От Leopan
К All
Дата 26.02.2010 11:57:25
Рубрики WWII; Память;

Умер американский офицер, "прозевавший" нападение на Перл-Харбор

Офицер американских ВВС Кермит Тайлер, в 1941 году не поверивший сообщениям о предстоящем японском нападении на военно-морскую базу Перл-Харбор, скончался в США на 96-м году жизни.
Тайлер был на дежурстве утром 7 декабря 1941 года, когда двое рядовых сообщили ему, что радар обнаружил подозрительные объекты, приближавшиеся к базе. "Не беспокойтесь", - ответил им Тайлер, который полагал, что радар засек своих - группу американских бомбардировщиков B-17. Эти слова преследовали его всю жизнь.
http://www.segodnya.ua/news/14118604.html
От HorNet
К Leopan (26.02.2010 11:57:25)
Дата 26.02.2010 12:30:08

Re: Умер американский...

>Тайлер был на дежурстве утром 7 декабря 1941 года, когда двое рядовых сообщили ему, что радар обнаружил подозрительные объекты, приближавшиеся к базе. "Не беспокойтесь", - ответил им Тайлер, который полагал, что радар засек своих - группу американских бомбардировщиков B-17. Эти слова преследовали его всю жизнь.
> http://www.segodnya.ua/news/14118604.html

Второй лейтенант Тайлер нес это дежурство второй раз в жизни, причем первый раз, 3 декабря с 12.00 до 16.00, оно было "пустым" - никаких целей планшетисты не вели.
И потом, винить надо не Тайлера, а отстутствие взаимодействия между авиациями Армии и USN.
Думаю, не очень длинная и сложная цитата по-английски:

During the first two hours, no radar contacts were made. At 0613, Koko Head and Fort Shafter began picking up sightings south of the island. Then at 0645, Kaaawa, Opana, and Kawailoa picked up a target approximately 135 miles north of Oahu heading south. All three stations called the Information Center with the targets, which were then plotted on the master plot board. Personnel at the center included five plotters (one for each radar site), a historical information plotter; PFC Joseph P. McDonald, the switchboard operator; and Lt Kermit Tyler, a pursuit pilot. The radar sites phoned the plots to the five plotters, and no one present found anything unusual with the information. McDonald had worked the switchboard for several months and knew the radar operators, while Tyler had been to the Information Center only once before. On 3 December he had worked from 1200 to 1600 with just the switchboard operator. On that occasion nothing had happened, because the sites were not operating. Therefore this was the first time he had actually seen personnel plot targets. When the reports began coming in, Tyler went to the historical plotter's position and talked with him about how he recorded the information. These first plots were probably the scout planes sent ahead of the main attacking force.15

At 0700 all the radar sites began shutting down. At the Information Center the five plotters and the historical information plotter shut down and left the area, leaving McDonald and Tyler behind. At Opana, Pvts George E. Elliott and Joseph L. Lockard had been scheduled to work until noon, but the next shift had come back early from a pass to town so they could relieve them at 0800. This meant that when the truck arrived to take them to breakfast, they would be through for the day.

However, the same call that informed them about getting off early also let them know the truck would be late picking them up. Lockard was a trained radar operator and had been with the 270s since they arrived on the island, while Elliot had just transferred into the Signal Corps from the Hawaiian Air Force and only knew how to operate the plotting board. Because the breakfast truck would be late and they were going to be off for the rest of the day, the two decided to use the time to work on Elliot's training. A few minutes after seven, Elliot got a large spike on the screen; thinking he had done something wrong, he immediately began to check the settings. Lockard then took over the operation and also rechecked the controls. This was the biggest sighting he had ever seen since learning how to operate the system. Elliot then tried to call the Information Center, using the phones connected directly to the plotters. No one was there to take the call. He then called on the administration line and got McDonald. The switchboard operator knew both of the radar operators and tried to explain to them that there was nobody on duty in the Center after 0800. McDonald then spotted Lt Tyler and called him over to talk to Elliot; meanwhile, Lockard got on the phone and tried to explain that this was a large target and might be significant. McDonald interjected at this point that if the targets were so large, maybe they should call back the plotters so they could practice handling a big aircraft movement. Tyler thought about this for a moment and then told Lockard and McDonald not to worry and closed the conversation.

Because the breakfast truck still had not arrived, Elliot and Lockard continued tracking the incoming target until about twenty miles from the coast of Oahu. At that point ground interference blocked thе signal, and the target was lost. This was around 0745. Just then the breakfast truck pulled up, so the two young radar operators shut their unit off and headed down the mountain to breakfast, not yet realizing that they had discovered the first wave of the Japanese attack.

Why had Lt Tyler told the operators not to worry, and why had he not followed McDonald's advice to call back the plotters? Tyler saw no reason to change the normal operations that morning. First, there was no alert or warning of an impending attack. Second, the US Fleet's carriers were at sea and the sightings could well have been the carrier's aircraft returning to port. Third, a bomber pilot friend had explained just a few days before that one could always tell when aircraft were arriving from the US because the local radio stations would play Hawaiian music all night. The incoming aircraft would use the music to tune their directional finders and thus locate the islands. (This was exactly what the Japanese did.) On the way to the Center, Tyler had heard the Hawaiian music, so he assumed a flight was coming in. Finally, although Lockard had said this was the biggest flight he had ever seen, he did not say how many aircraft he thought it might contain. Later, Lockard would claim he knew the flight had to number over 50 aircraft to make that large of a pip on the screen, but at the time he did not give that information to anyone. Had Tyler known that the sighting was over 50 aircraft, he might have reacted differently; but with the information on hand, second lieutenants do not wake up commanding officers at seven o'clock Sunday mornings with wild speculations.



От Д.Белоусов
К HorNet (26.02.2010 12:30:08)
Дата 26.02.2010 18:25:02

Чудеса - своей смертью помер, не оказался японо-итальянским шпионом-троцкистом (-)
От фельдкурат Отто Кац
К Д.Белоусов (26.02.2010 18:25:02)
Дата 26.02.2010 19:01:13

Зря его Сталин и Черчилль не поощрили ... (-)
От mpolikar
К Д.Белоусов (26.02.2010 18:25:02)
Дата 26.02.2010 18:35:33

американцы использовали его для двойной игры ;) (-)