От Игорь Островский
К Дервиш
Дата 15.05.2005 18:23:53
Рубрики Современность; Политек;

А такое впечатление, что автор - Кургинян. Или Кара-Мурза. (-)
От Денис Лобко
К Игорь Островский (15.05.2005 18:23:53)
Дата 16.05.2005 10:01:06

На С.Г.Кара-Мурзу по стилю совсем не похоже. Даже близко. (-)
От Игорь Островский
К Денис Лобко (16.05.2005 10:01:06)
Дата 16.05.2005 18:05:20

Зато по содержанию (-)
От Георгий
К Игорь Островский (16.05.2005 18:05:20)
Дата 16.05.2005 18:18:33

"Какие ваши доказательства"? %-) (-)
От Игорь Островский
К Георгий (16.05.2005 18:18:33)
Дата 16.05.2005 21:12:28

Содержание (-)
От Георгий
К Игорь Островский (16.05.2005 21:12:28)
Дата 17.05.2005 11:11:48

Примеры, плиз (-)
От Robert
К Игорь Островский (15.05.2005 18:23:53)
Дата 16.05.2005 02:12:44

Текст существует на английском

При очень беглом его просмотре сильныx неточностей в переводе не заметил:

THE GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Debating Russia's Fate
May 09, 2005 23 13 GMT


It has been 60 years since the defeat of Nazi Germany. The leaders of the
nations that participated in that victory, along with those that didn't,
have gathered in Moscow to commemorate the anniversary. The gathering has
a meaning that transcends the historical.

The question on the table is the future of Russia's relationship with the
West. The issue is simple: From Moscow's point of view, it is whether the
Russians squandered, over the past 15 years, the victory that was won at
the cost of more than 20 million killed. From its erstwhile allies' point
of view, it is whether to take Russia seriously, not only as a global
power, but even as a regional power. How these questions are answered will
determine the shape of Eurasia for a generation.

From the Soviet point of view, World War II was simultaneously a
catastrophe and a triumph. The catastrophe consisted of Josef Stalin's
massive diplomatic and military miscalculations, which led to the
occupation of vast parts of the Soviet Union by the Germans. The triumph
was the fact that the Soviet Union not only won the war (along with its
allies), it also emerged from the war as the dominant Eurasian power --
its borders effectively pushing into central Germany -- as well as a
global power. It became the only challenger to the other great victor in
World War II, the United States. Now the fruits of the victories of 1945
are gone.

Moscow's sphere of influence no longer extends to central Germany. In
fact, it doesn't extend even through the former Soviet Union. The Baltics,
Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia are all slipping from its hands. It
is not even certain that the Kremlin can hold all of the Russian
Federation. From Moscow's point of view, the current generation has
squandered the victory and betrayed the sacrifices of its greatest generation.

The leadership of the Soviet and Russian recessional did not undertake
this course out of indifference or confusion. Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris
Yeltsin and Russian President Vladimir Putin all pursued a calculated
policy, dictated in their minds by irresistible reality. Following the
analysis of Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB in the 1960s and 1970s,
they recognized that the Soviet Union was -- imperceptibly to many in the
West -- slipping into economic and social catastrophe, caused by two
things. First, the Soviet economy was inherently inefficient; geography
and ideology combined to create a fundamentally flawed system. Second, the
decision by the United States in the 1980s to directly attack this
weakness by accelerating the arms race created a crisis of unsustainable
proportions.

The Soviet Union was poor, but geopolitically and strategically powerful.
In order to retain that strategic power, it had to devote an enormous
amount of economic energy to sustaining its military forces and the
economic sectors that underpinned them. The cost of strategic parity with
the United States rose and threatened the rest of the economy with
collapse. Very quickly, the Soviet Union would be both poorer and weaker.

Moscow made a fundamental strategic decision to preserve the Soviet Union
by rebalancing the relationship between geopolitics and economics.
Gorbachev attempted to implement this policy by effectively ending the
Cold War in return for technology transfers and investments from the West.
He lost control of the situation for two reasons. First, regardless of the
level of Western investment and aid, the economic sclerosis of the Soviet
Union was so extensive that Moscow could not effectively utilize the
Western funds in any politically meaningful timeframe. Second, the United
States was not going to allow the Soviets to recover from their weakness.

