От Llandaff
К Grozny Vlad
Дата 30.07.2018 17:35:21
Рубрики ВВС; Искусство и творчество;

Стрелять из пушек по летящим целям в воздушном бою сложно

Точнее, стрелять-то легко, а вот попадать сложно, даже с "корректировкой по трассам". Поэтому в воздушных боях второй мировой в основном все мазали, давали инструкции "открывать огонь только в упор". А те немногие, кто не мазали - становились асами.


Вертолетчики точно не имеют устойчивого навыка стрельбы из пушки в воздушном бою. А из дистанции "в упор" А-10 удалится быстро. Так что как мне кажется, шансов крайне мало.
От Ibuki
К Llandaff (30.07.2018 17:35:21)
Дата 30.07.2018 20:01:49

Re: Стрелять из...

См. патент RU 2218544...
От Инженер-109
К Llandaff (30.07.2018 17:35:21)
Дата 30.07.2018 19:27:04

А-10 быстро удалится? Полагаете он наземные цели атакует на 700кмч?

>Точнее, стрелять-то легко, а вот попадать сложно....
>...А из дистанции "в упор" А-10 удалится быстро. Так что как мне кажется, шансов крайне мало.

А-10 не сможет никуда попасть, если начнет огонь на 700кмч. Ему надо 350-400 для верных попаданий. А если рядом окажется Ми-24 на своих 220кмч, то все вполне может сложиться неблагоприятно для А-10. Сбил же Ми-24 штурмующего наземные цели F-4 в ирано-иракской.
Пило А-10 дав по "газам", должен еще 5-7 секунд подождать пока турбинки "запоют" и появится шанс быстро отрулить за горизонт
От Ibuki
К Инженер-109 (30.07.2018 19:27:04)
Дата 30.07.2018 23:19:44

Ми-24 vs Ф-4 Иран-Ирак

>Сбил же Ми-24 штурмующего наземные цели F-4 в ирано-иракской.
The tale of ‘Hind’ versus Phantom

