of the members of the

provincial councils are established by the first kurultay

(congress) of independent Turkistan.

4. In Turkistan, non-Turk minority communities will

have full civil rights. Turk elements must work rigorously

and collectively to preserve the Turkistan culture.

5. Turkistan national government will depend on its

national soldiers. Military service is mandatory.

6. Provincial governments will establish local police

forces, which will be under the jurisdiction of the

national defense organization.

7. There will be freedom of religion in the country.

The State guarantees the freedom of the performance of

religious rights. Foreign (religious) missions will not be

permitted to operate in the country.

8. Freedom of the press and publication and the

personal freedoms will be secured through the constitution.

9. Taxes will be proportional to income. So will the

inheritance taxes. In Turkistan, taxes that are the

remnants of medieval times will be abolished.

10. Principles of land ownership will be based on the

fact that water, land and the mineral wealth under and on

the land, and the forests belong to the state. Land will

be given to villagers as private property.

11. Private persons cannot engage in directly buying

and selling of water and land with each other. These

transactions can only be enacted through the state. Laws

pertaining to ownership are determined by local custom and

jurisprudence.

12. Turkistan's freedom can only be ensured with

economic independence. In this vein, Turkistan will strive

to establish and develop modern economic relations with

neighboring countries.

13. The principal issue of land in Turkistan requires

that the whole nation work with all its might to irrigate

and expand cultivation. Water management must be handled

with great care.

14. In Turkistan, especially Kazak, Kirgiz, and

Turkmen provinces, the most important issue is the

transition from nomadic to settled life. This problem can

be solved by irrigating regions alongside large rivers. No

immigrants can be brought to Turkistan other than ethnic

Turks and Moslems.

15. The solution to the problem of workers in

Turkistan is dependent on the development of industry.

Working conditions of the workers, working hours, rights

of child and women laborers are determined according to

methods prevailing in developed countries.

16. Equal justice for everyone shall prevail. This

will be accomplished, without regard to differences in

religion and sect, by accepting and applying modern laws.

17. General free education is to be striven for.

Citizens can establish private educational institutions,

provided that they are not against the interests of the

state.

18. Importance shall be attached especially to the

establishment of trade schools and to sending students to

Europe.

19. Turkistan being the hearth of an ancient

civilization, those monuments of civilization accumulated

throughout centuries will be preserved, organized to serve

the development of the national civilization.



Togan observed:

It must be categorically stated that the

proposed future administration of Turkistan by

two parties, one radical national and other

socialist, was not influenced by any outside

thought. This developed due to local conditions

and in 1921 through consultations with the

educated leadership representing the local

population of Turkistan. The Alash Orda was

added to others to form a three party system.

At the time, during deliberations, Turkistan

nationals were not aware of the existence of the

two party systems in England and in the USA.



The Society and the Basmachi

Until the establishment of the Society, and

while the Emirate of Bukhara was still in

existence, the educated Turkistani were not in

contact with the Basmachi. Basmachi units

(parties) were largely based on the Kadimist

ulama and the elements of the fanatic Ozbek

bourgeoisie. During the 1917 Representative

Council elections, the educated were on List

Number Four. The ulama, opposing the educated,

thus labelled them dorduncu (4th) and engaged in

violent anti-Dorduncu propaganda. As a result,

the majority of the younger generation did not

trust the Drdnc during 1918-1919,

particularly since the educated were siding with

the soviets.45 As the hopes of the educated

were dashed by the Bolsheviks during 1920, they

joined the ranks of the Society. The abolition

of the Bukhara Emirate eliminated the reasons

preventing the youth from any action.

Collectively, these developments diminished the

influence of the ulama on the Basmachi. The

Society established contacts without any

hesitation with the Basmachi in Samarkand, Khiva

and Ferghana. The objective was to shape it

into a real national movement infused with

spirit, coupled with modern organization, to

form military units under the command of

educated individuals. To this end, educated

advisors and some instructor officers were sent

to them. The Emir of Bukhara regarded the

Bolsheviks as "Russia" until his last days and

attempted to remain "loyal." The Emir had

disarmed Osipov's military unit in Shehrisebz,

where it had sought protection within his

domains. When Shirmehmet and his friends of

Ferghana sent an embassy seeking a united front

with the Bukhara Emirate, the Bashvezir (Chief

Minister) Nizamettin Kushbeghi had responded

with : Are you not aware of our friendship with

the Russians," and tearing up Shirmehmet's

letter, trampled upon it. The members of the

embassy were jailed, only to be released seven

months later upon intervention of the Afghans.

Shirmehmet relates these events in his memoirs,

regarding the incident as a manifestation of the

Emir's extraordinary ignorance and heedlessness.

For that reason, a portion of the Basmachi were

not at al affected by the lapse of the Emirate.

Even some Basmachi, such as Mahkem Haji and

Toychi Korbashi,46 made peace with the

Bolsheviks, participating in the occupation of

Bukhara alongside the Bolshevik forces. After

the Fall of Bukhara, they returned to the ranks

of Basmachi, but were killed by Shirmehmet.



Shirmehmet and Rahmankul themselves sought to

establish contacts with the Society. Shirmehmet sent two

of his men, who were working within the Bolshevik

apparatus, to the Baku Congress. Through them, Togan

wrote:

A very interesting rumor pertaining to the

Bolshevik policies concerning the East began to

spread. Shirmehmet relates: "The information

arriving from Baku suggested that the Russians

wished to kill fourteen and a half million of

the inhabitants, only to retain two million

under their rule. In the Baku Congress, the

Turkistani decided not to lay down their arms

and sent word to intensify the struggle. At the

end of the Baku Congress, Basmachi Movement

caught fire."47



Togan also points to the Red Army's use of the

Russians living in Turkistan:

On 12 September Bolsheviks began serious attacks

from all directions. This was an

extraordinarily difficult time. Bolsheviks

inducted into the Red Army those Russians from

Central Russia who were starving, in order for

them to loot the population for bread (in

Turkistan). Hence, volunteer Russian numbers

swelled. These were fighting seriously, since

they would have died of starvation if discharged

from the army.



The atrocities of the Russians were increasing the resolve

of the Society and the Basmachi:

In the village of Sufiyan, near Dushanbe,

Russians found a Russian soldier with burns on

his face. Because of that, Russians killed all

OOzbek villagers they found in the vicinity.

Meanwhile, Bolsheviks, instigated by a communist

woman in their army, tied up seven OOzbek

soldiers, mutilating them with knives and swords

so as not to kill them. Afterwards, placing

these soldiers in the wheat heaps, set fire and

burnt them alive. A Basmachi, Mustafa Shahkul

observed: "This communist woman was so ugly and

despicable that any man swearing off all women

because of her would not have been

unjustified."48



Togan includes his discussions of the relationships

between Enver and Jemal Pashas and the Society:

Even before I became the Chairman of the Central

Committee of the Turkistan National Unity (The

Society), I was a member of that body.

Therefore, it is necessary to delve into the

relations between Enver and Jemal Pashas and the

Society. They sought to join forces with the

Bolsheviks by forming the "Islamic Revolutionary

Society," for the purpose of liberating the

Islamic world from European imperialism. First

Halil and Jemal, later Enver Pashas arrived in

Moscow with this aim and began their propaganda.

We49 spoke with Halil and Jemal during June 1920

in Moscow. Jemal Pasha explained his ideas and

urged us to work with him, but we left Moscow.

On 20 August, Jemal Pasha arrived in Tashkent.

His aim was to secure the environs of Punjab and

to establish an Islamic state there. He was

going to prepare in Afghanistan. With 15-20

Ottoman officers in his retinue, he left for

Afghanistan. In the meantime, Halil Pasha and

Haji Sami50 thought of establishing a truce with

the Bolsheviks, to cross over to Eastern

Turkistan via Yedisu and Narin (rivers). But

neither could they trust the Bolsheviks, nor

could the Bolsheviks trust them. Finally, they

returned to Moscow. Jemal Pasha told the

Bolsheviks that he could use the Basmachi for a

campaign to overthrow the British regime in

India. But the Bolsheviks did not believe him

in the least. We knew all this and the real

intentions of the Russians through our friends

working within the Communist Central Committees

of Moscow and Tashkent. The Russians thought

that Jemal Pasha was actually preparing an

organization to control Turkistan, and wanted to

keep the Pasha between the Indian and

Afghanistan borders as a last resort for their

own policies.



The personal representatives of Jemal Pasha, sent to

enter into discussions with various Basmachi groups, were

arrested by the Bolsheviks. This event, notes Togan:

Showed that Jemal Pasha did not have influence

among the Bolsheviks.... Jemal Pasha's advice

to the Basmachi was rather strange: "make peace

with the Bolsheviks, without giving up your

arms, or dissolving your organizations."

Although the Bolsheviks had previously tried

that method on many occasions, we were now

strictly against it.



On 25 January 1921, Central Committee of the

Turkistan National Unity (TNU) sent a letter to Jemal

Pasha, then at Kabul, via a courier of the Bukhara Foreign

Ministry. The said letter summarized the objectives (as

noted above) of the Organization, and continued:

....We ask that your Middle East policies be

drawn so as not to sacrifice the future of this

old Turkistan to plans in preparation for the

deliverance of the Islamic world. It is to the

benefit of all concerned, that all initiatives

concerning Turkistan be entered into via the

(TNU) Central Committee, including contacts with

the Basmachi. Likewise, no aid should be

extended to the Emir of Bukhara, currently in

Eastern Bukhara. Any support given to the Emir

(by the Afghan government) will be taken as

enmity towards our Committee. Even if we were

to accept, for a moment, that the Bolsheviks

remain sincere to their avowed position of

liberating the colonies from European

imperialists, Turkistan cannot subsume its

future to the as yet unknown outcome of

forthcoming struggle between capitalism and

socialism. Thus, policies pertaining to

Turkistan must be based on these principles.



Togan comments on this letter:

With these words, it was requested from Jemal

Pasha that he not seek to utilize the political

and military resources of Turkistan for the

dreamed of purpose of liberating India from the

English. The Pasha did not like this.

[Meanwhile] the Society steadily worked towards

its goals, despite the paucity of politically

experienced personnel among its ranks. Active

elements of the Moslem communists were channeled

into the activities of the Society. In all of

these provinces, members of the Society entered

into the Soviet Congresses, Communist Party

meetings. Everywhere, the police (militsia)

organizations and administrative organs were

under the influence of the Society. The labor

organizations of Bukhara, Tashkent, Samarkand

and Kokand were under the influence of the

members of the Socialist Tde (the Erk Party?)

branch of the Society. This was a monumental

success and promise for the future of Turkistan

and her inhabitants, who were relatively

inexperienced in such matters. Although the

individuals working within the government and

party machinery of Khiva, Tashkent and Orenburg

were not members of the Society, they were

completely cooperating. For that matter, they

were not aware of the details. Such success of

the Secret Organization could not have been

dreamed, for example, during 1917.



Togan relates details of other matters weighing on

the minds of the Central Committee members:

The national Flag was decided upon, having been

earlier debated and reconstructed from

historical elements, emblems and colors, at the

Samarkand sessions... teachers were sent in the

retinue of each Korbashi... ten mounted troops

were requested from in each Korbashi in

Ferghana, Samarkand; to be sent to the Ferghana

and Samarkand Commands. The purpose was to

conduct preliminary preparations for the

formation of a Turkistan-wide unified military

command; experiment with military operations...