Washington pressed home its advantage. First, it made alliances, covert
and overt, in Eastern Europe that essentially pried the region out of the
weakening Soviet grip. Second, the loss of its Eastern European empire
created a dynamic that led to Gorbachev's fall and the rise of Yeltsin --
and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. Retreat fed on itself, until
Moscow lost not only what it won in World War II, but also much more.

Yeltsin essentially extended Gorbachev's policies and deepened them. He
assumed that the economic benefits that Andropov had been searching for
would materialize more quickly if Russia were not also responsible for
economic conditions in Soviet republics that lagged generations behind
Russia itself. In effect, Yeltsin continued to trade geopolitics for
economic relations with the West -- having abandoned the drag imposed by,
for example, Central Asia.

Russians hoped for a massive improvement in their lives. While there was
substantial economic activity, wealth was not dispersed. The lives of
Russians outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as the elderly and
others who were not among the Westernized elites, went from difficult to
extraordinarily harsh. The reasons are complex, but they boil down to
this: Capitalism is extremely rewarding, but it demands huge social
sacrifices up front -- and Russia, having already paid the price of
communism, had nothing more to offer. By this, we don't simply mean money;
we mean the social dynamism that capitalism requires. Russia was exhausted
by communism. Its social, political and legal structure could not change
to accommodate the requirements of capitalism. Theft replaced production
as a means of becoming wealthy.

Yeltsin could not have done anything about this had he wanted to. It was
hardwired into the system. As a result, there was no economic payoff in
return for Russia's geopolitical decline. Before the collapse of
communism, Russia had been poor but enormously powerful. Afterward, Russia
was even poorer and pathetically weak. Moscow had to struggle to hold on
to Russia itself.

Geopolitics is not a sentimental game, and the United States is not a
sentimental country. It did precisely what the Russians had done in the
past and would have done had the situation been reversed: It pressed its
advantage. Using a variety of mechanisms, such as NATO expansion, the
United States first spread its influence into Eastern Europe, then into
the former Soviet Union itself, in the Baltics. Washington has increased
its influence in the Caucasus via its relationship with Georgia and
others.The Americans moved into Central Asia -- first, through the
development of energy resources there; then, as a side effect of Sept. 11,
through the deployment of U.S. troops and intelligence services throughout
the region.

Russian weakness had created a vacuum. The United States inexorably moved
into it. Putin came to power in the wake of the Kosovo conflict, in which
the United States had treated Russian interests with indifference and even
contempt. He did not wish to reverse the Andropov doctrine, but intended
only to refine it. He expected there never to be a repeat of Kosovo, in
which the United States attacked Serbia -- a nation regarded by the
Russians as friendly -- without ever taking Russian interests into
account. Putin also intended to reverse the consequences of the economic
chaos of the 1990s. But he did not intend to create any fundamental change.

In other words, Putin wanted to have his cake and eat it too. He did not
want to change the foundation of U.S.-Russian relations; he simply wanted
to rebalance it. The two goals contradicted each other. The relationship
could not be rebalanced: It was built around the reality that Russian
leaders had been dealing with for a generation with declining success.
Russia didn't have the weight to rebalance the relationship. Economically,
it remained crippled. Militarily, it was impotent. The geopolitical
consequence --
decline -- could not be stopped. For the past six years, Putin has been
searching for the Holy Grail: a no-cost, no-risk solution to Russia's problems.

The United States has followed a consistent policy from Ronald Reagan,
through the administrations of George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and now
George W. Bush as well. It has sought to prevent, under any circumstances,
the re-emergence of Russia as a regional hegemon and potential global
challenger. This has been a truly bipartisan policy. Clinton and George W.
Bush have sought to systematically increase American influence in what the
Russians call their "near abroad" while at the same time allowing the
natural process of economic dysfunction to continue. More precisely, they
have allowed Russia's weaknesses to create vacuums into which American
power could move.

The breakpoint came in Ukraine. Washington took advantage of pro-Western
forces there to create a situation in which it, rather than Moscow, was
the most influential foreign force in Kiev -- including raising pointed
discussions about whether to include Ukraine in NATO. Ukraine lies on
Russia's southern frontier; if it becomes a NATO country, Russia becomes
indefensible. This, coupled with growing U.S. power in Central Asia,
threatens Russia's position in the Caucasus. The situation quickly becomes
hopeless for Moscow.

