От Nagel
К All
Дата 15.03.2023 12:27:47
Рубрики Флот; Армия; Локальные конфликты;

The Russian Military Has a Tendency to Reinforce Failure


During the first phase of the war, it was apparent that the course of events described in the
orders issued to units diverged significantly from developments on the ground. Nevertheless,
units continued to seek to execute their orders long after it had become apparent that
assumptions in those orders were wrong. This behaviour has continued throughout the war.
The continuous attempts to assault Bakhmut, for example, long after it ceased to be on Russia’s
main effort, demonstrate that until an order is countermanded commanders will continue to try
to execute their last instruction. In the early phases, during offensive operations, this was best
demonstrated around Mykolaiv and Chernihiv. In both cases, Russian units had been ordered
to bypass resistance to reach their objectives. The orders made clear that resistance was
expected to be light. When this assumption was demonstrated to be false, however, Russian
commanders continued to seek to bypass strongpoints, even when it degraded their tactical
position, exposed their flanks and diluted their combat power by spreading concentrated forces
over a long frontage in contact with Ukrainian troops.

Страница 47.

This approach has probably had the greatest impact in creating a gap between potential and
actual capability as regards Russian fires. All reported contacts are treated as true. All fire
missions appear to be given equal priority and are prosecuted in the order in which they are
received unless an order to prioritise a specific mission comes from higher authority. It seems
that those directing fire missions either do not have access to contextual information or are
indifferent to it. In any case, observations of Russian pre-planned fires shows that they will
strike targets that have moved and subsequently engage the same target in its new position,
suggesting a purely chronological prioritisation of activity. Страница 48

Royal United Services Institute
for Defence and Security StudiesPreliminary Lessons in Conventional
Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion
of Ukraine: February–July 2022
От Pout
К Nagel (15.03.2023 12:27:47)
Дата 16.03.2023 16:41:35

Re: на всякий случай

вообще-то по правилам нужно размещать на ресурсе не иноязычный текст только, но краткую аннотацию на русском. Это раз

Но сейчас не об этом
начало цитат
Информирую о претензии, полученной от РосКомНадзор, касательно дезинформации о проведении СВО. Должен отметить, что есть и другие авторы, увлекающиеся переводикой западной прессы с публикацией перевода без обработки или с минимальной обработкой, кто может подпасть под данный закон, поэтому прошу прочесть внимательно и сделать выводы.
конец цитат
отсюда - https://aftershock.news/?q=node/1223061


повторно размещают
http://www.vif2ne.org/nvk/forum/0/archive/3016/3016968.htm
>Royal United Services Institute
>for Defence and Security Studies Preliminary Lessons in Conventional
>Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion
>of Ukraine: February–July 2022
От Nikolaus
К Nagel (15.03.2023 12:27:47)
Дата 15.03.2023 15:51:56

Re: The Russian...

Culturally vulnerable to deception
Надо запомнить
От Nagel
К Nagel (15.03.2023 12:27:47)
Дата 15.03.2023 12:30:24

Re: The Russian...


>Royal United Services Institute
>for Defence and Security StudiesPreliminary Lessons in Conventional
>Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion
>of Ukraine: February–July 2022
Deception has succeeded against Russian forces at all echelons and across all three service
branches. At the tactical level, the UAF have systematically employed false signals traffic and
decoys of prestige systems to misdirect Russian fires. This has almost always succeeded, leading
to a vast expenditure of munitions against non-existent targets and a corresponding vulnerability
for Russian fires in revealing their positions. Tracking how the Russians were conducting battle
damage assessment and thereby assuring the Russian military that all strikes were successful
repeatedly led to the loss of Russian aircraft and other capabilities because they proceeded
on the assumption that the threat had been eliminated. At the operational level, too, Russian
forces have been predictable in allocating resources against telegraphed movements and failing
to detect or prepare for concealed movements.
От KGBMan
К Nagel (15.03.2023 12:30:24)
Дата 15.03.2023 15:15:08

Re: The Russian...

все равно ни кто это не будет читать и пытаться что то изменить.

разведка и связь. как говорят враги "situational awareness"
От Nagel
К KGBMan (15.03.2023 15:15:08)
Дата 15.03.2023 17:52:13

Re: The Russian...

>все равно ни кто это не будет читать и пытаться что то изменить.

>разведка и связь. как говорят враги "situational awareness"
Ну даже не разведка и связь, а навыки командной работы что-ли...