All existing disagreements between tribal units

were resolved... those battalions in the

barracks of the Bolsheviks were arriving the

order to emerge as the units of the Turkistan

forces. The Society was in constant contact

with those high-level Russians who were against

the Bolsheviks, supplying the Society with

critical intelligence, thus preventing Bolshevik

surprise attacks. In sum, the Central Committee

of the Turkistan National Unity was taking all

precautions for a Turkistan-wide general and

final assault. The final stage would have been

accomplished by establishing military

superiority, through disrupting traffic and

communications of the opposition with their

center. The Moslem reactionaries (mrteci-

recidivist),51 as usual, were those Emirists and

the ulama that have not yet lost complete

credibility. These were still propagandizing

against all our efforts. The hope was to reform

them in a year or two. The arrival of Enver

Pasha in Turkistan at year's end and the

attitude of the Emirists recidivists toward him

turned all precautions upside-down.



Togan and Enver Pasha 52

Enver Pasha arrived in Bukhara and sent word

that he wished to speak with me. On 2 October

1921, I met him for the first time, and upon his

request provided him with the details of the

circumstances in Turkistan, especially the

status of the Society. Since he was

particularly concerned with the conditions in

Eastern Bukhara, I related to him the

difficulties we were facing there, and the lack

of progress due to the remnants of the Emirists.

He indicated that he was aware of those

conditions, that it would take an inordinate

time to standardize the general organization

through the Society, and this would be a waste

of time. He stated that he was directly going

to Eastern Bukhara and then to Ferghana with the

intention of giving a different form to the

Basmachi movement; he had made preparations to

that end, had obtained horses and equipment, and

had brought officers with him for the purpose;

he would be leaving Bukhara on the pretext of a

hunting expedition. Enver Pasha's arrival in

Bukhara, especially his plans, were a totally

unexpected development for us. A few months ago

this person was engaged in propaganda through

the pamphlets of "Union of Islam" and others, in

connection with Jemal Pasha, advocating

cooperation with the Bolsheviks against

imperialism. He was now not only taking a

position against the Bolsheviks, but actually

had brought plans to attack them... Enver Pasha

told me that he had been in Soviet Russia for

over a year now; [he had seen] that the

Bolsheviks were despicable people and he had

come to the conclusion that it was necessary to

liberate the Moslems from Red Imperialism before

any other Imperialism.... But his joining the

Basmachi or even his going to Eastern Bukhara

was not acceptable. I stressed that point

during our first meeting. He asked me what he

could do to be of service to Turkistan.

Truthfully, he appeared bewildered. We could

not meet every day, since he was under Bolshevik

surveillance. I wrote down 14 reasons why he

should not join the Basmachi, and sent it to

him. Main points were: The Russians are about

to wash their hands of external matters.

Henceforth they can concentrate all their

resources in Turkistan. Our organization, in

proportion to its duties, is very weak. This

year Turkistan is suffering from a great famine.

Ferghana is experiencing a crisis in its

attempts to feed the Basmachi . After joining

the Basmachi, you would want to fight with

regular fronts. At present, it is not feasible

to keep a standing army larger than five-six

thousand strong. It is only possible to conduct

guerilla warfare. As for the Basmachi in

Eastern Bukhara, it is not possible to cooperate

with them unless agreements are entered into

with the Afghans and the Emir will not allow you

to be recognized (as a leader). Hence, they

(Eastern Bukhara Basmachi) will not accept you

as such. Until today, the Turkistan question,

Basmachi movement and the secret political

activity has remained an internal issue of

Russia... If you join this struggle, the

Turkistan movement may assume a Pan-Islamist

character... This can cause the Russians

resident in Turkistan to unite with the

Bolsheviks, for their national objectives,

against us. The best course of action available

for you to cross over to Afghanistan and aid the

Turkistan movement from there... Pasha was

consulting with others on the topic. Some

individuals, whose names it would not be prudent

to reveal as yet, received Pasha's joining the

Basmachi with a positive attitude. Haji Sami

was another who was advocating this course.



Togan describes Enver's consultations and vacillation

over many days, and finally his decision (possibly on 28

October):

On the night of the following day, he sent word

asking me to meet him. He indicated that he was

going to Eastern Bukhara, to convene a congress

of the Basmachi and the educated. He asked me

to send men to Khiva, the Kazakhs, Ferghana,

Turkmen for the purpose of relaying his

decisions in the name of the Society and invite

representatives. I again objected and reminded

him that his crossing over to Afghanistan would

be the most suitable path. He was most annoyed.

I gathered that Enver Pasha was not at all fond

of objections. Apparently he was not going to

change his mind. The next night five or ten of

us met in someone's home. Enver Pasha related

his decision in careful phrases. Tears were

streaming down his face. Others were somber as

well... He was wearing German-made sports

boots. He was giving the impression of a

sportsman ready to jump into competition. He

related his most sincere thoughts... That day I

learned that this person was a great idealist,

who had not squared himself with events and

life, and he had not equipped himself with the

geography and the statistics of Turkistan even

from the Russian and the European

publications... Ten days later a special

courier brought a verbal message from Enver

Pasha in Bukhara: "Decided to go to Eastern

Bukhara. we will be Ghazi if we win, martyr if

we do not. Let the Turkmens (of Burdal k) not

await our arrival."



Togan records Enver's imprisonment by the

"frighteningly bigoted" Ibrahim53 of the Emirist Lakay

clan. The hasty attack induced by Ibrahim of the Lakays

upset carefully laid plans by the Society. Further, Enver

caused the premature emergence of a Turkistan army unit,

an orderly force of 600 rifles, that has been under

"Bolshevik" cover. The skirmish was lost to the

Bolsheviks, who were openly aided by the Emirist Lakays.

Enver Pasha and a few of his followers crossed over to

Afghanistan. By May, Enver Pasha had 7000 troops.

Volunteers from Afghanistan had turned the tide. But, he

was not without opposition. Togan relates an assessment

meeting after the latest event:

Enver Pasha was a fait accompli to the Society.

The Central Committee met in the vicinity of

Samarkand, discussing the state of affairs. It

was decided to regard this development as

specific to Bukhara border regions, not to

change the rest of the plans, not to declare

uprising in the name of the Society, to continue

guerilla warfare as before, to provide support

for Enver Pasha. But the early failures of

Enver's each initiative had a negative effect.

This was also true of Enver's propaganda.



Togan proceeds with the details of his war

preparations, listing the units, commands, commanders,

troop strengths, armaments under the Society auspices. He

quotes from the memoirs of other combatants, members of

the Society and participants in compiling this section.54

Togan also states that between April and July of the same

year he participated in the battles against the

Bolsheviks:

Between April-June, people and combatants of

Turkistan were cheerful and the Bolsheviks were

unable to leave the railroad lines. Comrades of

Stalin, Ilvaya and Ordzhonikidze, arrived from

Moscow in May. They could visit the Ulugh Bey

observatory55, two kilometers from Samarkand,

only in the company of a strong Bolshevik

military detachment. For that matter, if they

had not taken extreme precautions, they could

have been thrashed by the Basmachi who were

waiting in ambush.



The Beginning of the End

During mid-March, Feyzullah Hoja brought a

secret order from Moscow Communist Party

headquarters, consisting of a few articles,

about "serious struggle against Enver Pasha and

Validov (Togan) Group." Stalin himself

published an article in Pravda, under the title

of "Validovshchina," seeking to mobilize the

nationalist youth against us. The Red Army's

first action, after settling in Bukhara, was to

employ the Emirists. The Red Army charged a

high level official of the Emir, one Nusreddin

Aghal k, who had killed Mahmud Hoja Behbubi on

25 March 1919, with the administration of the

Karshi province. Since this man was also in

contact with the Emirist rebels, he was in a

position competently to quash all our

undertakings. As soon as he arrived in Karshi,

Aghal k detained some individuals who would have

been instrumental in carrying out the rebellion

of Shehrisebz, Guzar and Karshi garrisons.

These preparations were set and prepared for 23

March, by War Commissar Abdlmamid Arif. Those

of our essentially lax Jadid friends of Bukhara,

who were in contact with the military

organization in Karshi, became needlessly

frightened and stated: Nureddin Aghal k has

heard of our intentions... I personally

travelled for two weeks between Karshi,

Shehrisebz, Katta Kurgan, but was unable to

break the "Nureddin Aghal k" bands. In Kashan

and other regions, some troops, fourteen

educated Tatars and officers, Kashanl Behram

Bek, Jure Ishan and others were able to join the

Basmachi, but they could not carry with them the

stockpiled rifles and the ammunition. Molla

Mushtak, a chieftain under Molla Kahhar,

approached the Bashkurt army officers who were

under the direction of Heybetullah Suyunduk.

Disguised as Basmachi, Mushtak killed twelve men

during a rest period on 10 April.



Togan proceeds to answer a question oft misunderstood

both in and out of the region:

Now, let me illustrate the complexity of the

Turkistan question and the impossibility of

conducting these affairs only on the basis of

Turkism or of Islam, as Enver sought to, by way

of an incident in Samarkand: A group of

Russians, SR's, working in the cooperatives and

food distribution administration, and some

officers under their influence, were in contact

with the society, providing us with ammunition.

One individual, occupying the highest positions

in the General Staff (in the Turkistan Military

District) rendering us help. On 10 May, I met

with an officer representing this group in Bag-i

Bala of Samarkand. This group was seriously

frightened of Enver Pasha's operations. A

friend accompanying me stressed that Enver Pasha

was in Turkistan temporarily, but the officer

could not be persuaded. On that day I spoke

with an educated local Turk who had arrived from

Tashkent, in a garden near Ab- Rahmet.

Although an intellectually committed communist,

he was rendering important aid to the national

movement through the agency in which he was

employed. He and his friends were frightened by

the documents reaching their hands, signed by

Enver Pasha as "Deputy of Bukhara Emir, Son-in-

Law of the Caliph of Moslems, Seyyid Enver" and

the news that Enver was cooperating with the

Emir. I told this man: "Enver Pasha cannot

serve the Emir. He is not a monarchist either.

No one in the Society will be permitted to lean

towards monarchy. You can relay this to your

friends. The same day, Yusuf Ziya Bey of

Azerbaijan arrived from the side of Enver Pasha

with the title of "Commander-in-Chief of the

Northwest Front." He further claimed to bring a

verbal order from Enver Pasha, to the effect

that: "The Society should not be involved in

military affairs, but ought to confine its

efforts to propaganda. Yusuf had the seeming

intention of derailing the Zarafshan Basmachi

movement, which had been reorganized only by the

efforts of the Society. The next day, the young

man from Tashkent (I referred to above) saw

Yusuf Ziya Bey in Kanigul. Though Yusuf Ziya

Bey continued at length on the necessity of

having an autocrat for the martially inclined

Turks and that it would be very beneficial for

such a person also to be a "seyyid." Next, he

related that he had heard from Enver Pasha that

there were 30 million Turks in Western Turkistan

and another 25 million in Eastern Turkistan. On

the issue of Kazakistan, Yusuf Ziya Bey rejected

the proposals we put before him, which were done

in cooperation with the young man. Yusuf Ziya's

words and behavior entirely negated the

guarantees I gave to this young man the day

before. The young man was seriously grieved.

