От apple16
К All
Дата 14.05.2004 14:03:23
Рубрики Флот; Локальные конфликты;

Нашел статейку про флот Египта в 1973 году

Это точно наш 30-бис "Солидный"?
Флаг у него какой-то странный.

ЭМ проекта 30бис 'Солидный' в составе ВМФ Егита (AL Zaffer)



The Egyptian Navy in the 1973 October War
Ashraf M Refaat. Naval Forces. Aldershot: 1998. Vol. 19, Iss. 5; pg. 76, 5 pgs

This year Egypt is celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the October War. The War in which the Egyptian Armed Forces achieved a spectacular victory, a victory which brought back an overwhelming feeling of national pride that overflowed the borders of Egypt into all the countries of the Arab World. Over the years much has been written about the October War, and most readers are probably familiar with the striking aspects of that War. The assault of the Suez Canal against major odds presented by crossing the waterway against enemy resistance, surmounting the steep sand-bank erected by Israel all along the Canal, and the storming of the Barlev Line by Egyptian infantry who fought bravely and were able within a few hours to raise the Egyptian Flag valiantly over almost all the defensive positions of the Barlev Line. The massive and sudden air blow delivered by over two hundred Egyptian warplanes at the start of operations by the Egyptian Air Force, was in complete contrast to what happened in 1967. In the following article the role of the Egyptian Navy in the 1973 October War will be presented briefly by the author who was Chief of Naval Operations at that time.


THE OCTOBER WAR

The October War was by no means the first round of hostilities between Egypt and Israel, but it was indeed the first time the Egyptians took the offensive. This time there was proper coordination between the political leadership and the military command, a situation hardly followed in the past. The objective was to assault the Suez Canal, destroy the Barlev Line and establish firm beach-heads on the eastern bank in Sinai. Thus a substantial change in the military situation in favour of Egypt would be brought about, making a negotiated resolution of the conflict possible. This time the Egyptian Armed Forces were able to secure the advantage of surprise and it was the first time the Israelis had to face combat on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts at the same time. Furthermore quite a marked improvement was achieved in relations with other Arab States.

THE NAVY PREPARES FOR WAR

Since the defeat in June 1967, the Egyptian Armed Forces were striving hard to increase their fighting capabilities. The Egyptian Navy was in a better shape than the rest of the Armed Forces, having not been subjected to defeat in 1967 - in fact the standard of combat training, military discipline and will to fight were quite high. The effectiveness of the Egyptian Navy was demonstrated world-wide very soon after the June War when on 21 October, 1967, Egyptian missile boats successfully launched a surface-to-surface missile attack against the Israeli destroyer EILAT which was hit by two missiles and sank north/east of Port-Said.

WAR OF ATTRITION

The war of attrition which broke out towards the end of 1969 provided the opportunity to try out new tactical procedures and to assess enemy reactions. At the same time no effort was spared to increase the efficiency and combat readiness of the Navy, and gain combat experience. Outstanding combat actions were the repeated Egyptian frogmen attacks on the Port of Eilat in the Gulf of Akaba and the Egyptian destroyer bombardment of Israeli logistic areas in Romanah east of Port Said. On the strategic level talks with various Arab nations insured the availability of alternative stationing points that would enable the Egyptian Navy to operate at long distances from the home bases.

PLANNING FOR THE OCTOBER OFFENSIVE

Serious planning for the October operations started in January 1972. The Naval Plan for the war, code named "Granite" was adjusted and altered a number of times to insure that all combat missions assigned were within the combat capability of the forces. Special attention was given to deception which was recognised as a very important factor to insure the success of operations, bearing in mind that the Israeli forces required from 48 to 72 hours only, to achieve full readiness. Hence the choice of Saturday, 6 October - the "Yom Kippur" feast - to launch the offensive. A fairly accurate and unbiased estimate of enemy combat capabilities and distribution was the basis on which the plan of action was made.

