>>Одна установка не защитит от пакета, батарея не защитит от батарейного залпа (4 ПУ).
>
>уже ответил там - М.Климов: Петреус, «Хаймарс» и ядерная война
> https://youtu.be/g5bqW_0CGkg
Что было, то и будет; и что делалось, то и будет делаться, и нет ничего нового под солнцем.
At the start of the war, enemy antisubmarine materiel was comparable with our own; their listening and echo ranging gear were practically duplications of that installed in our own antisubmarine vessels. The Japanese in certain fields have been notoriously poor inventors but great copyists, and with their espionage services cut off during the war, they rapidly fell behind in the development of antisubmarine measures. And although their original equipment was good, their technique of employing it was faulty. They seemed to have little trouble in locating a submarine with their listening gear following a torpedo attack, but having located her, they failed miserably in the solution of the mathematical problem of where to drop their depth charges. Their attacks were characterized by a consistent lack of persistence. They were prone to accept the most nebulous evidence as positive proof of a sinking, and being sure of a kill, they were off about their business, letting the submarine surface and thank God for the Japanese superiority complex. While only 48 submarines were lost in combat operations--and of these not more than 41 directly due to enemy action--the Japanese, at the end of hostilities, furnished us with information which showed a total of 468 positive sinkings of our submarines. The U.S. Navy, by a wise policy of total censorship of submarine operations, encouraged the enemy in their belief in their antisubmarine successes.