In the letters we received from Enver Pasha

after that incident, we found no confirmation of

the words spoken by Yusuf Ziya. Nonetheless, it

was clear that the statement of Yusuf Ziya, who

had no idea of the spirit of this generation

educated in the colonial psychology of Russian

schools, was going to leave a negative

impression on this young man and his cohorts.

And so it was.



Those of us noting the actions of the Emirists

and their intentions thought that the Society

was in a difficult position. Two days later, we

convened the Central Committee at a location

outside the city to discuss the developments in

detail. We regretfully observed that some

Basmachi groups were attempting to enter into

separate peace agreements with the Bolsheviks

due to the crisis at hand. To prevent the

united front from dissolving and to preserve the

Society, we decided to take immediate action.

In our opinion, the only solution to save the

national armies from being routed and

exterminated was to gather those Basmachi

leaders in difficulty and Enver Pasha in

Bukhara, to have them cross over to Afghanistan

freely. Troops were to give their arms to those

going to Afghanistan and they were to be sent

back to their villages. To this end, we decided

to write two letters: one to Enver Pasha, to

persuade him to cross over to Afghanistan and to

facilitate his opening communications with the

Russian Commander-in-Chief, general Kamenev, who

was expected to arrive in Bukhara. The other

was to be signed by me, as Chairman of the

Central Committee, to the Moscow Soviet

government, containing the conditions of peace,

on 12 May. Both were to be sent via special

couriers. The letter we sent to Moscow was

delayed due to the mistakes of our friends in

Tashkent. Enver Pasha, rather than accepting

our suggestion (perhaps before our courier

arrived), sent an ultimatum to the Russians

demanding that they withdraw from Turkistan,

Bukhara and Khiva. He signed it "Commander-in-

Chief of Turkistan, Bukhara and Khiva National

Armies."



A disciple of Enver Pasha arrives, visiting Togan's

at the headquarters of Achil Bey:

The Akhund was a Shii theologian. He liked to

talk on that topic. Akhund lectured the new

arrivals on the necessity of fortifying the

national movement from the religious aspect, and

that they must provide information to the troops

on the politics of Islam. He also looked

around, on the way to preparing for namaz, as if

to imply that everyone should be following him.

But, only some individuals regularly performed

namaz in the retinue of Achil Bey, and none

could pressure the others to do so. After the

event, I told the Akhund: "Among Samarkand

Ozbeks, the traditions of Timur is still

dominant. Beys will not consult with the ulama

and the sheyks, even those they greatly respect,

on affairs of religion and military. The hoja

and the sheyks do not even think of requesting

such. Beys will go to namaz once a week, on

Fridays. If I and my Bashkurt officers feel

like it, we will perform namaz If we do not,

nobody will question us. Therefore, while you

are in Samarkand, in the retinue of Achil Bey,

it would be very commendable for you to be

attentive to these matters." Akhund Yusuf

Talibzade, who had the objective of uniting the

Turks with other Moslems on the basis of Islamic

political plane, did not like my words. On

another occasion, my friend Kaari Kamil brought

kimiz.56 It was plentiful. The spirit of the

ensuing conversations were based on the dastans

of Koroglu and Yusuf Ahmet. In the afternoon,

an Ozbek played the ney (a wood-wind

instrument), I recited a couplet in Persian.

Kaari Kamil and other friends repeated in Ozbek.

Akhund said: "There is ney but no mey (wine)"

and I responded "In this land of ours, kimiz is

consumed during summer. Your not being

satisfied with kimiz and asking for wine, though

you are an educated Islamic scholar, will not be

received well in this society, because we do not

prefer wine to kimiz. Akhund asked: "Do you not

drink wine?" I said: "Why not? But that is not

the issue. Since you are a representative of

Enver Pasha, there may be those in these yaylaks

(summer pastures) who might disapprove of your

drinking wine instead of kimiz. Kaari Kamil

added: "We know you as a religious scholar, a

Koranic Commentator," and prevented wine being

offered to the Akhund.



After these events, Togan chronicles the battles in

which he took part. He provides political and military

repercussions of each, as well as details. He was

receiving intelligence from Moscow to the effect that

large formations of Bolshevik troops from the Western

front were on their way to Turkistan. There were attempts

on his life. After numerous meetings of the Central

Committee, a decision was made to fall back and regroup.

The "above ground" members of the Society were being

pursued by Russian military formations. They dispersed,

preparing to cross the Russian unit lines incognito, to

meet in Tashkent. Togan, along with two of his friends

chose a mountainous route. After much difficulty, they

arrived in Tashkent. According to the decisions taken in

a series of further meetings, Togan was to leave

Turkistan. He left, after sending a final letter to

Lenin:



20 February 1923



Dear Vladimir Ilich,



Due to your illness, it is possible that you

might have been prevented from reading this

letter or it might not have reached you. But

since I sent copies of it to some other friends,

it is now a historical document. Comrade Stalin

ostensibly stated that under Comrade Rudzutak's

auspices I could return to the Party. In other

words they (Party) would disregard the letter I

sent to the Central Committee from Baku in 1920,

outlining my opposition to and initiatives

against Moscow by joining the Rebellion.

However, who can believe that and return?

Especially since you have abrogated the 20 March

1919 agreement which was signed by you, Stalin,

myself and my friends; by your order of 19 May

1920 signed only by you and Stalin? When I

personally protested that latter order, you had

characterized our 20 March 1919 agreement "only

a piece of paper." However, that agreement

announced that Bashkurts would retain the right

of maintaining their own army and that army was

going to be under the command of Soviet

Headquarters without intermediary stages. With

your 19 May 1920 order, you have deprived the

Bashkurt army of those provisions, assigning it

to the trans-Volga army, disbursing the Bashkurt

units as the trans-Volga Headquarters saw fit

among its formations. Indeed, that is what

happened and today there is no physical Bashkurt

army. Similarly, in the same order what was

deceivingly termed "attaching Ufa to

Bashkurdistan" turned out to be the reverse,

attaching Bashkurdistan to the Ufa province.

Consequently, what was conceded to the "Russian

moslems" on 20 December 1917, "the right to

secede from Russia," should they choose, has

been destroyed from its foundations by your

order of May 1920. From now on, following the

defeat of Bashkurts, Kazakhs and the Turkistanis

in the South-West and my departure from Soviet

Russia as of tomorrow, a ne era shall begin in

their history; that is, rather than seeking

their legal equality with the Russians (in the

Russian context), that experimentation having

failed, the transition to the international

arena (for seeking those rights) is being made.

My task will be to familiarize the world with

the history of those struggles.57 The

Veklikiirus nation has already decided on the

specific policy to be applied to the captive

nations and tribes they are holding, not only in

economic and social matters, but also in

cultural affairs. The "Eastern University"

which you established last year is operating as

a center for these policies. A specialized

"eastern affairs" group, comprised of Velikiirus

personnel around the Central Committee has also

been formed. The CC has brought in certain

individuals of the eastern nationalities of the

Soviet domains, charged with the specific duty

of preparing material for these "eastern

specialists." Those eastern nationals even

published certain books and pamphlets. But, the

topics they are to work on are assigned by your

Velikiirus. These non-Russian intellectuals are

not even being admitted into the debates on the

"constitutions" which are being prepared to

govern them. Today, the main task on which the

CC Eastern Affairs Specialists are working is to

prepare separate alphabets and literary

languages for each nationality and tribe, based

on the extant local "phonetic" differences

between them. In principle, the non_russian

communists are said to be serving only as

consultants in this endeavor. In the latest

issue of the journal Kizil Shark, published by

the members of the Eastern University, contained

a commentary by one mer Aliyev of Daghestan.

According to him, should the Cyrillic alphabet

be accepted for the Northern Caucasus Turkish

dialects, this would lead to Christianization.

Further, he has reportedly said, it would be

necessary to borrow the Latin alphabet in use in

Azerbaijan (sic).58 It is imperative that the

issues of Alphabet and literary language

(according to Aliyev) not require Russian help,

but the aid of those governments formed on the

basis of national political freedom, and should

be accomplished by native scholars. These

writings and efforts of the Azerbaijanis to

gather the intellectual communist of the Turk

tribes around Kizil Shark and one literary

language is said to be making the Velikiirus

specialists nervous, angry. When Shahtahtinskii

and Jelal Guliev of Azerbaijan defended a single

alphabet based on Latin, Prof. Polivanov and

other Russians are said to have stated that even

if the Latin alphabet is accepted, this would be

replaced by the cyrillic and a special sub-set

will be created for Turkish dialects, whose

number was approaching forty. Shahtahtinskii

retorted that the aim of Russians was not to

allow standard literary language to live. It is

now understood that, when you Velikiirus friends

begin playing with the language and the syntax

of a people, you will not let their collars free

until they, too, become complete Russians. It

is not possible not to be surprised to observe

the differences between your current policies

and your writings in "Against the Tide" and in

your other writings, where you state that

ideally, the rights of nations should be placed

in their hands. Your representative comrade

Zeretskii gave numerous conferences to our

people, during the summer of 1919 while we were

refurbishing our army in Saransk, to the effect

that the Soviet government was the first in

history to base the freedoms of captive nations

on their own national armies. I myself

published an article in Pravda in the same vein.

It has not been four years since those events

and it appears that your policies will be

developing in the opposite direction. RKP may

continue to claim, in Asia and the countries far

away from Russia, such as Africa, that it will

liberate them. The truth is, your Velikiirus

become angry when people such as Gregori Safarov

display the colonial policies of the tsar in

Turkistan. Those Velikiirus enjoy hearing the

native communists liken themselves to small fish

being eaten by the whale, better if that

argument were presented as a proverb. When

comrade Artium was visiting us, he used to state

his belief that except for China and India, the

Soviet Russian culture would become dominant in

all of Asia. Those native languages and

cultures attempting to prevent this would not be

worth dwelling upon, since they are only going

to be used to spread communism. These and

similar words were repeated elsewhere. Without

a doubt, this will be carried-out and as a

result all those nations who wish to retain

their independence but have become your

prisoners will view Soviet Russia as their

foremost enemy. I mentioned these matters to

you while you and I were discussing your theses

on "Colonialism and the Nationality Question."

Later, I read your aforementioned theses in

Kommunisticheskii Internatsional journal (No.

11) once more. You have suggested that even

after the establishment of the worldwide

dictatorship of the proletariat, "it would be

obligatory for the vanguard nationalities to

actively participate in the establishment of

socialist regimes in the less developed

countries." This translates into perpetuating

the colonial regimes in India by the British, in

Turkistan by Russia, in Africa by French and the

Belgium through their labor organizations. When

I spoke with you and your friends in Ufa during

1919, never was there a mention of the use of

terror to destroy the human self-determination.

What happened? Wa that the object of those

revolutions? Piatokov was correct when he

directed this question to you while debating the

"labor unions" issues. You were beseeched not

to take away those revolutions from the labor

unions whose sweat and blood were spilled for

it. It is said that even Rosa Luxembourg was of

the opinion that no good would come of

socialism, should it become a prisoner of

imperialist traditions serving great nations.