THE EGYPTIAN NAVY FACES UP TO THE CHALLENGE

When planning for the October War started, the Department of Naval Operations was quite aware of the difficulties facing the Navy in the upcoming war, and tremendous efforts were made to overcome all the factors that would hinder the execution of successful naval operations in the war. The naval superiority available to Egypt ever since the arms deal with the Soviet Union in 1956 had been slowly eroded. The surface-to-surface guided missiles, the "Styx" Russian-made missile used in the attack on the Israeli destroyer EILAT were no longer that effective. Details of their characteristics had become known to Israel and their weakness against small targets exposed. Thus the Navy found itself in a very awkward position regarding the main naval weapon, the surface-to-surface guided missile, which could not be used effectively against the newly acquired Israeli missile boats of the SAAR and RASHEF Classes, while at the same time Israel had stopped using its bigger units such as destroyers in combat. The next problem facing Naval Operations was the fact that although modem naval combat has to be coordinated with air support, the situation at the time dictated that most of the available air-effort should be directed to support the army assault across the Suez Canal.

Another problem was fire support for the army, a mission which is normally carried out by destroyers which cannot operate safely without sufficient air cover. Working out suitable alternatives and solutions for these problems became the main task for Naval Operations.

NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS


Besides solving these problems, new and effective surprise planning had to be resorted to in order to catch Israel unawares, and thus be able to achieve victory under these difficult conditions. A new concept was developed to expand the area of combat into the strategic depths of the Arab World, southwards in the Red Sea towards Bab-EI-Mandab, and westwards in the Mediterranean towards Libya - a situation which would put Israeli airplanes out of reach of the area of combat. Secondly much dependence was placed on the wide employment of submarines and special forces using light craft. A new and previously unused weapon of naval warfare should be exploited to the advantage of the Egyptian Navy, namely minewarfare, for which Israel was completely unprepared, due to the lack of minesweepers in the composition of the Israeli Navy. This weapon was used extensively in the Gulf of Suez area and also in the Mediterranean, causing insurmountable problems for Israel. The dependence of Israel on the supply of oil from outside sources, created a unique chance for the Egyptian Navy to achieve a strategic victory by conducting activities against Israeli maritime transport, which will be detailed in the following paragraphs.

As for the fire support missions for the benefit of the Army, several torpedo boats were converted in the naval dockyard to operate as new rocket launching fast attack craft which were very effective during combat, being able to approach undetected and deliver rapid and devastating fire strikes from the sea. The appearance of these units developed and equipped inside the Navy were a total surprise for Israel.

Early in the planning stage the weakness of the Israeli Navy in the Red Sea was recognised. In that area there were no Israeli missile boats, there were no minesweepers and no anti-submarine ships. At the same time the configuration of the Gulf of Suez and Red Sea provided an ideal stage to mount combat actions directed at disruption of enemy lines of communication. The dependence of Israel on oil from the Persian Gulf passing through the straits of Bab-El-Mandab and oil from the Gulf of Suez passing through the straits of Jubal at the entrance to the Gulf of Suez made it clear that intensive pressure could be brought to bear on Israel if these sources were turned off, even though Israel would still be in control of Sharm-el-Sheikh.

OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT

The October War being an offensive operation meant that sufficient time would be available for the Navy to deploy its forces even though some of the operational areas lay at very long distances from the home bases. In order to insure secrecy of operational intentions it was decided that deployment would be reduced to a minimum with the distribution of forces being achieved beforehand. Consequently, deployment of forces took place smoothly and quietly making full use of deceptive measures. As for formations and units taking part in combat against maritime lines of transport, the concept was to have these forces placed as close as possible to their combat area making use of stationing facilities in Arab countries such a Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. Egyptian Naval units allotted for the Bab-EI-Mandab operation left port under the cover of a routine trip for repairs and docking in the port of Karachi. The mediocre technical condition of units in the Red Sea was intentionally exaggerated to portray them as almost inoperative for deception purposes. During contacts with foreign naval attaches the question of refits and modernisation for these units was raised - procedures which would normally require at least a couple of years.


