От ttt2
К Kosta
Дата 03.10.2021 09:28:43
Рубрики WWII; 1917-1939;

Мнение ученого из за границы

The fact that the fighting at Nomonhan coincided with the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was no coincidence. While Stalin was openly negotiating with Britain and France for a purported anti-fascist alliance, and secretly negotiating with Hitler for their eventual alliance, he was being attacked by German’s ally and anti-Comintern partner, Japan. By the summer of 1939, it was clear that Europe was sliding toward war. Hitler was determined to move east, against Poland. Stalin’s nightmare, to be avoided at all costs, was a two-front war against Germany and Japan. His ideal outcome would be for the fascist/militarist capitalists (Germany, Italy, and Japan) to fight the bourgeois/democratic capitalists (Britain, France, and perhaps the United States), leaving the Soviet Union on the sidelines, the arbiter of Europe after the capitalists had exhausted themselves. The Nazi-Soviet Pact was Stalin’s attempt to achieve his optimal outcome. Not only did it pit Germany against Britain and France and leave the Soviet Union out of the fight – it gave Stalin the freedom to deal decisively with an isolated Japan, which he did at Nomonhan. This is not merely a hypothesis. The linkage between Nomonhan and the Nazi-Soviet Pact is clear even in the German diplomatic documents published in Washington and London in 1948. Recently revealed Soviet-era documents add confirming details.
Stuart D. Goldman is a Russian specialist and a scholar in residence at the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research.

This article is based on his book, NOMONHAN, 1939: The Red Army’s Victory That Shaped World War II (U.S. Naval Institute Press).

https://thediplomat.com/2012/08/the-forgotten-soviet-japanese-war-of-1939/

Тот факт, что боевые действия при Номонгане совпали с германо-советским пактом о ненападении, не был случайным. Пока Сталин открыто вел переговоры с Великобританией и Францией о предполагаемом антифашистском союзе и тайно вел переговоры с Гитлером об их возможном союзе, он подвергся нападению со стороны союзника Германии и антикоминтерновского партнера, Японии. К лету 1939 года стало ясно, что Европа катится к войне. Гитлер был полон решимости двинуться на восток, против Польши. Кошмар Сталина, которого нужно было избежать любой ценой, - это война на два фронта против Германии и Японии. Его идеальным исходом было бы, чтобы фашистские / милитаристские капиталисты (Германия, Италия и Япония) боролись с буржуазными / демократическими капиталистами (Великобритания, Франция и, возможно, Соединенные Штаты), оставив Советский Союз в стороне, арбитра Европы. после того, как капиталисты исчерпали себя. Советско-нацистский пакт был попыткой Сталина добиться оптимального результата. Это не только натолкнуло Германию на Англию и Францию ​​и оставило Советский Союз вне борьбы, но и дало Сталину свободу решительно бороться с изолированной Японией, что он и сделал в Номонгане. Это не просто гипотеза. Связь между Номонганом и нацистско-советским пактом очевидна даже в немецких дипломатических документах, опубликованных в Вашингтоне и Лондоне в 1948 году. Недавно обнародованные документы советской эпохи добавляют подтверждающие детали.

Стюарт Д. Гольдман - специалист по России и научный сотрудник Национального совета по исследованиям Евразии и Восточной Европы.

Эта статья основана на его книге NOMONHAN, 1939: The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War (U.S. Naval Institute Press).

С уважением
От Kosta
К ttt2 (03.10.2021 09:28:43)
Дата 03.10.2021 11:16:13

Но где же упомянутые документы?



> Это не просто гипотеза... Недавно обнародованные документы советской эпохи добавляют подтверждающие детали.

Нам, кажется, нужно знать о таких диковинках, учитывая всеобщий интерес к теме ПМР, а мы и не в курсе! Что же это за доументы?
От Skvortsov
К Kosta (03.10.2021 11:16:13)
Дата 03.10.2021 12:07:43

Да вот они:

However, the documentary record shows clearly that the Nomonhan conflict was a factor, and not an unimportant factor, in Soviet calculations in the summer of 1939. In a speech before the Supreme Soviet on May 31, Molotov stressed the resolve of theSoviet Union to defend the borders of the MPR as its own. Without referring specifically to the recent battle, he mildly admonished the Japanese that “it would, therefore, be best for them [Japan] to drop, in good time, the constantly recurring provocative violations of the USSR and the MPR by Japanese-Manchurian military units.”23

The Soviet press played down the Nomonhan fighting to such an extent that the first official references to the incident did not appear until June 26, one and one-half months after the initial clash. Thereafter, the few battle reports were written in a relatively restrained tone and were relegated to the inside and back pages of Soviet newspapers. According to the editor of the First Army Group’s newspaper, Stalin personally forbade detailed reporting about the battle.24

The evidence indicates that Stalin was not merely embarrassed by the Nomonhan incident, but was alarmed as well. Although he knew through Richard Sorge that the Japanese army was not yet prepared for a large-scale war with the USSR, and that the leaders in Tokyo were striving to avoid such an occurrence, he could not be certain that Kwantung Army would act rationally or obey the instructions from Tokyo. Had not Japanese field armies taken the bit in their mouths in 1931 and 1937 and launched military campaigns with far-reaching consequences? After a seemingly interminable period of diplomatic sparring, in which the Germans and Soviets attempted to ascertain one another’s “sincerity,” Molotov finally got around to discussing specific outstanding issues between the two nations. One of the first issues he raised was that of German “encouragement and support” of Japanese aggression against the USSR. When the German ambassador, Schulenburg, attempted to turn this charge aside, Molotov insisted that Berlin must prove its good faith not only with words, but with deeds.25