If Russia has not descended into the lows of

becoming the prisoner of imperial traditions,

what business did it have concocting literary

languages and alphabets from the regional

vernaculars? If you are alive, perhaps you can

personally correct some of these errors. I have

but one request: I ask that permission be given

to my wife Nefise to meet me in Germany; she

could not accompany me tomorrow on the way to

Iran, due to her pregnancy.



Ahmet Zeki Validov.







NOTES:



1. Speech at the Fourth Conference of the Central

Committee of the RKP(b) with the responsible Workers of the

National Republics and Regions, 10 June 1923. "The Sultan

Galiev Case." J. V. Stalin, Works. (Moscow: Foreign Languages

Publishing House, 1953). Vol. 5, 1921-1923. Pp. 308-319. For

a reprint of this speech, see A. Bennigsen and S. E. Wimbush,

Moslem National Communism (Chicago, 1979).



2. As he refers to himself in his writings.



3. H. B. Paksoy, "Basmachi" Modern Encyclopedia of

Religions in Russia and the Soviet Union (FL: Academic

International Press, 1991). Vol 4, Pp. 5-20.



4. Z. V. Togan, Hatiralar. (Istanbul, 1969).

Introduction.



5. Z. V. Togan's Turkili Turkistan was first printed

in Cairo 1928-1939, although it was not widely distributed due

to the prevailing conditions. The first Latin alphabet printing

was effected during 1947 in Istanbul. It was reprinted,

effectively the third time, in Istanbul, in 1981 (696 Pp.),

although it carries the designation of 2nd Edition. Turkili is

primarily a history text. Togan's Hatiralar, on the other hand,

contains more personal observations on his involvement.



6. Most of the quotations are taken from Pp. 399-474

of Turkili (1981 edition) and Pp. 365-463 of Hatiralar.

Biographical material is primarily from the earlier pages of the

latter work. Therefore, extensive page references shall not be

given.



7. See H. B. Paksoy, Central Asian Monuments.

(Istanbul: Isis Press, 1992). Introduction, for a bibliography of

readily accessible versions. According to Ottoman archival

material (in Bashbakanlik Arshivi), it appears that Kro lu was a

real person living in the c. 16th century, around Bolu province

in Asia Minor.



8. See the short biography of Akchura by David S.

Thomas in H. B. Paksoy, Central Asian Monuments.



9. Given the date of original writing, these

references are to the respective liberation movements.



10. Turkili, Pp. 486-526.



11. Although Togan's Memoirs cover the period up to

and including the year 1925, as a consummate professional

historian, he often provides information on the resolution of

many an event, down to the days during which he was writing the

memoirs themselves. On the other hand, Togan does not introduce

new issues after 1925.



12. Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire and the Turks of Central

Asia (London, 1953). Indeed, Caroe acknowledges his indebtedness

to Togan.



13. Togan's spellings.



14. For discussion of religious terms, see M. G. S.

Hodgson, The Venture of Islam (Chicago, 1974). 3 Vols.



15. Despite their names, neither was Russian, but both

had been Baptized. Togan calls Katanov a Sagay-Turk from the

Altai region and Ashmarin, a Chuvash-Turk.



16. See Uli Schamiloglu, "The Formation of a Tatar

Historical Consciousness: Shihabeddin Marcani and the Image of

the Golden Horde" Central Asian Survey. Vol. 9, No. 2; 1990. Pp.

39-49.



17. Another prominent Orientalist of the era.



18. It was translated into English: V. V. Barthold,

Four Studies on the History of Central Asia (Leiden: E. J. Brill,

1963). Volume II, Ulugh-Beg.



19. A German born and trained compiler of Turkish

materials.



20. See H. B. Paksoy, "Basmachi" Modern Encyclopedia

of Religions in Russia and Soviet Union (FL: Academic

International Press, 1991). Vol. 4, Pp. 5-20.



21. See Edward J. Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii's

Perevodchik/Tercman: A Clarion of Modernism. H. B. Paksoy,

Editor, Central Asian Monuments (Istanbul, Isis Press, 1992) and

the sources quoted.



22. For the last two, see Audrey L. Altstadt, The

Azerbaijani Turks (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992).



23. See Fen-Edebiyat Fakultesi Arastirma Dergisi,

Ataturk Universitesi, Erzurum. Say 13, 1985. This source

contains some biographical material, especially on the post 1925

period, not found in Turkili or Hatiralar.



24. Ulama in the khanates of Bukhara or Khiva were not

part of this official structure, The Spiritual Board. As Togan

describes however, the Kadimist/Emirist ulama in these khanates

were also siding with the Russians. The ulama hoped to eliminate

the challenge to their own authority, presented by the reformist

Jadids, by liquidating the latter with the aid of the Russians.



25. According to the handlist of his papers, Togan

also completed a history of the Bashkurts and the Bashkurt Army.

This work remains unpublished. In Hatiralar there are extended

references to the past of the Bashkurt Army and its operations.

R. Baumann, in his "Subject Nationalities in the Military Service

of Imperial Russia: The Case of Bashkirs" Slavic Review

Fall/Winter 1987, argues that "...Bashkirs have parallels among

Apache Scouts in the US, the Gurkhas in India, the Philippine

Scouts, or the Natal Native Contingent in Africa." Baumann's

account ends at 1914.



26. Togan relates that secret agents of Bolsheviks,

trying to win over the Bashkurt troops, were being killed by the

latter on the spot. As a result, he reports "such elements

stopped coming even near the barracks."



27. See Society for Central Asian Studies, Programmnie

dokumenti musulmanskih politicheskih partii 1917-1920 gg. Reprint

Series, No. 2. (Oxford, 1985).



28. A biography is published: Naim Karimov, Cholpan

(Tashkent: Fan, 1991). Cf. Naim Karimov, "Exposing the Murderer

of Alpamysh;" translated by Shawn T. Lyons, from Shark Yulduzi

(Tashkent) 12:1992, in H. B. Paksoy, Ed., Central Asia Reader

(NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).



29. In Russian language Sources "Sultan Galiev." For

his and other Central Asians referenced by Togan, see Moslem

National Communism. For a more recent treatment, see Masayuki

YAMAUCHI, The Dream of Sultangaliev (Tokyo, 1986), in Japanese.

Also the sources cited by YAMAUCHI in his "One Aspect of

Democratization in Tatarstan: The Dream of Sultangaliev

Revisited" presented to the Conference on Islam and

Democratization in Central Asia, held at the University of

Massachusetts-Amherst, 26-27 September 1992.



30. For the two personages and the organization, See

S. Shaw & E. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern

Turkey (Cambridge University Press, 1977).



31. Provided to the Bashkurt RevKom by the Bolsheviks,

along with several automobiles; confiscated from foreign

missions.



32. Translation of its platform is below.



33. Togan notes that a copy of this letter was later

brought to Berlin in 1923.



34. Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur Padishah Ghazi was a

direct descendant of Timur (d. 1405), and the founder of the

Moghul dynasty in India. Babur's memoirs were widely known.

They were published in facsimile under the title Babar-Nama by

Anette S. Beveridge (Leiden-London, 1905). An English

translation was also made by Beveridge (London, 1922); reprinted

at least once, in 1969.



35. For the Russian/Bolshevik period, see Seymour

Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and

Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge, MA., 1968). For the earlier period,

see R. N. Frye, The History of Bukhara (Cambridge, MA., 1954).



36. See the Kadimist ulama above.



37. Who was the first Minister of Interior, and later,

of Defense. Earlier, Arif was Togan's military aide in the

Bashkurt Movement.



38. Togan provides the details of intellectual

currents "that might have effected the thoughts of the

individuals preparing this program" in Turkili Pp. 415-416.



39. Program in Togan, Turkili Turkistan, Pp. 410-411.



40. Togan notes that this program was expanded and

republished in Prague during 1926 in a bilingual edition. See

Togan, Turkili Turkistan, Pp. 411-414.



41. Uli Schamiloglu, "The Formation of a Tatar

Historical Consciousness: Shihabeddin Marcani and the Image of

the Golden Horde" Central Asian Survey (London) Vol. 9, No. 2,

1990.



42. Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Abdul Kayum

Al-Nasyri: A Tatar Reformer of the 19th Century" Central Asian

Survey (Oxford) Vol. 1, No. 4, 1983.



43. See Edward J. Lazzerini, Ismail Bey Gasprinskii's

Perevodchik/Tercuman: A Clarion of Modernism" H. B. Paksoy,

Editor, Central Asian Monuments (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1992) and

the sources cited therein.



44. Togan, Turkili Turkistan, Pp. 416-418.



45. A particular perspective on the Drdnc, from the

Kirghiz side, can be found in H. B. Paksoy, "Observations Among

Kirghiz Refugees from the Pamirs of Afghanistan Settled in the

Turkish Republic" Journal of the Anthropological Society of

Oxford Vol. XVI, No. 1, Hilary, 1985.



46. Korbashi is the title of preference of the

Basmachi leaders, origins of which explained as "Commander of

Defense Troops" in Mahmut Kashgarli's 11th c. work Compendium of

Turkic Dialects.



47. Togan, Turkili, Pp. 419-421.



48. Togan, Turkili P. 427.



49. The Bashkurt Movement leadership. See above.



50. Glenda Fraser, in her "Haci Sami and the Turkestan

Federation 1922-3" Asian Affairs (London). Vol. XVII (Old Series

Vol. 74) Part I, February 1987, follows Haji Sami tied to Enver's

path.



51. It must be remembered that Murteci has a much

stronger meaning than just "reactionary." Togan is remarkably

restrained in his reference.



52. See S. S. Aydemir for a biography of Enver,

Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Pa a (Istanbul, 1972) 3 Vols.

Aydemir himself was one of the early students at KUTVA, in

Moscow. He met Enver in the Caucasus during the First World War,

and later in Moscow. Aydemir subsequently worked to propagate

Bolshevism in the newly established Turkish Republic (which had

waged a similar and successful war of independence, 1919-1924, in

Asia Minor), was jailed. After his release, Aydemir entered the

Turkish Republic government service. See also Azade-Ayse

Rorlich, "Fellow Travelers: Enver Pasha and the Bolshevik

Government 1918-1920)" Asian Affairs (London) Vol. XIII (old

Series Vol. 69) Part III. October 1982).



53. Togan knew this individual well, having met him

during his earlier trip sponsored by the Imperial Academy of

Sciences.



54. It appears that the referenced memoirs were kept

very much in the tradition of the bitikchi of earlier eras. It

is well known that military units of the Turks always employed

such recorders on the battlefields for the purpose of keeping

tabs on the performance of individual troops. After the

termination of fighting, rewards and promotions or punishment and

demotions were dispensed accordingly.



55. See Kevin Krisciunas, "Legacy of Ulugh Beg." H.

B. Paksoy, Editor, Central Asian Monuments (Istanbul: Isis Press,

1992).



56. See H. B. Paksoy, "Sun is also Fire" Central Asian

Monuments, footnote 106.



57. The text in the rest of this paragraph is garbled

at the typesetter, Hatiralar, P. 461.



58. See Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks for the

alphabet issues in Azerbaijan.