This explains why Putin recently referred to the collapse of the Soviet
Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe in the 21st century.
Western leaders expressed shock at the statement, but Putin was simply
expressing the obvious. President Bush's travel itinerary surrounding
Russia's V-E Day celebrations -- making his first stop in the Baltics and
leaving by way of Georgia -- is intended to drive the point home.
Discussion of internal Russian affairs -- the status of democracy there --
similarly drives home the inequality of the relationship. So, too, does
the attempt to equate the Soviet occupation of the Baltics with the Nazi
occupation, with Bush administration leaders saying that the fall of Adolf
Hitler did not end oppression. All of this is designed rhetorically to put
Russia on the defensive, just as it has been put on the defensive
geopolitically.

The Russian decline and the U.S. exploitation of the situation have taken
us to the breakpoint. If Ukraine is lost to Moscow, if Georgia becomes the
dominant power in the Caucasus, if events in Kyrgyzstan are extended to
the rest of Central Asia -- all of which are very easy to imagine -- it
will be difficult to imagine the survival of the Russian Federation. We
will see a second devolution in which parts of the Federation peel off.
Russia, as we know it today, will be finished.

It is not clear that the Russians have the will to recover. Putin seems to
be struggling with internal and external demons, and his heir is not
apparent. However, if Russia is going to make an attempt to recover, now
is the time when it will have to happen. Another year and there might not
be any chance. It might already be too late, but the Russians have little
to lose. It is really a case of now or never.

Russia will never have a vibrant economy. In the long run, centralized
command economies don't work. But neither does capitalism in Russia. A
centralized economy can do remarkable things in the short run, however.
Russia is particularly noted for short-term, unbalanced spurts --
sometimes with the government using terror as a tool, sometimes not.

It must always be remembered how quickly military power can be recovered.
Germany went from a collapsed military in 1932 to Great Power status in
five or six years. Economic authoritarianism, coupled with a pre-existing
skilled officer class, transformed Germany's strategic position. It is not
wise, therefore, to assume that Russia cannot recover significant military
force if it has the will to do so. It might not become a superpower, but
Great Power status -- even with an impoverished population -- is not
beyond its capabilities. We have seen Russia achieve this in the past.

It therefore makes sense that the United States has been consolidating and
extending its position in the former Soviet Union during the past few
months. Russia can recover, but only if given time. The United States,
having no desire to see Russia recover, doesn't intend to give it time.
Washington intends to present Moscow with a reality that is so unfavorable
that it cannot be reversed. Russia is close to that situation right now,
but in our opinion, not yet there. A window is open that will close shortly.

The question is simple: Will the Russians grab what might be a last
chance, or are they just too tired to care?

(c) 2005 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.
От А.Никольский
К Игорь Островский (15.05.2005 18:23:53)
Дата 15.05.2005 19:16:16

не исключено, что частично с Кургиняна переписали

этот деятель (босс Стратфора) приезжал, кажется, в 2002 г и давал интервью Известиям, надо поискать.
Но его контора действительно работает на подрядах правительственных органов и нефтекомпаний США (а они в Ираке смешались). Как-то коллега звонил еще в оккупационную администрацию Бремера, там посоветовали в энтот Стратфор обратится, получается, что-то вроде пресс-службы на аутсорсинге.
С уважением, А.Никольский
От Паршев
К А.Никольский (15.05.2005 19:16:16)
Дата 16.05.2005 01:00:54

А Вы читали Кургиняна?

Так вот: совсем непохоже.
На Кара-Мурзу кстати тоже.
От А.Никольский
К Паршев (16.05.2005 01:00:54)
Дата 16.05.2005 12:22:46

Re: А Вы...


>Так вот: совсем непохоже.
++++++
читал, алармизм насчет окружения нас США, и что нам осталось до развала месяцы - прямо как у К.

С уважением, А.Никольский
От Паршев
К А.Никольский (16.05.2005 12:22:46)
Дата 16.05.2005 17:33:55

Не, ну я про стиль, "стиль - это человек"


а про месяцы - ну это вовсе не указание на одного-единственного уникального аналитика.