In describing this interview in more detail to Weizsacker a few days later, Schulenburg summarized Molotov’s sentiments as follows: “Finally—and this seems to me the most important point—M. Molotov demanded that we cease to support Japanese ‘aggression’.”26

On August 12 Astakhov reminded Molotov—as if it were necessary—“By the way, the prospect of drawing Japan into the German-Italian alliance remains a reserve option for Berlin in the event of our agreement with England and France.”27

Molotov learned a few days later that Ribbentrop was anxious to fly immediately to Moscow to lay the foundations for a final settlement of German-Soviet relations, he asked forthwith “how the German Government were disposed toward the idea of concluding a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, and further, whether the German Government
were prepared to influence Japan for the purpose of improving Soviet-Japanese relations and eliminating border conflicts.”28

Upon receipt of this momentous news on August 16, Ribbentrop immediately instructed
Schulenburg to inform Molotov and Stalin that Germany was prepared both to conclude a nonaggression pact and “to exercise influence for an improvement and consolidation of Russian-Japanese relations.”29
Molotov reacted favorably to this statement, which
Schulenburg reported to Berlin. Ribbentrop then ordered Schulenburg immediately to arrange another meeting with Molotov at which he was to explain the extreme urgency of the Polish situation and the need for quick action. Schulenburg was instructed to tell Molotov that “we are in complete agreement with the idea of a nonaggression pact, a guarantee of the Baltic states, and Germany exercising influence on Japan.”30

The Soviet-Japanese conflict at Nomonhan was not the exclusive, nor even the principal, factor that led Stalin to conclude the alliance with Hitler. Standing aside from a war in Europe in which the principal capitalist powers might tear themselves apart could
well have been reason enough. However, the Soviet-Japanese conflict was also on Stalin’s mind and was a factor in his calculations that has received little attention in standard historical accounts of the outbreak of the war. This analysis, focusing on those
East Asian events, is an attempt to clarify the record. This is not a revolutionary reinterpretation of Soviet foreign policy. Rather, it puts an important piece into place that previously has been overlooked or misplaced in the jigsaw puzzle called “the origins of the Second World War.” In so doing, it makes that puzzle less confusing.
От Kosta
К Skvortsov (03.10.2021 12:07:43)
Дата 03.10.2021 12:10:56

Re: Да вот...

>
>The Soviet-Japanese conflict at Nomonhan was not the exclusive, nor even the principal, factor that led Stalin to conclude the alliance with Hitler.

Ну, как я предполагал. По смыслу нечто противоположное тому, что декларируется в статье.
От Evg
К Kosta (03.10.2021 12:10:56)
Дата 03.10.2021 19:25:20

Re: Да вот...

>>
>>The Soviet-Japanese conflict at Nomonhan was not the exclusive, nor even the principal, factor that led Stalin to conclude the alliance with Hitler.
>
>Ну, как я предполагал. По смыслу нечто противоположное тому, что декларируется в статье.

А кто и когда утверждал, что ХГ был exclusive или principal причиной ???
От Kosta
К Evg (03.10.2021 19:25:20)
Дата 04.10.2021 00:03:23

Re: Да вот...

>>>
>>>The Soviet-Japanese conflict at Nomonhan was not the exclusive, nor even the principal, factor that led Stalin to conclude the alliance with Hitler.
>>
>>Ну, как я предполагал. По смыслу нечто противоположное тому, что декларируется в статье.
>
>А кто и когда утверждал, что ХГ был exclusive или principal причиной ???

principal это вообще то общее место в рассуждениях о ПМР. Примерно 4\5 участников ветки не дадут соврать))
От ttt2
К Kosta (03.10.2021 11:16:13)
Дата 03.10.2021 11:36:49

В книге естественно (-)
От Kosta
К ttt2 (03.10.2021 11:36:49)
Дата 03.10.2021 11:51:26

Процитируйте хоть один (-)
От ttt2
К Kosta (03.10.2021 11:51:26)
Дата 03.10.2021 13:31:41

Покупайте книгу, а не тролльте (-)
От Kosta
К ttt2 (03.10.2021 13:31:41)
Дата 03.10.2021 14:02:25

Здрасьте

Я, значит, должен потратить деньги, поверив вашему честному слову, что найду там необходимые документы? В то время как то, что цитирует коллега Skvortsov, не дает никаких оснований для такого предположения.

Это похоже на банальный развод.))
От Skvortsov
К ttt2 (03.10.2021 09:28:43)
Дата 03.10.2021 10:00:32

А в самой книге он даже цитирует документ:


>Эта статья основана на его книге NOMONHAN, 1939: The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War (U.S. Naval Institute Press).

В книге цитируется отрывок из меморандума Рибентроппа:

During the fateful night of August 23–24, while the nonaggression pact was being drafted and the Japanese Sixth Army was being smashed, Stalin, Molotov, and Ribbentrop discussed a wide variety of issues affecting German-Soviet relations. An official on Ribbentrop’s staff preserved the substance of this conversation in a detailed memorandum. Seven broad topics were discussed. The first was the question of Soviet-Japanese relations. Ribbentrop repeated his readiness to use his influence to affect favorably the strained relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. At that moment the events in Moscow and on the battlefield both pointed toward a satisfactory resolution of the Nomonhan incident — from the Soviet point of view — and this is reflected in Stalin’s reply.

"M. Stalin replied that the Soviet Union indeed desired an improvement in its relations with Japan, but that there were limits to its patience with regard to Japanese provocations. If Japan desired war she could have it. The Soviet Union was not afraid of it and was prepared for it. If Japan desired peace — so much the better! M. Stalin considered the assistance of Germany in bringing about an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as useful, but he did not want the Japanese to get the impression that the initiative in this direction had been taken by the Soviet Union."