It was assumed that on the outbreak of hostilities the Israeli Navy would anticipate a destroyer attack against Israeli naval bases in the Mediterranean, a custom which had been followed by the Egyptian Navy in all the previous rounds. With the Israeli Navy enjoying a marked advantage in missile boats and the availability of air support, such an attack would simply be annihilated.

Following the same line of reasoning the Israeli Navy would encourage various missile boat engagements in which they would have the upper hand. In order to support the Army the Israeli Navy would probably attempt a diversionary landing operation either west of Port-Said or in the Gulf of Suez in order to distract Egyptian Forces towards secondary directions.

In general and especially in the Red Sea the Israeli Navy would depend greatly on direct and effective air support. A possible Egyptian attempt to blockade the straits of Tiran using surface units could be easily handled by the Israeli Air Force. A deployment of Egyptian submarines and destroyers further south would not be considered possible due to their technical condition.

CONCEPT FOR COMBAT EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES


The general plan was to employ the full force of the Navy on three levels as follows:

a) In the tactical zone: to concentrate operations in support of the Army offensive.

b) On an operational level: to insure naval security in the operational Zone of Naval Bases.

c) On a strategic level, to concentrate efforts against maritime communication.

NAVAL ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY OFFENSIVE

This consisted of participating in fire preparation for the assault of the Suez Canal mainly using naval coastal artillery in the direction east of Port-Fouad in the Mediterranean and in the direction of Eyoun Moussa (Hyun Musa) in the Gulf of Suez. A number of rocket assaults from the sea were also carried out against coastal targets at the request of Army Command. Many of these raids were concentrated during critical stages mainly to divert Israeli attention and to draw Israeli efforts, especially aviation away from the main direction of the Army assault. Furthermore naval assistance was provided for small tactical raiding operations by Commando Forces from the Second Field Army behind enemy defensive positions east of Port-Said and across the Gulf of Suez by special Forces from the Red Sea Military Command. The Navy also carried out a number of commando and frogmen attacks across the Gulf of Suez. To prevent the Israeli Navy from carrying out small tactical landings on the western side of the Gulf of Suez it was decided to depend mainly on mines to block the entrance to the Gulf of Suez besides air and guided missile attacks on landing ships stationed in Sharm-el-Sheikh.

SECURING THE OPERATIONAL ZONE

Naval activities in this respect consisted of carrying out defensive procedures against submarines, against mines and against frogmen using the organic forces of the Naval Bases. Penetrations by Israeli missile boats were repelled by coastal artillery, coastal missile defence batteries and in some cases by missile boats.

DISRUPTION OF ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATION

This mission was given major attention due to the strategic importance of maritime transport for Israel. The Egyptian Navy surprised Israel with new combat procedures, the usual destroyer strikes at coastal targets were no longer the theme of action; now operations were carried out more than a thousand miles away from Israeli bases. For once the Israelis found themselves outwitted and unable to retaliate, thus this mission achieved spectacular results. First and foremost was to prove to Israel that the occupation of Sharm-el-Sheikh would not necessarily guarantee the safety of supplies to the port of Eilat. Badly needed oil (Israel was depending almost totally on the oil wells captured in 1967) was no longer reaching Eilat. Attempts to force a passage through the strait of Jubal only resulted in further losses due to mines. In Bab-el-Mandab the right to stop and search ships carrying strategic supplies to Israel and declaring areas unsafe for maritime navigation due to the outbreak of hostilities was exploited successfully to stop the flow of oil from Iran. Control of traffic was maintained well into January 1974 and the effect on negotiations after the cease-fire was most prominent. Lifting the "blockade" off Bab-el-Mandab was one of the first Israeli requests which proved a very useful "card" in the hands of Egyptian negotiators.