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>"BASMACHI": TURKISTAN NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT 1916-1930s

H.B. Paksoy
The following paper is published in the MODERN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGIONS IN RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION (FL: Academic International Press) 1991, Vol. 4, Pp. 5-20.
The "formal" beginning of the "Basmachi" movement is usually associated with the tsarist Imperial Decree of 25 June 1916, which ordered the first non-voluntary recruitment of Central Asians into the army during the First World War. The movement was a reaction not only to conscription, but to the Russian conquest itself and the policies employed by the tsarist state in that region. Although it is primarily Russian sources and officialdom who used the term "Basmachi" --and almost exclusively to denigrate the movement-- to the Central Asians, it was an Action for National Liberation, and so referred.

Central Asia had been occupied by the tsarist armies in a long process that began with the conquest of Kazan in 1552. Its latest manifestation was the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The largest territories were taken in the second half of the 19th century when the conquest of Tashkent took place in 1865 and the Goktepe massacre of the Turkmen in 1881. Millions of Central Asians were added to the empire's population (just under 20% of the population by the 1897 Census. This is similar to the current demographic profile, due to Stalinist liquidations during which millions of Central Asians perished). It is likely that the memory of the occupation and resentment of the occupiers' repressive policies were fresh in the minds of the Central Asians in 1916. The resentment was enhanced by earlier historical memories -- the historical roots and traditions of the Central Asians include numerous large empires of their own (though in decline by the 16th century), some of which antedate the first mention of the word Rus in the chronicles. Some of those empires counted the Russians among their subjects.

Zeki Velidi Togan (1890-1970) was for over half a century a professor of history (and shared similar objectives with his contemporary colleagues Czech Thomas Masaryk and Ukrainian Michael Hrushevsky). A Central Asian himself and a principal leader of the Turkistan National Liberation Movement, Togan described the sources of the movement as follows:


"Basmachi is derived from "baskinji," meaning attacker, which was first applied to bands of brigands. During tsarist times, these bands existed when independence was lost and Russian domination began in Turkmenistan, Bashkurdistan and the Crimea. Bashkurts [in Russian language sources: "Bashkir"] called them "ayyar," by the Khorasan term. In Crimea and, borrowed from there, in Ukraine, "haydamak" was used. Among Bashkurts such heroes as Buranbay became famous; in Crimea, there was [a leader named] Halim; and in Samarkand, Namaz. These did not bother the local native population but sacked the Russians and the Russian flour- mills, distributing their booty to the population. In Ferghana, these elements were not extinct at the beginning of 1916.
.... after the proliferation of cotton planting in Ferghana [imposed by the tsarist state at the expense of cereal cultivation] the economic conditions deteriorated further. This increased brigandage. Among earlier Basmachi, as was the case in Turkey, the spiritual leader of the Uzbek and Turkmen bands was Koroglu. Basmachi of Bukhara, Samarkand, Jizzakh and Turkmen gathered at nights to read KOROGLU and other dastans [ornate oral histories]. What has the external appearance of brigandage is actuality a reflection and representation of the thoughts and spirit of a wide segment of the populace. Akchuraoglu Yusuf Bey reminds us that during the independence movements of the Serbians, the "hoduk;" the "kleft;" and "palikarya" of the Greeks comprised half nationalist revolutionaries and half brigands.

The majority and the most influential of the Basmachi groups founded after 1918 did not at all follow the Koroglu tradition, but were composed of serious village leadership and sometimes the educated. Despite that, all were labelled Basmachi. Consequently, in Turkistan, these groups were regarded as partisans; more especially representing the guerilla groups fighting against the colonial power. Nowadays, in the Uzbek and Kazakh press, one reads about Chinese, Algerian and Indian Basmachi [the references are to the respective anti-colonial movements]."


Before the 1916 Decree could be put into force by the Russians, the Central Asian leadership proceeded to take steps to prevent or delay its execution. In Samarkand, Khoja Behbudi; in Tashkent, Munevver Kari; in Khiva, Pehlivan Niyaz; in Bukhara, Osman Khoca; in Jizzakh, Kari Kamil; in Kokand, Abid Jan gathered around them the prominent personae of their localities for the purpose. Those leaders took on the historical title "Korbashi," meaning "commander of defense troops," and set about preparing the resistance. On 11 July 1916, the first mass protest meeting took place in Tashkent. Russian police fired into the crowd. The Russians arrested an additional group and summarily executing another thirty-five. The Russian settlers, who had been brought into Tashkent some thirty to forty years earlier, began looting, apparently at the instigation of the Russian police. At this, the Central Asian response stiffened. Protest meetings spread to Marghilan, Andijan and Hojend; attacks on Russian officials took place in Akkurgan, Akmesjid and Kanjagali. The population of the Jizzakh and environs destroyed the railroad at several sites, and began organizing a self defense group. The Russians responded by indiscriminate attacks on the Central Asian populations. The Turkistan National Liberation Movement had formally begun.
By the middle of August, the resistance spread to Ashkhabad and Merv, under the leadership of Juneyd Khan; to Akmola and Turgay under Abdulgaffar Bek; to Yedisu and Karakul under Shabdan Batirogullari Muhiddin and Husameddin; to the Chu basin under Ayuke oglu Kanaat Bek. Karakul was declared the center of an independent Khanate, while Yedisu was the governmental center. Their first targets were the Russian police headquarters, to acquire weapons -- their only source of supply.

Russian officialdom declared martial law in Turkistan (and the Caucasus as well), and announced a lower quota of laborers to be drafted under the 25 June decree. The new Russian statements did not change the conditions. Russian Generals Kuropotkin and Kalbovo armed the Russian settlers in Central Asia to act as additional military units to reinforce their existing and well armed regular forces. Even prisoners of war, who were being held in Russian POW camps in Central Asia, were recruited by the Russian generals as mercenaries with regular pay. Generals Ivanov and Rynov moved all their forces against Jizzakh. Fully equipped Russian regiments under General Madridov attacked the civilians of Khiva region, and according to eyewitnesses, massacred even babies in the cradle. Those who were not killed were stripped of their all possessions as retribution. After the Bolshevik revolution, it was discovered that during that short period "General Madridov had pilfered and stashed Turkmen silver jewelry in excess of 17 puds." More Russian settlers were brought in to occupy confiscated Central Asian land and homes. Contemporary reports estimated that between 25 June 1916 and October of 1917, some one and one half million Central Asians were killed by the Russian forces and settlers, with the Russian casualties numbering around three thousand. At least half of the Central Asian livestock was destroyed and an inestimable amount of personal property was looted by the Russian military forces and settlers.

The Turkistan Extraordinary Conference of December 1917 announced the formation of Autonomous Turkistan, with Kokand as its Capital. Bashkurdistan had declared territorial autonomy in January of 1918; the Tatars also took matters into hand in forming their autonomous region. Also in spring 1918, the Azerbaijan Republic and others came into being in the empire's former colonies. It seemed as if the Russian yoke was ended and freedom reigned. However, with the onset of the Bolshevik revolution, local soviets were established, again by the Russian settlers, some of whom were railroad workers. These were often headed by professional revolutionaries arriving from Moscow. Generous promises were made to the Central Asians, including indemnities for all property expropriated earlier. It proved to be a time-buying ploy. As Togan demonstrated, the soviets had no intention of allowing the much-touted "self-rule" in Central Asia, despite the rhetoric. This became clear when the Bolshevik forces burned Kokand on March 1918, and again massacred the population. The struggle not only had to continue, but also became harsher. After a final series of conferences with Lenin, Stalin and the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, Togan realized that the aims of the Bolsheviks were not different than those of their predecessors. Organizing a secret committee, Togan set about forming the basis of the united resistance, the leadership of which moved south to Samarkand and environs. A new, large-scale, coordinated stage of organizing the Turkistan National Liberation Movement commenced.

The struggle was to continue, under various methods, well into the 1930s, despite Stalin's measures and liquidations. During that period, perhaps another several million Central Asians perished in the artificially created famine, as documented in Ukrainian case. Only the relaxation of repressive measures by Moscow at the onset of the Second World War precipitated a hiatus in the movement. Moscow was once again in need of Central Asians, this time as troops to fight in yet another war. It should be noted that, almost half a million of those Central Asians thus incorporated into the Red Army defected to the Germans, solely to fight the Russians.

HISTORICAL PRELUDE TO THE TURKISTAN NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

The Turkistan National Liberation Movement was shaped directly by the attempt of the Bolsheviks to reconquer Turkistan. It must also be seen, however, as a culmination of a long process of Russian intrusion into Central Asia as reflected in the "Eastern Question" and what Kipling dubbed the "Great Game in Asia."

The long standing "Eastern Question" entailed attempts by European powers and the Russian Empire to control, or prevent another Power from controlling, the lands of the Ottoman Empire. The "Great Game," on the other hand, was played in two adjacent arenas -- in Turkistan- Afghanistan arena, as Russian armies moved south and the British tried to keep them north of Afghanistan; and in Iran (also regarded as an approach to India) with an Anglo-Russian competition for economic concessions and political influence. The Eastern Question and the Great Game can not be separated from each other, nor from Russian policy vis a vis Europe. The confluence of Russia's European policies and its Asian expansion led to conflict in Asia with England, which was then protecting her "Jewel in the Crown" -- India. This competition, in turn, directly involved the Anglo-Russian dimension of the "Eastern Question" because England regarded the tsars' ambitions with respect to the Turkish Straits (Dardanelles and the Bosphorus) as well as Russian expansion in the Caucasus (partly at the expense of the Ottomans) as threatening to India. Russian control of the Straits would lead to Russian naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and, thus, at Suez -- one gateway to India (England had similarly regarded Napoleon's invasion of Egypt as a threat to India). Expansion in the Caucasus both weakened the Ottomans as an obstacle to Russian expansion toward the Mediterranean, and seemed to some in England as a step toward an overland invasion of India via Iran. Thus in at least some respects, the Eastern Question might be considered a part of the Great Game.

It was in the Caucasus that the Eastern Question and the Great Game were linked directly. Although the major action of the Game took place in the Turkistan-Afghanistan arena -- paving the way for the Turkistan National Liberation Movement -- it seems to have begun with Russian conquests in Caucasia. The first Russo- Iranian war (1806-13) ending with the Treaty of Gulistan (1813), the second, ending with Treaty of Turkmanchai (1828), and the Russo-Ottoman war of 1828 ending in the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) all resulted in Russian expansion south of the Caucasus mountains and thus closer to India. Perhaps more worrying for the British in 1828 were the provisions of the Turkmanchai peace -- Russian goods imported into Iran would be exempt from internal tariffs; Russian subjects would not be subject to Iranian law; only Russia could maintain a fleet on the Caspian. The latter potentially enabled Russian forces to land on the southeast Caspian shore, closer to Herat (Afghanistan), a potential stepping-stone to an invasion of India, or so the English feared.

These provisions and the presence of the Russian ambassador in Tehran made the British fear a Russian-backed Iranian move against Herat thus linking the Iranian arena to the Turkistan- Afghanistan arena. The Iranian attack on Herat came in 1837 and provoked British intervention, which led in turn to the First Afghan War. The latter resulted in the destruction of the entire British force. In 1841, the British imposed on Iran a treaty almost identical to Turkmanchai. Thus proceeded the competition for political position in the "Iranian arena," a struggle which would shift into a fight for economic concessions in the last quarter of the century.