Iraq’s overclaims for the numbers of Iranian aircraft it had shot down in air combat and by air defences were common during this war. The most controversial of all the Iraqi daims ever was published on October 27 in the Baghdad Observer, a magazine controlled by the Iraqi regime and targeting Western reporters. In the report with the title The Day of the Helicopter Gunship an air battle was briefly described that supposedly developed several days earlier, and in which a Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter had shot down an Iranian F-4. According to the article, the engagement happened “north of the Eyn-e Khosh area” and the Phantom was destroyed by a “next―generation, long-range, AT-6 Sprial ATGM,” fired by a Mi-24 specially prepared and brought to Iraq by the Soviets in order to test the AT-6 missile in the air-to-air mode.
Ever since, this claim has been making the rounds in various Western, Ukrainian and Russian publications. In general, this claim has widely been accepted as ‘authentic’ and was considered as ‘confirmed’ even by observers with considerable knowledge of helicopters and anti-armour warfare, or former dignitaries of the Soviet Air Force and airspace industry. Most Russian and Ukrainian students use it to ‘confirm’ the capabilities and firepower of the Mi-24 and the AT-6, even if very few people actually knew anything about the background of the claim, or its initial source, while others are obviously ignoring these, while maintaining that the claim was confirmed by ‘US intelligence’.
Significantly, even Western armoured-warfare experts, who are usually sceptical of any ‘Arab’ claims - especially for destroying such an advanced product of Western technology like an F-4 - have appeared to be more than willing to accept that this incident really happened. Considering the number of sources and their credibility, it seems difficult to dispute anything in this context. Under closer scrutiny, the reality turned out to be completely different and this case illustrates once more how poorly the air war between Iraq and Iran has been researched so far.
The more one looks into this case, the more evidencethere appears to be that there was no engagement between Iraqi Mi-25s and Iranian Phantoms - at least with the claimed result - in the time and place stated. On the contrary - it appears that the actual source for all the publications that have so far mentioned this claim regardless of being Western or East European sources - is the same: the report of the Washington-based Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which repeated the claim of the Baghdad Observer on page E2 of its Communique No.885, FBIS-MEA-82-209, from October 28, 1982.
FBIS is not ‘US intelligence’, but rather an information service which compiles reports from all possible foreign media sources and broadcasts, and reports these to different US services, government agencies, and branches of the military. FBIS neither confirms nor denies reports that it is forwarding: it simply passes on what has been reported by somebody else. This is frequently ignored, especially in an increasing number of the research papers published in recent years, many of which meanwhile explain that this air battle happened on October 27, 1982 - that means, on the same date which the claim had actually been published for the first time in the Baghdad Observer, which in turn obviously described that the engagement had happened several days earlier!
Ever since that report was published for the first time in the Baghdad Observer, no new details about this engagement have appeared. There has been no gun-camera footage (all Iraqi Mi-25s, and all Soviet Mi-24s were equipped with gun-cameras), no narratives from the (unknown) pilots who supposedly make the ‘kill’ (especially surprising, given the fact that the crew of the scoring Mi-24 should have been Russian), not even a closer description of how this engagement developed. Nothing except for some rumours from Russia that this battle “must have happened”, if for no other reason, than because the Soviets and Iraqis had supposedly organised a party to celebrate this success several days before the report in Baghdad Observer was published.
Research into the theoretical possibility that the Soviets might have deployed some AT-6-equipped Mi-25s to Iraq, brought no positive results whatsoever. As revealed earlier, the Iraqis never got any AT-6s. Furthermore, while both the Iranians, and later the US forces during the Second Persian Gulf War, in 1991, have captured hundreds of Iraqi ATGMs, including such Western products as Milan, Swingfire, HOT, AS.11, and AS.12, or Soviet-produced AT-2s, AT-3s, and AT-4s - no AT-6s, nor any traces of them in the Iraqi military, have ever been captured or found. In addition, during the early 1980s, the Soviet Air Force was so short of Mi-24s due to the war in Afghanistan, and under such pressure to field as many Mi-24s as possible with units facing NATO, that deliveries of Mi-25s to Iraq slipped badly behind schedule. At one point the Soviets were even forced to take several East German Mi-24s, which were in the USSR for refurbishment, and press them into service in Afghanistan! It should also be remembered that in 1982 relations between Moscow and Baghdad were not close enough forthe Soviets to consider sending one of their most important weapons to Iraq. Particularly as they were already working on using the R-60 (AA-8 Aphid) short-range air-to-air missile as the main air-to-air weapon for the Mi-24, because they were well aware that the AT-6 could not be used in that role: the version available at the time - the 9M114 (AT-6A) - was so poorly manufactured that it constantly failed even when tested under ideal conditions.
This was confirmed by a series of tests conducted by the US Army on the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in the 1980s and 1990s under the code-name PASSIVE NOVA 1, 2, and 3. These used a total of 120 AT-6s clandestinely purchased from different East European sources. Conducted by top US Army personnel, expertly trained in the use of Soviet-produced weapons systems, these tests showed that only four out of 100 AT-6s fired against targets moving at speeds of up to 9mph (15km/h) would score a hit and destroy the target.
Testing against stationary targets ended with only slightly better results, as only eleven out of 100 AT-6s would hit and destroy the target - and that while being fired from a fixed tower, not from a helicopter diving at high speed and flown by a crew under stress and in hurry! US Army personnel concluded from the tests that the most reliable part of the AT-6 was its warhead (despite its small diameter) and that the weapon was highly efficient - if it managed to score a hit, which did not happen very often. In short, not only do these facts contradict Russian sources which claim a hit probability of 70-80% for the AT-6, but - statistically - there is also no possibility that the AT-6A could hit a target moving at 350-500 knots while being fired from a moving helicopter. The claimed hit probability of 70-80% for the AT-6 is probably valid only for the AT-6B and AT-6C versions and only for rounds fired during the trials in the later 1990s. In 1994 the Russians completely rebuilt and upgraded their remaining stocks of AT-6s. Obviously, they had good reasons to do so!
Two former Iraqi helicopter pilots who flew with the 4th Squadron IrAAC in 1982, and three other former officers of the Iraqi military, remember being told about how Iraqi helicopters had shot down Iranian helicopters time and again during the war. They recall also that pictures of the wreckage of Iranian helicopters were shown to them, and that many of their comrades being killed when Iraqi helicopters were shot down by Iranian helicopters and fast jets. But, they never heard about any claim that any of their Mi-25s had shot down an F-4, nor about the Soviets deploying Mi-24s and AT-6s to Iraq and achieving anything similar.
All of them consider this claim to have been a propaganda plot by the Iraqi government - which, after the severe setbacks from the previous fighting during 1982, was in a dire need of some good news at the time this claim was published. Both of the former IrAAC pilots confirmed - just like US documents released to the authors after several FOIA inquiries - that the AT-6 was never accepted to Iraqi Army service, especially not by IrAAC Mi-25s, and that the Soviets never tested that weapon in Iraq.
To the best knowledge of the authors, the IRIAF wartime records, as well as other official documents mention no losses of any F-4s or F-5s over the front near Eyn-e Khosh in October 1982, and no losses of any Iranian fighters to Iraqi helicopters ever. Finally, none of the several dozen former Iraqi and Iranian pilots and officers interviewed can remember hearing about any similar claim either - indeed several of them actually ridiculed the idea. As a result, we can only conclude that a Mi-24 never did shoot down an F-4 Phantom in the Eyn-e Khosh area during October 1982.

Fire in the Hills: Iraq and Iran in Conflict
Tom Cooper and Farzard Bishop
2003
От john1973
К Инженер-109 (30.07.2018 19:27:04)
Дата 30.07.2018 20:50:01

Re: А-10 быстро...

>Пилот А-10 дав по "газам", должен еще 5-7 секунд подождать пока турбинки "запоют" и появится шанс быстро отрулить за горизонт
Да и разгон жеж не мгновенный, это десятки секунд
Вообще стрельба из ГШ-23 по самолету конечно несколько фантастична, а вот Р-60М будет неплохо работать по малоскоростным целям
От Grozny Vlad
К Llandaff (30.07.2018 17:35:21)
Дата 30.07.2018 17:45:04

Re: Стрелять из...

>Вертолетчики точно не имеют устойчивого навыка стрельбы из пушки в воздушном бою. А из дистанции "в упор" А-10 удалится быстро. Так что как мне кажется, шансов крайне мало.
Согласен, шансов мало, но, я уверен, если хвост противника будет маячить перед носом, тут любой попробует...

Грозный Владислав