ISRAELI NAVAL ACTIONS IN THE OCTOBER WAR

The Israeli Navy seems to have placed too much dependence on its superiority in missileboats. In this type of combat, the Israeli Navy scored some success especially when supported by helicopters, but this did not secure any operational or strategic objectives. Israeli Special Forces managed to penetrate the defences of some forward bases and inflicted minor losses, but at the cost of the lives of some of their number. The strategic deployment of the Israeli Navy left the Red Sea direction very poorly equipped to handle the new type of warfare conducted by the Egyptian Navy. An amphibious assault on the western side of the Gulf of Suez which could have assisted Israeli ground forces on the Suez front, could not be attempted with the entrance of the Gulf mined. Egyptian action against maritime traffic could not be counteracted, thus the Israeli Navy failed to ensure the normal operation of the port of Eilat.

CONCLUSION

Although the Egyptian Navy had to conduct the war with very limited air support, and using outdated missile-boats and ineffective missiles, the Egyptian Navy managed to accomplish almost all its assigned missions, and to achieve a very valuable strategic objective. This can be attributed to a large extent to sound operational planning and the launching of new operational ideas that were completely outside Israeli expectations.

От Exeter
К apple16 (14.05.2004 14:03:23)
Дата 14.05.2004 18:43:29

Да, это забавная вещь

Это практически полное повторение статейки того же адмирала Рефаата в "Просидингсе" 1995 года, уважаемый apple16. Клевое умение сказать много, не сказав толком ничего - ибо и говорить-то нечего по причине полного просирания войны на море :-))
Ну, подумаешь, израильтяне вытворяли на море что хотели - зато "this did not secure any operational or strategic objectives" :-))

А с чего Вы взяли, что это именно "Солидный"? Подпись явно неправильная, ибо Al Zaffer - это бывший "Сметливый", и был он пр.30БА, а на фото же - "чистый" пр.30бис. "Солидный" был Al Nasser (первый с этим названием) и его вернули СССР в 1968 г. По номеру же бортовому ничего точно установить нельзя, ибо тогда египтяне номера регулярно меняли на советский манер.

С уважением, Exeter
От apple16
К Exeter (14.05.2004 18:43:29)
Дата 15.05.2004 14:45:29

Спасибо - я похоже ошибся

У меня сведения совсем отрывочные - МК разновсякие
- в принципе нет уверенности что это вообще 1973 год.
Наверное фото известное - надо каких-нибудь египтян поспрашивать
да и в Израиле кто-то должен в арабах разбираться.


Что есть:

Переданные в 1956 году,
вернувшихся к 1968 году:

"Солидный" - Al Nasser
"Способный" - Damietta
("Беспощадный" по Бережному - пошел Польше или что напутали?)

Переданные в 1962 году:

"Бурный" - Suez
"Сметливый" - Аl Zаffer
Это по Бережному - но что тогда пошел Польше?

Переданные в 1968 году:

"Отчаянный" - Al Nasser - 6 Oktober
"Бессменный" - Damietta

Итого - если доверять подписи (Al Zaffer) и дате 1973

кандидат один - "Сметливый" или кто-то другой но переданный тогда-же
От Exeter
К apple16 (15.05.2004 14:45:29)
Дата 15.05.2004 19:59:11

Не так

Здравствуйте!

В 1956 г Египту передали:
"Солидный" - Al Nasser - возвращен в 1968 г
"Сметливый" - Al Zaffer
Передавались они через Польшу и совершали переход из Гдыни в Александрию под польским флагом.

В 1962 г Египту передали:
"Беспощадный" - Damietta - возвращен в 1968 г
"Бурный" - Suez

В 1968 г Египту передали:
"Отчаянный" - Al Nasser (II)
"Бессменный" - Damietta (II)
Оба перед передачей модернизировали по пр.30БА.

Польше же в 1957-1958 гг передали "Способный" (Grom) и "Скорый" (Wicher).


С уважением, Exeter
От apple16
К Exeter (15.05.2004 19:59:11)
Дата 17.05.2004 10:20:03

Спасибо (-)
От Роман Алымов
К apple16 (14.05.2004 14:03:23)
Дата 14.05.2004 14:20:16

Номер на борту хорош :-) (-)
От apple16
К Роман Алымов (14.05.2004 14:20:16)
Дата 14.05.2004 14:27:40

Тогда этим не заморачивались тем более арабы :) (-)