The Russians were further spurred to expansion in Asia after their humiliating defeat in the Crimean War (1853-56). That war constituted a European victory over Russian pretensions in the eastern Mediterranean, including the tsar's claims for privileged access to the Holy Land as "protector" of the Orthodox in Ottoman domains (a position first taken by Catherine the Great in the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarja [1774]). The humiliation led the Russians to look for easier victories in Central Asia. The fragmented Central Asian states, mere remnants of former empires, proved more vulnerable targets than European rivals. Russian expansion against them began in 1864 and continued for 20 years. Military rule was imposed, Christian missionary activity strove to shape education, literature and publishing. Russian peasants were settled there, a strategically important railroad leading to the Far East was begun (entailing many Russian workers who would be fertile ground for socialist agitation, and some 200,000 Chinese laborers who were later armed by the Bolsheviks against all National Liberation Movements opposing the Bolsheviks), and natural resources were extracted. Cotton cultivation was imposed to compensate for the loss of the U.S. cotton supply in the 1860s. Russia's growing textile industry acquired an alternative source of cotton; Central Asia lost its food crops and, in the 20th century, would also lose the Aral Sea and their clean environment due to pesticide poisoning.

The Russians did not, of course, abandon their ambitions on the Ottoman frontier, and defeats there again had repercussions in Central Asia. Russian gains in the Russo-Turkish war of 1875-77 alarmed Europe, but especially Britain, who feared disruption of her lines of communication with India. The resulting Congress of Berlin (1878), hosted by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, offering himself as "an honest broker," deprived Russia of the fruits of her victories and awarded the island of Cyprus to the British, assuring British dominance in the eastern Mediterranean. Though this arrangement by Bismarck and British Prime Minister Disraeli soothed British nerves, it angered the Russians. To the Russians, expansion in Central Asia promised more certain returns on Russian "investments," and seriously damaged German-Russian relations thereby paving the way for the Franco-Russian alliance of the 1890s.

In the 1890s, the British and Russians negotiated the Russian- Afghan border, established Afghanistan as an official "buffer" under English influence in 1907 and thereby called a halt to the Great Game, at least for the time being. Perhaps Britain had been pushed to her limit and Russia knew that in a direct military conflict, victory could not be assured. Certainly both Powers feared the rise of Germany, not only in Europe and in the scramble for African colonies, but because Germany was entering the "Great Game." German interests envisioned a railroad from Berlin to Beijing, through the length of the Ottoman Empire. Due to the actual political and military conditions on the ground, the project was scaled down, and the railroad turned south towards Baghdad -- still within the Ottoman Empire. Germany would affect the Turkistan National Liberation Movement a few years later, albeit indirectly.

The Great Game also had a Far Eastern component manifested in its advances against China and a series of unequal treaties signed with Chinese rulers after 1858.

Thus the Turkistan National Liberation Movement constituted an initiative on the Great Game's "gameboard" not by the "formal" players, but by the former "pawns," who now sought to retake control of their homeland and destiny. As indicated by Togan, an indigenous leader of the Movement, the impetus and organization were internal. Leaders were local men, they were responding to decades of abuse in Turkistan by the Russian conquerors. Before long, however, the Movement would also be affected by leaders from the outside who had their own experiences with European leaders in the Eastern Question and the Great Game, and their own political agendas, which they sought to impose on Turkistan. The most prominent of these was Enver Pasha, Ottoman general and son- in-law to the Ottoman ruling family.

ENVER PASHA AND THE "PAN" MOVEMENTS

Before the First World War, one of the primary hotbeds of free- thinkers in the Ottoman Empire was Salonica, where the majority of "radical" publications were also located. It was there that the young officer Enver was introduced to both the national liberation movements of Eastern Europeans, and Turkism (nationalism of the Turks). Enver also apparently joined the Ittihat ve Terakki (Union and Progress) secret organization there, one of whose primary aims was to force the Sultan of the Empire to return to Constitutional Monarchy. It was also the headquarters of the Ottoman army units that marched into Istanbul under the self-proclaimed title of "Action Army" to suppress the recidivist Islamic movement of 1909, known as the 31 March incident. Staged by the madrasa (roughly, theological-scholastic school) students and their supporters, the 31 March incident involved massacres of secular troops by the scholasticists, who demanded the abolition of everything not in conformity with Shari'a (canonical law). Among the officers of the "Action Army" which suppressed that outbreak were Enver, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), and Omer Seyfettin. Enver rose through the ranks rather rapidly. He served in Germany as military attache (1909- 1911), later married a daughter of the Ottoman Sultan and became a "Son-in-law" to the Sublime Porte, the Ottoman Court. After the deposition of Abdulhamid II (ruled 1876-1909), Enver became the "first among equals" (along with Jemal and Talat) of the Union and Progress Party triumvirate ruling the Ottoman Empire.

Enver's German connection was significant with respect to the Turkistan National Liberation Movement for two reasons. First, Enver's stay in the German Empire brought him into direct contact with the products of Institutes of Oriental studies, and the Orientalist professors themselves, especially with the proponents of "Pan-Turanianism," also called "Pan-Turanism" or "Pan- Turkism." In fact, some of those scholars were also his official sponsors and hosts. To that end, the German authorities urged the Ottoman leadership to adopt "Pan-Turanian" policies and subsequently, those of the separate Pan-Islamic Movement. Second, Germany would facilitate Enver's visit to Moscow.

"Pan-Turanianism" or "Pan-Turkism," was formulated and initiated in Europe -- not in Central Asia -- about the time of the Russian occupation of Tashkent in 1865. The formulation was the brainchild of the Hungarian Orientalist and traveller Arminius Vambery, Professor of Oriental languages. The premise of this notion was that since the overwhelming majority of the Central Asians spoke (and still speak) dialects of Turkish, share the same historical origins and history, "they could form a political entity stretching from the Altai Mountains in Eastern Asia to the Bosphorus," where the capital of the Ottoman Empire was located. This pseudo-doctrine was then attributed to the Turks themselves, and the Russians and Europeans claimed it was a revival of Chinghiz Khan's conquests, a threat not only to Russia, but the whole of Western civilization. It seemed to justify any action against Central Asia, a new "crusade" in the name of self- defense.

In fact, the doctrine was not embraced in Central Asia. As it is now known, Vambery was in the service of the British government, at a time when Britain was embroiled in the Great Game. The fear of a resurgent Central Asia was echoed in Leon Cahun's history of the Turks and Mongols the year of the Franco-Russian treaty of 1894 and repeated by the Russians in popular and scholarly publications. It was not until the first decade of the 20th century that the notion was received as a "solution" by small groups of emigres from Central Asia, living in European capitals, who were working to remove the Russian colonialism. Nonetheless, it was a successful public relations ploy for its originators in their dealings with the Western public, and accusations of "Pan- Turkism" can still be heard. It should not be confused with Turks' national consciousness, their desire for cultural revival and political independence based on historical precedent. The latter, "Turkism," is nationalism, not any different than English, Irish or French varieties; or the type expressed by the other nationalities of the Ottoman Empire.

Thus the Germans' attempt to persuade the Ottoman leadership to embrace this policy before and during World War I reflects Germany's desire to make political use of such a weapon against its enemies, the Russians, by appealing to their Turkish populations. To undermine British control in Central Asia, another doctrine was revived -- Pan-Islam. The Pan-Islamic Movement was an anti-colonial political movement of the late 19th century, and must be distinguished from the "orthodox" Islamic unity of all believers, the umma. Jamal Ad-Din al-Afghani (1839- 1897) established the movement in its political form, striving to achieve the political unity of Muslims to fight against colonialism and the colonial powers. It was popular among Indian Muslims and in north Africa. However, the movement also served the colonial powers well. Painted as a reverse-Crusade -- without necessarily using the terminology, but through graphic allusions -- the Colonial powers could mobilize both Western public opinion and secret international alliances to fight the "emerging threat." The Germans, after the death of al-Afghani, sought to make that threat as real as possible for the British in India.

By the outbreak of the First World War, the Germans were utilizing both the "Pan-Turanian" and the "Pan-Islamic" rhetoric towards their own ends, from opposite theaters. When the Bolshevik Revolution took place, the Germans -- already hard pressed by the Allies -- facilitated (and, according to sources apparently instigated) Enver's and his colleagues' visit to Moscow, the second aspect of German influence on Enver. When Enver finally arrived in Moscow, he proposed to his Bolshevik hosts an Islamic Army in Central Asia to "liberate India." Such a military operation, of course, would have tied down substantial number of Allied troops in India, away from the Western theaters. Before his clandestine departure from Istanbul, Enver had dispatched a number of Ottoman officers to Central Asia -- in his own thinking, to lay the groundwork of a national liberation movement there. At that time, his former classmates and colleagues were making preparations for the Turkish War of Liberation in Asia Minor.

Enver departed from Istanbul shortly before the occupation of the Ottoman capital by the joint British, French and Italian forces in November 1918, after the Armistice. Only the end of the war opened the Straits to the Allied Fleets. Enver arrived in Berlin early in 1919; he would eventually make his way to Moscow After two tries, arriving 16 August 1920.

TURKISTAN NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND THE "PAN" MOVEMENTS

Before Enver, "...first Halil and Jemal Pashas arrived in Moscow [May 1920] with the aim of undertaking propaganda on behalf of 'Islamic Revolutionary Society' [now known to have been headquartered in Berlin]," writes Togan. Togan had already formed the Secret Society (certainly by 1919, perhaps several years earlier) as a basis for the Turkistan National Liberation Movement whose aim was the establishment of an independent Turkistan -- the movement was unconnected to any other. The membership of this Society was drawn both from the public and private figures, included much of the leadership from Kazakh, Uzbek, Bashkurt unions. These had been formed in 1918 when Central Asian regions declared autonomy or independence in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution. These regions were subsequently attacked by the Bolsheviks. When the northern regions fell to the Red Army in 1919, the leaders of the Bashkurt, Kazakh and some Tatar autonomy movements moved south and gathered in Samarkand, Tashkent and environs.

By spring 1919 Togan was in Moscow and heading the secret Society for the liberation of Central Asia. By spring 1920, Togan had openly broken with the Moscow Bolsheviks and moved to Central Asia to assume control of the movement. He, like some other resistance leaders, went in disguise to the Comintern-sponsored Baku Congress of the Toilers of the East (September 1920), where Russian control over the Revolution in Asia was reasserted. Enver spoke at the Congress, but went on an arms-buying trip to Germany the next month. He returned to Russia only in 1921.

Togan recorded his meetings during 1920 with Enver's colleagues:


"We spoke with Halil and Jemal during June 1920. Jemal Pasha explained his ideas and urged us to work with him. On 20 August, Jemal Pasha arrived in Tashkent. His aim was to secure the environs of Punjab and to establish an Islamic state there. He was going to prepare in Afghanistan. With 15-20 Ottoman-Turkish officers [he brought with him in his retinue], he left for Afghanistan. Jemal told the Bolsheviks that he could use the Basmachi for a campaign to overthrow the British regime in India. But the Bolsheviks did not believe him in the least. We knew all this and the real intentions of the Russians through our friends working within the Communist Central Committees of Moscow and Tashkent. The Russians thought that Jemal Pasha was actually preparing an organization to control Turkistan... and wanted to keep him between the Indian and Afghanistan borders as a last resort for their own policies."

On 25 January 1921, Central Committee of the Turkistan National Unity sent a letter to Jemal Pasha, then at Kabul, via a courier:

"...we ask that your Middle East policies be drawn so as not to sacrifice the future of this old Turkistan to plans in preparation for the deliverance of the Islamic world.... Turkistan cannot subsume its future to the as yet unknown outcome of forthcoming struggle between capitalism and socialism..."
Togan continued:


"The 'Society' [of the Turkistan National Unity] steadily worked towards its goals, despite the paucity of politically experienced personnel among its ranks. Active elements of the 'Muslim' communists were channeled into the activities of the Society. In all of the provinces, members of the Society entered into the Soviet Congresses, Communist Party meetings. Everywhere, the police (militsia) organizations and administrative organs were under the influence of the Society. The labor organizations of Bukhara, Tashkent, Samarkand and Kokand were under the influence of the members of the 'Socialist Tudeh' branch of the Society. This was a monumental success and promise for the future of the Turkistanis, who were relatively inexperienced in such matters. Although the individuals working within the government and [communist] party machinery of Khiva, Tashkent and Orenburg were not members of the Society, they were completely cooperating... Such success of the Secret Organization could not have been dreamed, for example, during 1917."

Even before the arrival of Enver in Turkistan (September 1921), Islam still exerted some political force among an increasingly small portion of the populace. By then, Islam had declined from its earlier intellectual vitality, had become conservative and closely associated with powerful individuals, as if a personal cult. The Emir (ruler) of Bukhara was one such personality. Togan states:

"...[prior to the establishment of the 'Society' in Turkistan] there were three types of Basmachi: 'Emirists,' 'somewhat Emirists,' and Anti-Emirists.' The political spectrum of the Basmachi did not end there. Jemal Pasha wished to manage the problems of Turkistan and the Basmachi from Kabul. Enver Pasha, on the other hand was conducting pro-Bolshevik 'Union of Islam' (as noted, instigated by Berlin) propaganda from Moscow. This had some effect."

The 'Society' had to eliminate the Emir, his brand of personalized religion and his supporters if they were to succeed in establishing any kind of unified mechanism to oppose the Bolsheviks. That did not prove to be easy. Togan observes:

Until the establishment of the Society, and while the Emirate of Bukhara was still in existence, the Educated Turkistanis were not in contact with the Basmachi. Basmachi units were largely based on the Kadimist Ulama [the scholasticists, not unlike those who staged the uprising in Istanbul during 1909] and the elements of the fanatics... During the 1917 Representative Council elections, the educated were on List Number Four. The ulama, opposing the educated, thus labelled them 'Dorduncu' [Fourth] and engaged in violent 'anti- Dorduncu' propaganda. As a result, the majority of the younger generation did not trust the Dorduncu during 1918-1919, particularly since the educated were also siding with the soviets. As the hopes of the educated were dashed by the Bolsheviks during 1920, they joined the ranks of the Society. The abolition of the Bukhara Emirate eliminated the reasons preventing the youth from any action. Collectively, these developments diminished the influence of the ulama on the Basmachi. The Society established contacts without any hesitation with the Basmachi in Samarkand, Khiva and Ferghana. The objective was to shape the movement into a real national movement infused with spirit, coupled with modern organization, to form military units under the command of progressive and educated individuals. To this end, educated advisors and some instructor officers were sent to them. The Emir of Bukhara regarded the Bolsheviks as 'Russia' until his last days and attempted to remain 'loyal.' The Emir had disarmed Osipov's military unit in Shehrisebz, where it had sought protection within his domains.

The Baku Congress of the Toilers of the East also had its effect on the Turkistan National Liberation Movement, increasing their resolve to fight the Bolsheviks. The Central Asians had a chance to see how Bolsheviks came prepared to the Congress, including resolutions to be made by the gathering. The Bolshevik "security" had effectively prevented the genuine Central Asian delegates from even making speeches. In other words, the outcome of the Congress appeared to have been pre-determined. While the "Society" was undertaking regular if secret political and military preparations for a free and independent Turkistan, "Enver Pasha arrived in Bukhara and sent word that he wished to speak with me" continues Togan.

"On 2 October [1921] I met him, and upon his request, provided him with the details of the circumstances, especially the status of the Society. Enver Pasha's arrival in Bukhara, especially his plans were a totally unexpected development for us. A few months ago this person was engaged in propaganda through the pamphlets of 'Union of Islam,' in connection with Jemal Pasha advocating cooperation with the Bolsheviks against imperialism. Now [he indicated that] he was not only taking a position against the Bolsheviks, but actually... planned to attack them."

The tsarist armies had earlier laid down arms and let the European conflict be acted out among the remaining participants. The Bolsheviks were in a position, after reorganizing and regrouping, to shift forces from the western front into Turkistan. On 11 August 1919, the Turkistan Front was formally established by the Bolsheviks, with a minimum of 106,000 regular troops and several generals. By September 1920, Bolsheviks consolidated their First, Fourth, Fifth armies with the Special Turkistan Army. Despite all that military force, Bolsheviks were unable to break the resolve of the Korbashi and the population of Central Asia. Special projects were needed to effect the results desired by the Bolsheviks. The "Pan" movement propaganda was the preferred solution.
Togan suggested that Enver should cross over to Afghanistan and continue his personal struggle from there, leaving the Society to continue with its own planned actions. Instead, Enver chose to take his headquarters to Eastern Bukhara to convene a congress of the Basmachi there. Vehement but polite objections from the Society's Central Committee did not affect Enver's decision. Togan wrote:


"That day I learned that this person [Enver] was a great idealist, who had not squared himself with events in life, and he had not equipped himself with the geography and the statistics of Turkistan even from the Russian and the European publications. Undoubtedly, he had decided on his actions during the twenty three days he was resident in Bukhara."

Apparently Togan was justified in his advice to Enver, for, the latter was detained by the Emirist forces upon arrival in Eastern Bukhara. Only after Enver had proclaimed himself "Commander of the Islamic Forces and Bukhara, Son-in-Law of the Caliph" etc. and began issuing edicts under those titles he was released from virtual prison. It was ironic that Enver, who had once fought against the Scholasticist Recidivists demanding Shari'a in Istanbul, should collaborate with a similar group, using religious epithets more than a dozen years later and more than a thousand miles away.
The Society decided to stay aloof, and attempted to cope with this fait accompli as best as it could. The Society was receiving the details of Enver's actions through its well ordered intelligence network. The Emirists began taking openly hostile actions against the known members and units of the Society, and even endeavored to enter into separate armistice negotiations with the Bolsheviks. The Society decided to take drastic action, even considered persuading Enver to cross over to Afghanistan by any means. Before action could be taken, Enver, the former Deputy Commander in Chief of the Armies of the Ottoman Empire, was killed in battle with the Russians. He headed a platoon-sized force, sword in hand, and was assaulting a machine-gun position.

After Enver's demise, the split caused by the Emirist ulama was not quick to heal. The Society of Turkistan National Unity continued the armed struggle against the Bolsheviks and began gaining the upper hand. Meanwhile, the Paris Peace Conference ignored Turkistan, her native population and its defenders. Unlike the independent Azerbaijan Republic (1918-1920) Delegation, which was received, if only briefly, at the Paris Peace Conference, the representatives sent to Paris by the Turkistani leadership never received formal recognition. The Turkistan National Movement not only did not receive any outside help, but was continually harassed via India and Persia. Even when the aid to the anti-Bolshevik Wrangel Armies through Crimea (via Istanbul) was being carried out, or Allied and US troops landed in Arkhangelsk to attack the Bolsheviks (1919), the Turkistanis were not even considered as allies. The old "Pan- Turk" and "Pan-Islamic" bogeymen were invoked against them. Perhaps they were still too close to India.

THE LAST YEARS OF THE TURKISTAN NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

When the Central Committee of the Society of Turkistan National Unity realized that the end of armed struggle portion of their movement was drawing to a close, they took several actions. The first was to smuggle out capable and knowledgeable representatives of their movement, so that they could make the movement known to the world at large. A second action was to continue the political side of the movement, to attempt to save the organization and its members within the Soviet apparatus. Initially, they succeeded in doing both.

Several dozen participants in the armed struggle were smuggled out. Even if those individuals were to stay behind, they could not have been of any help to the Society. They, unlike those who did occupy government and party positions under the Bolsheviks, would have been continually and relentlessly hunted down by Moscow and its security apparatus, thus becoming a liability to the Society. Those who emigrated would serve the cause well outside, mostly from various European capitals. After the Second World War, the US finally decided to take action. Through the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (based in New York), the Coordinating Center for the Anti- Bolshevik Struggle (Munich) was funded. Even then, the US policymakers and functionaries appeared not to have fully appreciated the Turkistan National Liberation Movement, its implications, goals, methods and organization. The US organizers continually insisted that all the representatives of those nationalities living in the USSR should gather within the Coordinating Center for the Bolshevik Struggle. While the Russian members of that Committee were held to be in charge by the US side, the Turkistani representatives were required to work under the Russians. To the Turkistani representatives, like those of other nationalities, that was unthinkable. But the US organizers either did not understand the issues on the ground, or were not well briefed, despite the well-intentioned efforts of individuals in regular contact with the emigres. The Committee did not prove to be very effectual for obvious reasons. The Moscow based counter-propaganda organizations did not encounter too many difficulties in splitting the Committee, rendering it useless for political purposes.

The second goal, saving the political organization and its membership within the Soviet state, was also accomplished in the short run. The Turkistan SSR was founded with Tashkent as its capital. The Society members were still in charge of the critical offices, or at least had influence over them. The Turkistan SSR, however, was never intended by Moscow to be a permanent division. During 1924, the Turkistan SSR was subdivided into Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen Republics. Later subdivisions created the Tajik and the Kirghiz SSRs, carved out of Uzbek and Kazakh SSRs respectively. Even then, the membership of the Society was not eradicated until the full force of Stalinist purges, the Great Terror, had reached Central Asia. Coming after collectivization and the famine caused by the mandatory shift to cotton cultivation, this crushing of the old leadership, which was also the educated elite in society, was the consummate attack on Central Asia, its leaders, and through their deaths, on indigenous culture and historical memory. That was the punishment meted out to Central Asians by Moscow, for wishing to decide their own fates apart from the Bolsheviks.

SOURCES:

No comprehensive history of the Turkistan National Liberation Movement exists. There are, however, a number of works dealing with various aspects of the era. Two volumes by Z. V. Togan are among the most important: TURKILI TURKISTAN [TURKISTAN AND ITS RECENT HISTORY] (Istanbul, 1981) 2nd Latin alphabet Edition; idem, HATIRALAR [MEMOIRES] (Istanbul, 1969). These works were originally written during the 1920s, while Togan was heavily involved in organizing the Turkistan National Liberation Movement efforts in Central Asia. Portions of Togan's volumes pertinent to the topic at hand have been extracted and translated into English. See H. B. Paksoy "Basmachi Movement From Within: Memoires of Z. V. Togan," in NATIONALITIES PAPERS, 1993 (forthcoming) --from which the quotations in the text are taken. The late Togan's personal library contains additional notes and unpublished accounts by several significant Korbashi -- such as Hemrah Kul Bek and Mamur Bek-- from which he quotes in his volumes. Those papers are as yet unavailable to researchers.

Togan's reference to the KOROGLU dastan (ornate oral history) is not a passing one. Koroglu is an identifiable historical person who had led a significant socio-political movement. As far as it is documented, the account of Koroglu can be dated at least to the 16th century. The Turkmen, Azeris (both in the USSR and in the present Islamic Republic of Iran) and the Turks of the current Turkish Republic -- all of whom share common ethnic and cultural origins with the rest of the Central Asians - - are well acquainted with KOROGLU. Various fragments of this dastan have been published at least two dozen times since 1930s at various locations. Until recently, the Soviet authorities exerted extraordinary efforts to keep KOROGLU out of print within the USSR domains. However, the Central Asians re-discovered this important work and began issuing it despite official attacks upon it, both in Central Asian dialects and in Russian. Currently the Central Asian scholars are hard at work in the Academies of Sciences of the Kirghiz, Uzbek and Kazakh SSR, documenting the effects of this dastan on the history of Central Asia. A list of already published volumes, almost exclusively in the Central Asian dialects, would be too lengthy to include here. For a discussion of the dastan genre, see the entry in MERSSU. Further, H. B. Paksoy, ALPAMYSH: CENTRAL ASIAN IDENTITY UNDER RUSSIAN RULE (Hartford, CT: Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research Monograph Series, 1989); idem, "Central Asia's New Dastans" in CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY, Vol.6., N.1., 1987; idem, "Chora Batir: A Tatar Admonition to Future Generations" STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM, Vol. XIX, Nos. 3&4, 1986.

Ali Bademci compiled and edited the written and oral memoires of a score of Korbashi, then living in the Turkish Republic, and published under the title TURKISTAN MILLI ISTIKLAL HAREKETI VE ENVER PASA 1917-1934 [NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF TURKISTAN AND ENVER PASHA] (Istanbul, 1975). A quantity of those individual memoires upon which Bademci draws, as he notes, were serialized in periodicals. This volume contains valuable documentation attesting to the comprehensive organization the Basmachi constructed. There are oral reports indicating further memoires are being compiled and edited with a view of publication by others. A partial list of the earlier compiled memoires include: Abdullah Recep Baysun, TURKISTAN MILLI HAREKETLERI (Istanbul, 1943); Mustafa Cokayoglu, 1917 HATIRA PARCALARI (Paris-Berlin, 1937) Husamettin Erturk, IKI DEVRIN PERDE ARKASI (Istanbul, 1969); A. Inan, "1916 Yilindaki Ayaklanma" TURK KULTURU Sayi 12, 1963; Hasan Oraltay, ALAS: TURKISTAN TURKLERININ MILLI PAROLASI (Istanbul, 1973); A. Oktay, "Turkistan Milli Muhtariyet Hukumeti" DERGI Sayi 19, 1964); Ibrahim Yarkin "Muhtar Turkistan ve Alas Orda Hukumetleri ile Basmacilik Hareketleri Hakkinda" TURK KULTURU Sayi 23, 1964; idem, "Turkistanda 1916 Isyani Hakkinda Bazi Bilgiler" TURK KULTURU Sayi 68, 1968. Bademci's volume contains a more detailed listing, including unpublished manuscripts and tape-recorded oral histories of the participants and major events. An English translation of this work would be instructive. Togan's works append full texts of the primary programs of the Turkistan National Unity organization, portions of which may be found in English in H. B. Paksoy, "Basmachi Movement From Within: Memoires of Z. V. Togan." Baymirza Hayit's ESIR TURKLER, Sekip Engineri (Tr.) (Ankara, 1966); idem, TURKISTAN IM JAHRHUNDERT (Darmstad, 1956) provide much detail on the Bolshevik countermeasures against the Turkistan National Liberation Movement, along with copies of official orders.

The Soviet organs have issued quite a few books on the "Basmachi," from their own particular perspective. Marie Broxup compiled a bibliography containing 205 entries, the majority of which are such works. See "The Basmachi" CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY Vol.2, N.1., 1983. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan induced a recent interest in the Turkistan National Liberation Movement and produced additional entries to the bibliography. For preliminary updates, see H. B. Paksoy in the NATIONALITIES PAPERS. See L. Tillett THE GREAT FRIENDSHIP: SOVIET HISTORIANS ON THE NON- RUSSIAN NATIONALITIES (Chapel Hill, 1969) for an overview of "history re-writing" in the Soviet Union, to eradicate the memory of the Turkistan National Liberation Movement. A. Park's BOLSHEVISM IN TURKESTAN 1917-1927 (Columbia, 1957) makes use of large number of Soviet sources on some perspectives of the Movement.

Much has been written on the Eastern Question, from various aspects: H. Seton-Watson THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE 1801-1917 (Oxford, 1967), and for the continuation, R. Pipes FORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION (Harvard, 1957). They complement each other and may be consulted to acquire a basic outline. The politicians of all involved nations (except the Ottomans, who were much more the target than a player) in the Great Game and the Eastern Question drew upon the knowledge of the most able Orientalists of their times. Russians imported very capable German scholars to initiate such efforts in St. Petersburg. See R. N. Frye "Oriental Studies in Russia" in RUSSIA AND ASIA, Wayne Vucinich (Ed.) (Stanford, 1972).

For the Russians, 1945 was the beginning of the redoubling of their efforts in this field. Currently, the Soviet Institutes and Academies of Sciences are continuing their work at breakneck speed on Oriental Studies. The efforts of the Russians are documented, even in English. For example, see ASIA IN SOVIET STUDIES (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, 1969); FIFTY YEARS OF ORIENTAL STUDIES (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, 1967). Not only had the Russians not forgotten, but, they are keenly aware that they could not afford to, and that their future is tied to the "East." German interest in Central Asian affairs continued well into the Second World War, as the advance units of the Wehrmacht reached Caucasus. See for example Reiter Olzscha and Georg Cleinow, TURKESTAN: DIE POLITISCH-HISTORIEN UND WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN PROBLEME ZENTRALASIENS (Leipzig, 1942).

The "Great Game in Asia" has been studied by E. Ingram: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE GREAT GAME IN ASIA 1828-1834 (Oxford, 1979); idem, COMMITMENT TO EMPIRE: PROPHECIES OF THE GREAT GAME IN ASIA 1797-1800 (Oxford, 1981); idem, IN DEFENSE OF BRITISH INDIA: GREAT BRITAIN IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1775-1842 (London, 1984).

Many Western and Russian authors wrote of "Pan Turanism," ostensibly a movement by Turks to establish hegemony over the world, or at least Eurasia, after its originator Arminius Vambery, in his TRAVELS IN CENTRAL ASIA (London, 1865). See his SKETCHES OF CENTRAL ASIA (London, 1868). See also C. W. Hostler, TURKISM AND THE SOVIETS (London, 1957), and the works cited by him. For documentation on Vambery's being in the pay of the British Government, see M. Kemal Oke "Professor Arminius Vambery and Anglo-Ottoman Relations 1889-1907" BULLETIN OF THE TURKISH STUDIES ASSOCIATION Vol. 9, No. 2., 1985, containing references to documents available in the Public Records Office-London. Among the "scare literature" perpetuating the "threat" of the doctrine itself, is L. Cahun's INTRODUCTION A L'HISTOIRE DE L'ASIE, TURCS, ET MONGOLS, DES ORIGINES A 1405 (Paris, 1896). The SECRET HISTORY OF THE MONGOLS, written c. 1240 A. D., however, notes, quoting Chingis: "Tangri (God) opened the gate and handed us the reins," indicating that Chingis regarded only himself ruling by divine order. See MOGOLLARIN GIZLI TARIHI [SECRET HISTORY OF THE MONGOLS] (A. Temir, Trans.) (Ankara, 1948).

Another well-known representative sample is A MANUAL ON THE TURANIANS AND PAN-TURANIANISM (H. M. Government, Naval Staff Intelligence Department: Oxford, November 1918), a work that was based on Vambery's TURKENVOLK (Leipzig, 1885). It was compiled by Sir Denison Ross, as Sir Denison later personally informed Togan. On this work, see Togan's comments in TURKILI. Earlier, writing under the pseudonym "Tekin Alp," Moiz Cohen wrote TURAN (Istanbul, 1914) had added fuel to the fire, when it appeared in German under the title TURKISMUS UND PANTURKISMUS (Weimar, 1915). It was secretly translated into English by the British Admiralty, and heightened the "Pan-Turanian phobia." That English translation THE TURKISH AND PAN-TURKISH IDEAL (London: Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division, 1917) was originally classified "secret," for use only within H.M. government, and is still rather difficult to see a copy of it even in the 1980s. See also J. M. Landau, PAN-TURKISM IN TURKEY: A STUDY OF IRREDENTISM (London, 1981). Landau's book is primarily concerned with the emigre aspects of "pan-Turkism."

Many studies have been made of the so-called language reforms in the USSR. Among others, see especially Z. V. Togan, TURKILI TURKISTAN; Stefan Wurm, TURKIC PEOPLES OF THE USSR: THEIR HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, THEIR LANGUAGE, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET LINGUISTIC POLICY (Oxford, 1954); idem, THE TURKIC LANGUAGES OF CENTRAL ASIA: PROBLEMS of Planned Culture Contact (Oxford, 1954).

A biography of Enver was written by Sevket Sureyya Aydemir under the title MAKEDONYA'DAN ORTA ASYA'YA ENVER PASHA [ENVER PASHA FROM MACEDONIA TO CENTRAL ASIA] (3 vols) (Istanbul, 1970- 1972). Enver left an autobiography. It was utilized by Aydemir. There is a German translation of Enver's autobiography, located in the Sterling Library of the Yale University -- also noted by Glen Swanson "Enver Pasha: The Formative Years" MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, Vol.16, N.3., October 1980. Azade-Ayse Rorlich provides a further view of Enver in her "Fellow Travelers: Enver Pasha and the Bolshevik Government 1918-1920" in the JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY FOR ASIAN AFFAIRS, Vol. XIII (Old Series Vol 69), Part III, October 1982. Close colleagues and classmates of Enver from the Ottoman Military academy left memoires in which Enver is featured prominently. Among those, Marshal Fevzi Cakmak, General Kazim Karabekir, Ismet Inonu and Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) are notable. Approximately half of those were written at the height of Enver's success and powers.

About the Recidivist Movement of 31 March 1909, Sina Aksin's 31 MART OLAYI (Ankara, 1970) is a good compilation from primary and secondary sources. THE YOUNG TURKS: PRELUDE TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1908 (Beirut, 1965) by Ernest E. Ramsaur, Jr. contains an extensive bibliography as well as an overview of the indicated period, and the "Young Ottomans." On Jamal Ad-Din al-Afghani, see, inter alia, H. A. R. Gibb, MODERN TRENDS IN ISLAM (Chicago, 1947). A comprehensive "Pan-Islam" bibliography would prove to be a long-term undertaking in itself. See Nikki Keddie, SAYYID JAMAL AD-DIN "AL-AFGHANI:" A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972).



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ESSAYS ON CENTRAL ASIA INDEX

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От	vladvitkam
К	Офф-Топик (28.01.2008 04:47:14)
Дата	28.01.2008 21:06:25

16-й, правда, не 14-й, но все равно спасибо (-)

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